



8-1950

The Hawaiian Movement for Statehood

Ruth E. McPherson
University of Tennessee - Knoxville

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes



Part of the [History Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

McPherson, Ruth E., "The Hawaiian Movement for Statehood. " Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee, 1950.

https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/2990

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Ruth E. McPherson entitled "The Hawaiian Movement for Statehood." I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in History.

Ruth Stephens, Major Professor

We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:

S. J. Folmsbee, LeRoy P. Graf

Accepted for the Council:

Carolyn R. Hodges


Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)



August 14, 1950

To the Committee on Graduate Study:


I am submitting to you a thesis written by Ruth E. McPherson entitled "The Hawaiian Movement for Statehood." I recommend that it be accepted for nine quarter hours credit in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in History.


Major Professor

We have read this thesis
and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Committee


Dean of the Graduate School

THE HAWAIIAN MOVEMENT FOR STATEHOOD

A THESIS

Submitted to
The Committee on Graduate Study
of
The University of Tennessee
in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts

by

Ruth E. McPherson

August, 1950

PREFACE

The Hawaiian movement for statehood is part of the bloodstream of Hawaiian history. Of necessity, therefore, this thesis is an account of those economic, political and cultural forces which bear upon Hawaii's qualifications for full-fledged membership in the American union of states. This study, it is hoped, will furnish sufficient proof that no factor in Hawaiian development has long been able to defy the magnetism which has pulled these mid-Pacific islands closer and closer to the very wellsprings of American life and government. Offered also is the proposition that this magnetism is still at work—that it almost certainly will make statehood for Hawaii a reality. The time element, alone, remains debatable. Due to her isolated, strategic location, her vulnerable economy, and her dependence upon shipping, Hawaii's plea for statehood, justly or unjustly, will be weighed at any specific moment with one eye on the state of world affairs. She will be granted statehood only when the American Congress is convinced that she is ready to meet any threat, internal or external, to her existence as an equal political unit in the American commonwealth. One further idea is submitted: that the nations adhering to totalitarian ideologies have yet to offer an example of conquest so devoid of force or so indicative of political, cultural and economic vitality as the American conquest of the Hawaiian Islands. While the Hawaiian-propelled movement for statehood is the culminating proof of the success of this conquest, this thesis can do little more than suggest the full story. It is hoped that the future will bring fewer works on Hawaii's scenic and cultural

attractions and more, serious studies of one of the remarkable achievements of American civilization.

This thesis is based upon the regrettably few secondary works of value on Hawaiian history, United States government documents, and magazine and newspaper articles. Of particular value have been the materials furnished by the present Hawaiian delegate to Congress, Mr. Joseph R. Farrington, the Washington, D. C., Office of the Hawaii Statehood Commission, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin and the Honolulu Advertiser. The study of the question of Communism in the islands was greatly aided by two pamphlets furnished by Mrs. Violet A. Silverman of the Hawaiian Historical Society. The author did not have access to such valuable materials as Hawaiian newspaper files, the publications of the Hawaiian Historical Society and the Hawaiian Archives.

For the making of history and historical research both a pleasure and a challenge, the writer is indebted to all those faculty members of the University of Tennessee History Department under whom she has taken work. Dr. Ruth Stephens not only suggested the subject of the thesis but gave the author that counsel and encouragement through every stage of preparation which made this study possible. The thesis has been improved by the helpful suggestions of Dr. Stanley F. Folmsbee and Dr. LeRoy P. Graf. No acknowledgments would be complete without mention of the unfailing consideration and helpfulness of the staff of the University Library.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. THE EARLY YEARS	1
Setting—Discovery—The natives and their culture— American missionaries—Fur trade—Sandalwood— Hawaiian-American treaty of 1826—Early whaling trade—French colonizing venture—Russians in Hawaii—British influence.	
II. THE GROWTH OF A KINGDOM	28
French intervention—British intervention and decline of British influence—Tyler Doctrine— Failure of first annexation treaty—Decline of whaling trade—Agricultural development— Land reform—Rise of sugar—Early immigration— Reciprocity Treaty and renewal—Education— Political growth.	
III. THE YEARS OF CHANGE	68
American-Hawaiian diplomacy, 1889-1892—Rule of Liliuokalani—Revolution of 1893—Provisional Government—Failure of annexation treaty of 1893—American protectorate—Blount report— Cleveland's restoration policy—Minister Stevens in the Revolution—Evaluation of Cleveland's Hawaiian policy—Causes of Revolution—Establish- ment of republic—Royalist revolt of 1895—Immigration dispute with Japan—Failure of annexation treaty of 1897—Annexation, 1898—Annexation and the Spanish- American War—Implications for statehood.	
IV. BACKGROUND FOR THE STATEHOOD MOVEMENT	113
Hawaii, 1898-1900—Sugar—Pineapple—Ranching— Other agricultural enterprises—Hawaii's agricultural problems—Forests—Manufacturing— Commerce—Fishing—Tourist trade—Naval-military income—Transportation and communication—"Big Five"—Labor's rise to power—Land distribution— Hawaii's racial composition—Japanese-Hawaiians— Hawaii's position in American defense.	

CHAPTER

PAGE

V. THE FORMAL MOVEMENT FOR STATEHOOD 179

Territorial government and politics—Statehood movement, 1900-1930—Massie case and aftermath—Rankin Bill—Jones-Costigan Act—Legislative discrimination—Congressional investigations of 1935 and 1937—Hawaii's qualifications for statehood—1940 Plebiscite—Military government—Congressional investigations and actions, 1946-1950—Racial issue—Non-contiguity and the "promise" of statehood—Communism—International significance—Summary and conclusions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

CHAPTER I

THE EARLY YEARS

Ultimately the people of the United States must answer this question: shall the Territory of Hawaii become a state? Today the movement for Hawaiian statehood is so strong that every Congress is confronted by a bill to enable the people of Hawaii to become full-fledged citizens, privileged to help choose the President, to be represented in the Congress, and to vote for their own governor.

The story of this movement begins with the Polynesians who settled the Hawaiian archipelago centuries before 1776. Had these people been more aggressive, more hostile to penetration by the white man, one of the nineteenth-century colonial powers might have been tempted, by the lure of commercial profits, to subdue the islands by force while the youthful United States was still immersed in the task of settling a new continent. Or, as the story progresses, had the government of Great Britain followed more closely the activities of its sea captains, Cook and Vancouver, American traders and missionaries would have made little progress in the British colony or protectorate which might have resulted from such interest.

Without an understanding of the geography of the islands, of their discovery, of the native people, and of the early American and European influences, one cannot weigh justly the prime argument of statehood proponents: that Hawaii is and has been, almost from the time of discovery, an American frontier and an American community.

But first comes the setting for the statehood story. What Mark Twain called "the loveliest fleet of islands that lies anchored in any ocean"¹ is composed of twenty islands, ranging from large, volcanic masses to coral reefs. Of these, seven volcanic islands, Niihau, Kauai, Oahu, Molokai, Lanai, Maui, and Hawaii are inhabited. The remaining islands are little more than masses of rock or coral.² From northwest to southeast, the archipelago extends some 1,600 miles, the principal islands spanning about 390 miles. The populated area of the islands is 6,449 square miles.³

Due to a geologic past of eruptions, earthquakes and tidal waves, the primary topographic characteristic of the islands is ruggedness. The island of Hawaii, or Big Island, boasts two mountain peaks over 13,000 feet high, while its area, already two thirds that of the entire group, continues to grow by volcanic eruptions.⁴ Only about a

¹From facsimile of letter, S. L. Clemens to H. P. Wood, November 30, 1908, in Walter Francis Frear, Mark Twain and Hawaii (Chicago: Privately Printed by The Lakeside Press, 1947), facing page 243.

²Francis Carpenter, The Pacific: Its Lands and Peoples (New York: American Book Company, 1944), 17-18, 481; Ralph S. Kuykendall and A. Grove Day, Hawaii: A History (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948), 3.

³Collier's World Atlas and Gazetteer (New York: P. F. Collier and Son Corporation, 1942), 62; Statehood for Hawaii, Hearings, Pursuant to House Resolution 3034, Subcommittee of the Committee on Territories, 74 Congress, 1 Session (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1936), 9.

⁴Frederick Simpich, Jr., "Because It Rains on Hawaii," The National Geographic Magazine, XCVI (November, 1949), 578, 600.

tenth of the area of the islands can be described as approximately level. The level, fertile areas are found in the valleys and narrow coastal plains, while the mountain slopes provide forest land and grazing areas. Oahu has the best harbors, Honolulu and Pearl. There are no large rivers or lakes.⁵

A year-round temperate climate, averaging about 74° F. at Honolulu, is marred by an uneven rainfall which makes irrigation a necessary adjunct to agriculture.⁶

With its principal islands lying just south of the Tropic of Cancer, Hawaii's location almost midway between the Americas and Asia makes obvious its strategic position both commercially and militarily. As they were the supply depot for the sailing vessels of the last century, the islands are the center for modern sea and air routes. To the United States their importance is implicit in their formation, with Alaska and American Samoa, of a defense line for the mainland. Their title of the "Crossroads of the Pacific" is no misnomer, and it is a matter of some surprise that it was 1778 before they became known to the civilized world.

On January 18, 1778, the English captain, James Cook, sighted Oahu.⁷ Whether this event was the discovery or the rediscovery of the islands, the fact remains that the world at large was unaware of Hawaii's

⁵George B. Cressey, Asia's Lands and Peoples (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1944), 7; Carpenter, op. cit., 470, 481.

⁶Collier's, op. cit., 166.

⁷John W. Vandercook, King Kane (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1939), 2.

existence until that date.⁸ Cook had been sent by the Earl of Sandwich in search of a sea passage from the Pacific to the Atlantic around North America.⁹ Although he continued northward after a short stop to take on supplies at Kauai,¹⁰ Cook would later characterize his discovery as one "which, though last, seemed in many respects to be the most important that had hitherto been made by Europeans throughout the extent of the Pacific Ocean."¹¹ Returning in November of the same year, he sailed along the coasts of Maui and Big Island, traded with the natives and received visits from their chiefs, and finally stopped in Big Island's Kealahou Bay in January, 1779.

Although Cook was first treated with great kindness, relations with the natives soon deteriorated due to the continuous demands of

⁸J. C. Furnas, Anatomy of Paradise (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948), 109. For a discussion of evidence of previous Spanish discovery, see Osgood Hardy and Glenn S. Dumke, A History of the Pacific Area in Modern Times (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), 167, and James A. Williamson, Cook and the Opening of the Pacific (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948), 200. For a refutation of the Spanish theory, see Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 13, and Furnas, op. cit., 108.

⁹Vandercook, op. cit., 1-2; Williamson, op. cit., 188-198; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 14.

¹⁰Vandercook, op. cit., 3; Furnas, op. cit., 110.

¹¹Quoted from Cook's Journal by William Ellis, Polynesian Researches, During A Residence of Nearly Eight Years in the Society and Sandwich Islands (New York: J. and J. Harper, 1833), IV, 9. A slightly different wording, with the same meaning, is found in A Voyage to the Pacific Ocean; . . . Performed Under the Direction of Captains Cook, Clerke, and Gore, in the Years 1776, 1777, 1778, 1779, 1780, Compiled from the Various Accounts of That Voyage Hitherto Published (Philadelphia: Published by Robert Desilver, 1818), II, 53.

Cook's party for supplies, the relations of the ships' companies with the native women and the natives' habit of taking whatever caught their fancy. When, after leaving on February 4, it was necessary to return for repairs, Cook found the natives hostile, and a controversy over a boat stolen from one of the ships led to a skirmish in which Cook, four of his men, and some natives were killed on February 14, 1779. Cook's second-in-command managed to settle the dispute, recovered the bodies of Cook and the others and sailed north again in March.

Short though the first visit of the white man was, he left his mark on Hawaii. The trouble resulting in Cook's death undeceived the natives as to the godlike nature of the whites. Secondly, in breaking the native kapus (taboos), the white men demonstrated the impunity with which these native laws could be ignored. In the third place, the white man left, in venereal disease, the first of a long list of foreign diseases which were to contribute so much to the decline of the native population.¹² The designation, Sandwich Islands, Cook's salute to his patron, was another legacy which would not be supplanted until many years later by the native name, Hawaii.¹³

The people Cook found in the Hawaiian Islands had one thing in common with him--they, too, had been sea adventurers. Between the fifth

¹²Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 126, 168; Furnas, op. cit., 110-112.

¹³Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 125.

and eighth centuries,¹⁴ Polynesian pioneers had sailed in outrigger canoes from either the Samoan or the Caroline group to Hawaii.¹⁵

Since, as it has been said, only climate and scenery are native to Hawaii,¹⁶ these first Hawaiians, or later migrants, must have brought domestic animals and plants, including sugar cane. Isolated from their South Sea relatives after the fourteenth century, the Hawaiians developed their own culture. Although cannibalism evidently was not a part of that culture, infanticide, animal sacrifices and some human sacrifices were.¹⁷ While his irrigation ditches and terracing attested to remarkable engineering abilities, the native confined his farming primarily to garden plots, since he spent much of his time fishing.¹⁸

The Hawaiian commoner lived under a feudalistic system of government and land ownership. He provided produce and labor to chiefs in return for protection against raiders. Prescribing his every

¹⁴For various estimates of the time of this migration, see Harold Whitman Bradley, The American Frontier in Hawaii: The Pioneers, 1789-1843 (Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 1942), 4; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 166; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 5; D. L. Crawford, "Hawaii--Our Western Frontier," Review of Reviews, XCI-XCII (January, 1935), 59; Vandercook, op. cit., 7.

¹⁵Ibid.; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 5.

¹⁶Simpich, loc. cit., 573.

¹⁷Bradley, op. cit., 4; Simpich, loc. cit., 585; Vandercook, op. cit., 7; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 6; Furnas, op. cit., 34, 110, 117-118.

¹⁸Ibid., 114-115; Vandercook, op. cit., 7; Theodore Morgan, Hawaii, A Century of Economic Change, 1778-1876, Harvard Economic Studies, LXXXIII (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1948), 7-8.

activity were the kapus, which formed the basic law for social relations, government and religion. In denying certain privileges, the kapus relegated women to an inferior position, although chieftainesses sometimes acted as regents and received certain marks of respect. Despite the power of the chiefs, no individual leader had gained control over the entire island group at the time of discovery.¹⁹

Less vigorous, less aggressive than some of his southern relatives, the Hawaiian offered little resistance to white penetration. His tendency to absorb readily the white man's culture (in both its good and bad facets) demands special comment since the early, basic trend toward Americanization of the islands came mainly through subtle, cultural influences, not by force. But the Hawaiian paid dearly for Western culture. His adoption of Western vices and his susceptibility to diseases of both Western and later Oriental origin slashed the estimated 300,000 population of Cook's day to about 142,000 by 1823. The end of the nineteenth century found the natives mustering only ten percent of their numbers in 1778.²⁰

Despite their numerical decline, the Hawaiians did not suffer the complete eradication of their culture. The present-day English of

¹⁹Furnas, op. cit., 116, 126; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 166. For fuller details of early economic organization in Hawaii, see Morgan, op. cit., Chapters II and III.

²⁰Furnas, op. cit., 108, 119, 123-124; Vandercook, op. cit., 50-52.

the islands is enriched by expressive Hawaiian words.²¹ While the full influence of Hawaiian culture had never been determined to any exact degree, the authors of a recent book were praised because:

Instead of writing a volume in which the emphasis is upon the influence of 'civilization' upon the Hawaiian people, . . . they have provided a collection of anecdotes which, collectively, suggest the extent to which the subtle influence of Hawaiian tradition and environment has molded the thinking of European and American residents of the archipelago.²²

In the interaction of American and Hawaiian cultures during the whole period of Hawaiian independence is to be found one of the keys to the present statehood question. Those who would object to the distinctive cultural overtones of the islands have failed to recognize the traditional pattern of American growth and development, which has successfully encompassed three such varying patterns of living as that of New England, the old South, and the Southwest. In this respect, Hawaii as a state would but add a new chapter to an old book.

²¹For examples, see Simpich, loc. cit., 595-596; and Furnas, op. cit., 119n. For a description of another cultural remnant, the hula dance, see Mark Twain's account of 1866, included by Frear, op. cit., 298. For Hawaiian music, as adapted from American songs, particularly hymns, see ibid., 10-11, 295; and Furnas, op. cit., 193-194.

²²Harold Whitman Bradley in "Reviews of Books," The Pacific Historical Review, XI (March, 1942), 111. Mr. Bradley is referring to Bob Davis and George Armitage, Hawaii, U.S.A. (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1941).

Of one particular native mention must be made, for Kamehameha I was the central figure of the era in which Hawaii "grew up." The death of his uncle, king of Big Island, in 1782, signaled the beginning of a number of civil wars, gradually engulfing the entire archipelago. Grasping this opportunity, Kamehameha by 1810 had merged, through conquest or cession, all of the islands into the Kingdom of Hawaii.²³ The resulting ability of the Hawaiians to meet foreign penetration as a unit made feasible the islands' maintenance of independence through turbulent years. By providing peace and order, Kamehameha encouraged agriculture, fishing and other enterprises. His use of white men as both military and civil advisers set a pattern for his successors.²⁴ It has been suggested that his absolutist rule, in obliterating the responsibility of the chiefs to the people, paved the way for great social and political change. His death certainly marked a great religious change.²⁵

The native Hawaiian religion was not unlike that of the ancient Greeks, but its pantheon offered in its god of the spirit, Kane, a deity somewhat similar to the Christian divinity. While idols were

²³Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 169-170; Bradley, op. cit., 9-10; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 27, 29.

²⁴Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 170; Furnas, op. cit., 121.

²⁵Ibid., 121-122; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 170-171.

used, it is believed that the Hawaiians worshipped them only as symbols of more ephemeral things.²⁶

By 1819 the vitality of this religion was ebbing rapidly. The chief support of the religion had been the kapus, and, for some thirty years, the natives had observed that foreigners, natives traveling abroad, and even their chiefs, while drunk, either violated or ignored the kapus without suffering divine punishment. Evidently only Kamehameha's insistence upon the old rites had kept the native religion alive for some years past.²⁷ In 1819 the new king, Kamehameha II, or Liholiho, violated one of the most vital kapus by eating with the women. This example, plus royal orders to destroy all idols and shrines, sounded the death knell for the ancient faith.²⁸

At the time the native religion was falling into disrepute, New England Calvinists were facing, in the Unitarian movement, the specter of dissent. As part of an effort to strengthen their position, the Calvinists created the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions.²⁹

²⁶To Enable the People of Hawaii to Form A Constitution and a State Government, Hearing, Pursuant to House Resolution 3034, Committee on Territories, 74 Congress, 1 Session (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1935), 2-3.

²⁷Bradley, op. cit., 8, 124-125; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 40-41.

²⁸Bradley, op. cit., 125; Joseph Barber, Jr., Hawaii: Restless Rampart (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1941), 20; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 174.

²⁹Bradley, op. cit., 121-122.

A few years later, the plight of an Hawaiian boy, Harry Opukahaia, stranded in New Haven, Connecticut, led the American Board to train him and three other Hawaiian youths for missionary work in the islands. Opukahaia died in 1819 before completing his schooling, but his story was a strong missionary impetus. There were now volunteers for work in the islands, and, on October 15, 1819, Boston saw the birth of the Sandwich Island Mission. Among its outstanding members were the Reverends Asa Thurston and Hiram Bingham.

In March, 1820, the brig Thaddeus arrived in Hawaii with a cargo perhaps as meaningful for Hawaii as any that ever entered its ports. The New Englanders were granted leave to establish missions, and, by July, had stations on three islands. At the year's end the station school had about one hundred pupils.

The Bible was completely translated into the native language by 1839,³⁰ and Kaahumanu, an early convert and regent for Liholiho and his younger brother, aided missionary progress by her insistence that, as soon as the chiefs learned to read, the commoners were to be taught.³¹

Potent allies of the missionaries were their own wives and children. Their presence invalidated the charges of the anti-missionary whites that the Americans were the vanguard of foreign aggression. The efficacy of the white man's medicine and doctors, too, was a powerful

³⁰Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 43-44; Furnas, op. cit., 128, 145; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 172-175.

³¹Furnas, op. cit., 133-134.

force for conversion. Also, aware by 1820 of the dishonesty of some of the traders, the natives began to ally themselves with the missionaries in the fight against the abuses and immorality that were a part of the early trading relationships with both Americans and Europeans.³² The missionaries supplied real needs.³³ They were successful, generally, in the fight for law and order, while great strides were made in reducing illiteracy. So successful was the purely religious phase of the missionary work that, by 1848, Hawaii was considered a Christian nation; and, in 1863, the American Board turned over practically all of its financial and administrative duties to the Hawaiian Evangelical Association.³⁴

The greatest objection of the trading and foreign elements, however, was to missionary interference in government, whereby blue-laws and governmental reforms were instituted. Since native priests had always been advisers to the chiefs, it was scarcely surprising that, by 1824, Kamehameha III's government was consulting the priests' successors with regard to royal policy. A generation after 1820, five

³²Ibid., 129; Barber, op. cit., 21. Perhaps the traders were in full accord with Mark Twain's comment, "How sad it is to think of the multitudes who have gone to their graves in this beautiful island and never knew there was a hell!" Reprinted by Frear, op. cit., 288, from a letter written by Twain to the Sacramento Union, March, 1866.

³³Furnas, op. cit., 138.

³⁴Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 175; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 132-133; Sylvester Kirby Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842-1898 (Harrisburg: Archives Publishing Company of Pennsylvania, Inc., 1945), 31.

of the missionary group had resigned to take up government positions. They tended to follow policies for the protection of the people against the traders and other foreign elements; and, naturally, they were amenable to missionary influence.³⁵ Among these men were Dr. Gerrit P. Judd, able adviser in economics and foreign affairs, and the ex-Reverend William Richards, by 1838 a leader in Hawaiian diplomacy and constitutional development and, in 1846, the first minister of public instruction.³⁶

The Boston Board of Commissioners discouraged participation in political affairs, but the missionaries were in an odd position. To refuse requests for advice would alienate the king and thereby endanger missionary progress. Also, to relinquish political influence would place their trader adversaries in a superior position. So the missionaries continued in governmental activities.³⁷ Although lacking in political training, the missionaries were sincere in feeling they would provide the native government with more honest advice than would the commercial interests.³⁸

Some missionaries found their way into the economic life of Hawaii. Such was former ministerial student, J. A. Brinsmade, who,

³⁵Barber, op. cit., 23; Furnas, op. cit., 145-146.

³⁶Ibid., 146; Stevens, op. cit., 9-10; Bradley, op. cit., 308-310, 319-323, 413-418, 428 et passim; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 66-67, 69-70, 73-75, 81.

³⁷Barber, op. cit., 23-24.

³⁸Furnas, op. cit., 146-147.

with two partners, by 1833, had organized Ladd and Company, which handled most of the missionary business affairs and, probably through missionary influence, got a royal land grant for experimentation with a sugar plantation. Two other missionary workers, Samuel N. Castle and Amos Starr Cooke, established a wholesale and retail firm, the continued success of which numbers it among the "Big Five" of modern Hawaiian economic life. The missionaries frankly wanted business in dependable, moral hands, but Honolulu businessmen, understandably, were enraged at their economic power.³⁹ In defense of this development, one authority has written:

There is no reputable evidence to support the charge that the missionaries deliberately misused their position to advance their own interests, and there is much evidence to indicate that they and their children were pushed into a favorable economic position by events over which they had only a minimum of control.⁴⁰

Of primary importance in the missionary role of bringing about American orientation of Hawaii was the strengthening of ties with the mainland. The missionaries, through their influential friends at home and through the American Board, made their desires felt in the State Department. They had close relations with American naval officers

³⁹Ibid., 150; Barber, op. cit., 25; Bradley, op. cit., 236-238, 244-246, 253; Vandercook, op. cit., 33, 155.

⁴⁰Harold Whitman Bradley, "Reviews of Books," The Pacific Historical Review, XIV (June, 1945), 232-233. Mr. Bradley was reviewing a book by Alexander MacDonald, Revolt in Paradise: The Social Revolution in Hawaii after Pearl Harbor (New York: Stephen Daye, Inc., 1944).

visiting Hawaiian ports and usually saw to it that commissioners and consuls appointed by the American government were men sympathetic with their interests. Their development of fine schools, especially Oahu College, brought to Hawaii in the gold rush years of 1849 and the 1850's the children of Californians, and many of the missionary children became prominent in Hawaiian affairs, thus perpetuating American influence.⁴¹ Furthermore, their work stirred up American interest in Hawaii. Even the New York Journal of Commerce reported on their activities. John Quincy Adams, in the House of Representatives in 1843, praised their work and gave their success as one of the main reasons why the United States should support Hawaiian independence.⁴²

Another link with America forged by the missionaries was the introduction of democratic principles. The native commoner found that he had a soul as important to the missionaries as the soul of a chief; and, as democratic government developed in the islands, missionary influence provided political ideas basically American.⁴³

But the main influence of the missionaries was more subtle:

. . . it was a simpler age. Those with a conviction of right--and the people of the Thaddeus were utterly convinced--then differentiated little between the rightness of their

⁴¹Stevens, op. cit., 28-29; Ray Lyman Wilbur, "Statehood for Hawaii," Atlantic Monthly, CLXVI (October, 1940), 494; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 175; Furnas, op. cit., 131; Walker Matheson, "Hawaii Pleads for Statehood," The North American Review, CCXLVII (Spring, 1939), 132.

⁴²Stevens, op. cit., 7-8; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 175-176. See also footnote 74.

⁴³Furnas, op. cit., 137; Stevens, op. cit., 9-10.

theology and the rightness of their clothes, their customs and their way of life. It was impossible for them to think of teaching the one without the other.⁴⁴

The missionaries did not leave New England--they brought it with them. And so carefully, if unconsciously, did they tend this transplanted culture, that it became an inextricable part of Hawaiian life. During the reign of Kamehameha IV (1854-1863), British prestige tended to overshadow the missionaries, but their work during the early, crucial years, when Hawaii was first learning western ways, served to vitiate and negate any later foreign influences.⁴⁵ But Americans were also competing successfully with the British in another sphere.

The commerce of Hawaii between 1778 and 1830 was monopolized by furs, sandalwood and whale oil. Sandalwood was a product of the islands; the other two were significant as commodities in trade which found Hawaii a convenient shipping center.⁴⁶ Although there was some overlapping, each of these commodities had its own span of supremacy.

A publication of 1784 concerning Cook's last trip mentioned Cantonese interest in furs picked up on the coast of North America. Traders in search of profits immediately were intrigued. In 1785 the Chinese-financed, fur-trading expedition of Captain James Hanna returned from the American coast via Hawaii, thus setting the pattern

⁴⁴Vandercook, op. cit., 12-13.

⁴⁵Barber, op. cit., 24-25; Matheson, loc. cit., 131. Bradley, op. cit., has an excellent account of the early missionary work in Chapters III, IV and VII.

⁴⁶Ralph S. Kuykendall, "Early Hawaiian Commercial Development," The Pacific Historical Review, III (December, 1934), 365.

for future fur trade routes. Between 1786 and 1787 some eight vessels stopped in Hawaii while pursuing this trade and, in August of 1789, the United States was first represented by the Columbia. In a decade "fur trader" had become almost synonymous with "Yankee," and earlier British dominance disappeared.⁴⁷

American traders, denied their former British trading haunts with the end of the Revolution, had been searching for new fields of profit. The Empress of China's voyage in 1784-1785 had given momentum to the Chinese trade, but Americans were handicapped by having no goods acceptable at Canton in exchange for the exotics of the East. The fur trade, in sea otters and later in seals, filled the bill.⁴⁸

The fur trade served to point up the value of the islands as a convenient supply depot, an excellent wintering spot for traders sailing in the northern seas and a place of rest for the hard-working crews. These advantages were put to work by the American fur traders who stopped in Hawaii between 1800 and 1815, either en route to the northwest coast from Cape Horn or from the North American coast to China. The value of the Hawaiian ports was increased by the growing

⁴⁷Bradley, op. cit., 12, 13, 15, 17; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 169. For a varying account as to the first ship to use Hawaii as a way-station in the fur trade route to China, see Morgan, op. cit., 57-58. Bradley's account, used in this paper, is well documented.

⁴⁸Bradley, op. cit., 13-14, 18; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 131.

facilities for repair and refitting of ships.⁴⁹ After 1815 the fur trade lost its supremacy in Hawaiian commerce, and by 1828, had expended its force.⁵⁰ But another commodity already had developed which far outdistanced the fur trade in its effects upon Hawaii.

The possibilities of the sandalwood trade were recognized as early as the 1790's, but the trade received its full impetus after the return of British-American peace in 1815. This trade tended to vacillate from low to high points throughout the era of its dominance. The high peaks of the trade came in 1817-1818, 1821, and 1827-1829. By 1831 the trade had lost all importance. Factors in the decline were the diminishing supply and quality of wood, the surfeiting of the chiefs' needs for American goods exchanged for the wood, the increasing indebtedness of the chiefs to American traders, and finally the shift of the Chinese to better sources.⁵¹

But the brief span of the sandalwood period produced results out of all proportion to its length. While the Hawaiians, especially the commoners, received little lasting benefit from the trade, it brought the islands to the attention of American commercial concerns,

⁴⁹Bradley, op. cit., 21-23, 25-26.

⁵⁰Ibid., 72, 74.

⁵¹Ibid., 53-55, 26-32, 57, 60-66, 116-117; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 41.

Interested the missionary-minded in the needs of the natives, and led the State Department to appoint a commercial agent to the islands.⁵²

The question of the sandalwood debts, in addition to the problem of increasing numbers of deserters from whaling ships, brought Captain Thomas ap Catesby Jones, commanding the U.S.S. Peacock, to Hawaii. Going beyond his instructions, Jones negotiated with the Hawaiian government its first formal treaty in December of 1826. The matter of the payment of debts was settled separately, the treaty itself providing most-favored-nation's privileges, Hawaiian cooperation in apprehending whaling ship deserters and aid in the salvage of American shipwrecks. The United States government took no action regarding this treaty, but Americans in Hawaii, even in 1837, considered it binding, and the Hawaiian rulers kept its provisions through fear of United States reprisals.⁵³

⁵²Furnas, op. cit., 119-121; Vandercreek, op. cit., 14; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 42-43; Bradley, op. cit., 120; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 177.

⁵³For text of treaty, see David Hunter Miller, ed., Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1931-), III, 269-272; ibid., 273-281, presents extensive notes on the treaty. Miller refers to this treaty as "Articles of Arrangement." For account of Jones' visit, his orders, the petitions of New England whaling interests leading to the expedition, and a copy of the tax regulations imposed by the Hawaiian King to pay the sandalwood debts, see House Report No. 92, 28 Congress, 2 Session, 1-6, 8-14, 18-19. Hereafter cited as House Report No. 92. For high opinion of House Committee on Foreign Affairs of the efficacy of this non-official treaty, see ibid., 3. See also Kuykendall, loc. cit., 379-380; Bradley, op. cit., 105-110; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 51; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 179. For the role of United States naval officers as ambassadors in early years, see Matheson, loc. cit., 131, and Senate Executive Document No. 77, 52 Congress, 2 Session, 4. Hereafter this document will be cited as Senate Document No. 77.

Sandalwood, in its day, was the principal medium of exchange, and only sugar would replace in volume the export of a native product.⁵⁴ It was now the turn of a third trading interest.

Hawaii's location near the southern whaling grounds and the discovery of the whaling areas off Japan, whose ports were denied to foreigners, brought whalers into Honolulu Harbor as early as 1819 or 1820. Growth of the trade was so rapid that in 1829 almost two hundred whaling ships visited Hawaii. The whalers found a new use for Hawaii as a point of transshipment--whale oil was brought to Hawaii by the whalers and transported thence in other ships. Again, as in the fur and sandalwood trade, the vessels were mainly American.⁵⁵

One of the results of the early trade was the great increase in the foreign population. Contemporary estimates of 1817-1818 placed the number of European and American residents at between one and two hundred.⁵⁶ Another development was that Hawaii had become more than a convenience to specific enterprises such as the fur and whaling trades. It had become an important world distributing center. The islands served both as a gathering point for goods from the Pacific area to be shipped to all parts of the world and as a temporary storehouse for American, Asiatic, and European goods intended for the Pacific area.

⁵⁴Kylandall, loc. cit., 368; Furnas, op. cit., 120.

⁵⁵Furnas, op. cit., 123, 148; Stevens, op. cit., 11; Bradley, op. cit., 79-80, 215; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 177; Morgan, op. cit., 75-76.

⁵⁶Bradley, op. cit., 34.

Important not only as it indicated the growth of trade but as it emphasized American commercial predominance was the presence by 1831 in Honolulu of nine American-controlled mercantile houses, four of them dating from 1823.⁵⁷

While one authority has written that the ". . . sandalwood trade was the foundation of the earliest noticeable American influence in the Hawaiian Islands . . . ,"⁵⁸ the fact cannot be overlooked that the earlier fur trade was dominated by Americans. It might be safer to say, as does another writer, that American traders in general were second only to the missionaries in bringing about a weakening of the British influence in favor of the younger nation.⁵⁹

In order to evaluate the vital contribution of the trader and the missionary to the growth of American bias in the islands, it is necessary to gauge the influence of the three early European entrants into the arena of foreign activities in Hawaii. While the first French attempts were repulsed and the Russian activities never received the Czar's sanction, the British made decisive inroads on the emotional and intellectual life of the islands.

French activities in the islands before 1830 were not menacing and came, oddly enough, from the machinations of one individual, Jean B.

⁵⁷Kuykendall, loc. cit., 381, 383; Bradley, op. cit., 118.

⁵⁸Bradley, op. cit., 119. Bradley writes (page 18) of the reference by the regent, Kalanimoku, in 1826, to the United States President as "our chief in America."

⁵⁹Kuykendall, loc. cit., 385.

Rives, who accompanied Liholiho to London in 1823 as his secretary. At Liholiho's death, Rives went to France where, through pretense of having weight in the Hawaiian government, he gained French governmental sanction and private financial support for an expedition that was to establish a French colony and a Roman Catholic mission in Hawaii.

After an unsuccessful attempt in 1826, a second expedition reached Hawaii the next year. The Hawaiian government disavowed Rives' actions, but reluctantly permitted the colonists to disembark and finally allowed them land for cultivation and construction of living quarters.⁶⁰ By 1828 only seven colonists, three of them missionaries, remained. Except for the followers of the governor of Oahu, Boki, whose loyalty to the royal house was suspect, the priests found few supporters. In two years they gained about one hundred converts.⁶¹

When Boki threatened rebellion in 1828, the priests were suspected of complicity, and the government forbade further native participation in Catholic services. Partly because some converts disobeyed this edict and partly because the government felt that two religions might cause dissension among the natives, the two remaining priests were expelled to California in 1831, the government paying their way.⁶²

⁶⁰George Verne Blue, "The Project for a French Settlement in the Hawaiian Islands, 1824-1842," The Pacific Historical Review, II (March, 1933), 85-89; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 56-57; Bradley, op. cit., 185.

⁶¹Blue, loc. cit., 90-94; Bradley, op. cit., 185-186; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 179.

⁶²Blue, loc. cit., 96; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 179; Bradley, op. cit., 204. Bradley has an excellent discussion of the political aspects of this affair on pages 203-211.

Undoubtedly, American missionary influence was arrayed against the French Catholics.⁶³ The American Board later upheld this attitude in announcing that it was the duty of its missionaries to point out the "errors" of Catholicism.⁶⁴ While these events ended the French influence for a few years, this insult to the Catholic religion and to French nationals would rankle.

Having no religious implications but more serious political effects, the Russian move on the islands had come some years earlier. The important fur-trading post of the Russian American Company at Sitka (in Alaska) found Hawaii a convenient source of supplies. Following two exploring vessels in 1804, a ship, sent by Alexander Baranov, chief Sitka agent, in 1809, was believed by one of its non-Russian passengers to be on a colonizing mission, but no such attempt was made.⁶⁵

In 1815 Baranov sent Georg Anton Scheffer, a German physician, to Hawaii ostensibly to salvage the contents of a shipwrecked Russian vessel. But Scheffer was soon writing to officials of the Russian American Company that he had been granted land on Oahu. However, when he began construction of a fort at Honolulu, reportedly under the Russian flag, he was ordered to leave.

Going to Kauai, Scheffer by 1816 had agreements with the chief of the island which provided a Russian protectorate over Kauai and Niihau

⁶³Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 57; Bradley, op. cit., 207-209; Stevens, op. cit., 15.

⁶⁴Bradley, op. cit., 187-188.

⁶⁵Ibid., 47-48; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 35.

and a sandalwood monopoly for Scheffer's company. In return, the chief was to get Russian military support in ousting Kamehameha I from Oahu. Scheffer reigned supreme on Kauai for almost a year, but American traders, having acted as interpreters for Scheffer, reported his activities to Kamehameha I, whose order for expulsion was probably received gratefully by the chief, now weary of Scheffer's insolence. After a brief resistance, the Russians were forced to leave in 1817.

Scheffer attempted to get official backing for his scheme but the Czar repudiated his activities, as did Baranov. The Czar probably was mindful of the strong British claims to the archipelago, but Great Britain neither took the Russian moves seriously nor made any attempt to strengthen her claims on Hawaii through colonization, as was strongly urged at the time by a British naval officer.⁶⁶ However indifferent Britain seemed, no other nation's hold upon the islands was so obvious in this period.

Most significant was the fact that the British had a clear claim to Hawaii by virtue of Cook's discovery in 1778. Nor were the implications of Cook's visit lost upon the islanders. Despite American trading supremacy after 1790, Kamehameha I and his chiefs retained great admiration for Great Britain. Other factors favorable to Britain were pleasant associations with visiting British naval officers and the loyal services rendered Kamehameha by two of his most trusted advisers, Isaac Davis and John Young, both former English sailors. Marrying native

⁶⁶Bradley, op. cit., 49-52; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 36.

women and settling in the islands, these two men at various times acted as governors of individual islands. Two other Britons held military and naval positions under Kamehameha.⁶⁷

From 1792 to 1794 Captain George Vancouver made three trips to the islands. In the latter year he negotiated with Kamehameha I and the chiefs an agreement which he believed involved outright cession of the islands to Britain, although the Hawaiians probably intended only to secure British protection. Various circumstances, including Parliament's preoccupation with other matters, defeated further action in support of Vancouver's coup. Kamehameha I designated himself in 1811 a subject of George III, but, again, evidently did not propose thereby to place his kingdom under British sovereignty. After Vancouver's visits, few British naval vessels stopped at the islands, but the affection for Britain lasted, as did the impression of British paramountcy.⁶⁸ Kamehameha I only discontinued his use of the British flag during the War of 1812 in order to assure the United States of Hawaii's neutrality. In a compromise flag, raised in 1816, the Union Jack was relegated to one corner and red, white and blue stripes were added.⁶⁹

⁶⁷The saying of the Hawaiians, regarding the British and Americans at this time, was, "The English have men-of-war, but the Americans have only whalers and trading-vessels." Quoted in petition of New Bedford citizens to President Adams (n. d.), House Report No. 108, 29 Congress, 1 Session, 12. See also Bradley, op. cit., 41-42, 37-38.

⁶⁸Ibid., 42-46; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 172; Kuykendall and Day, 33-34.

⁶⁹Furnas, op. cit., 122; Bradley, op. cit., 45-47; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 37.

When, in 1810, Kamehameha I, possibly in fear of Russian designs, begged George III to send a British man-of-war to Hawaii, he found it necessary to repeat his request before he received a reply, which, while very friendly, gave no indication that Britain regarded Hawaii as a protectorate.⁷⁰

In 1822 Liholiho spoke of putting the islands under British protection,⁷¹ and it was Liholiho's fate to die while on a visit to England in 1824. The British government instructed Lord Byron, who escorted the bodies of the king and his wife to Hawaii, to take the islands under British protection if any foreign power seemed likely to seize them, but there was no implication of outright annexation. However, it was during these months that the first British consul arrived in Hawaii,⁷² and the pro-British attitude of the Hawaiian royal family did not die with Liholiho.

The early years of Hawaii's life on the world stage, 1778-1830, were years of fusion. Into the crucible went four main elements: (1) the native Hawaiian civilization, (2) trade, (3) missionary activities, and (4) the influences of France, Russia and Great Britain. It

⁷⁰Bradley, op. cit., 48-49.

⁷¹Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 47.

⁷²Ibid., 47-48; Stevens, op. cit., 14; Bradley, op. cit., 101. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported in House Report No. 92, 2, of the good impression made by Lord Byron in Hawaii, and further stated that the ". . . English government had contrived to possess itself of a very large share of the confidence of those islands." There is a further statement that the British consul-general, in 1826, claimed Hawaii was under English sovereignty.

is notable that the last-named element, with the possible exception of Great Britain, was mainly active through informal channels. The day of diplomacy was still in the offing.

But the most significant development of the era was that, while great European powers alternately evinced interest and disinterest in the islands, the American sea captains and merchants plied their trade and the Yankee missionaries taught the Bible, bound not in leather but in New England wrapping paper.⁷³ A new pattern for conquest had already come into being.⁷⁴

⁷³Bradley, op. cit., 52, expresses this same idea.

⁷⁴Chairman John Quincy Adams of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1843 spoke eloquently of this new type of conquest. See Senate Report No. 227, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 121. Hereafter cited as Senate Report No. 227. For an outline of the important events in these early years, see extracts from C. C. Bennett, "The Hawaiian Directory and Historical Sketch of the Hawaiian or Sandwich Islands," ibid., 155-156.

CHAPTER II

THE GROWTH OF A KINGDOM

One statehood qualification claimed for Hawaii--its historical American orientation--requires increasing attention in the review of the years from 1830 through 1890. But bases of other averred qualifications--years of independent existence and practice in self-government, economic stability, the successful blending of many racial cultures into a democratic society and a long-standing public school system--must be traced through the period of Hawaii's growth of national maturity.

In their maintenance of independence, the Hawaiians, after 1830, chiefly dealt with three nations: France, Great Britain and the United States.

A lull in Catholic persecution after 1832 ended in 1837 with the refusal of residence to three priests (two of whom were French) and Kamehameha III's decree against the teaching and practice of Catholicism. Another era of native Catholic persecution reached a high point in 1839. But, in that year fear of French retaliation and other factors brought about religious toleration.¹

¹Bradley, op. cit., 287-294; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 58-60; Furnas, op. cit., 151-152. For the extent of persecution, its causes and the American missionary role in it, see Bradley, op. cit., 293-298, and Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 180. That the policy of toleration, later guaranteed in Hawaiian constitutions, was enforced is evident in the fact that in the 1890's there were 29,685 Protestants in comparison with 20,072 Catholics. See the report of Captain G. P. Scriven and Lt. J. Y. M. Blunt in Senate Report No. 227, 53.

But the French, self-appointed defenders of Catholicism in the Pacific, were past mollification. Naval Captain C. P. T. Laplace arrived in Honolulu in 1839 and forced a treaty, the main provisions of which guaranteed Catholics freedom and privileges equal to those of Protestants and exacted a \$20,000 bond for future good behavior. Laplace then required more: the trial of accused Frenchmen by foreign jurors selected by the French consul and entry of French liquors with a limited duty. These clauses not only introduced partial extra-territoriality, later gained by Great Britain, but made void a previous Hawaiian law banning importation of intoxicants.²

Despite the beginning of construction of a Catholic church and establishment of mission schools by 1840, tension over religion and liquor importation continued. The Catholic charges of discrimination in the marriage and school laws brought protests from the French consul and demands in 1842 from another French naval officer. The King's reference to his emissaries en route to France to resolve outstanding differences persuaded this officer to abandon his demands.³

The Anglo-French recognition of Hawaiian independence in 1843 did not ease fears of French aggression, although the \$20,000 bond was returned in 1846. A new treaty signed in this year still contained

²Senate Document No. 77, 33-34; Bradley, op. cit., 291-292, 311-314, 317-319; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 60-61; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 180-181, 183, 629; Furnas, op. cit., 152-153; Commissioner L. Severance to Secretary of State D. Webster, March 12, 1851, Senate Document No. 77, 88.

³Stevens, op. cit., 15; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 181; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 61-62; Bradley, op. cit., 418-420.

undesirable features for Hawaii. After 1848 old troubles were stirred by a new consul and led to a visit in 1849 by Admiral de Tromelin, who met the refusal of more demands with a short-lived, destructive occupation of various Honolulu buildings, after which he and the consul left. A futile Hawaiian mission to France to gain reparations for this action and a more equitable treaty was followed by French Commissioner Emile Perrin's reaffirmation, in 1851, of de Tromelin's demands. However, Perrin's discovery of the King's plan to cede the islands to the United States in event of further French aggression led to a temporary agreement and the threat of French arms never again plagued the islands. A treaty, effective in 1858, relieved Hawaii of some objectionable restrictions and provided for the abrogation of others after a ten-year period. In 1873 these remaining restrictions were repudiated by the Hawaiian government.⁴

But the French were not Hawaii's only international problem. While the British government seemingly never desired possession of Hawaii, British residents of the islands were concerned over the sharp decline of British influence from 1815 to 1840⁵ when American commercial,

⁴Senate Document No. 77, 64-65, 68-74; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 72-73, 110; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 184-185, 629; Stevens, op. cit., 50-53; Richard W. Van Alstyne, "Great Britain, the United States, and Hawaiian Independence, 1850-1855," The Pacific Historical Review, IV (March, 1935), 16, hereafter cited as "Hawaiian Independence;" Osborne E. Hooley, "Hawaiian Negotiations for Reciprocity, 1855-1857," The Pacific Historical Review, VII (June, 1938), 140.

⁵Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 58-59; Bradley, op. cit., 281-282, 299-300. For text of the treaty, see Senate Document No. 77, 33.

agricultural and missionary activities far outdistanced British efforts. By 1830 Britain had lost to the United States, in Hawaiian eyes, the role of guardian. The brief but startling resurgence of British trade from 1840 to 1841 only tended to align British and American residents of the islands in two hostile camps. Several Hawaiian court decisions against British subjects in which the opposing litigants were either Americans or had American support fed the flame. Complaints over these decisions and other matters brought the naval commander Lord George Paulet to Honolulu in February of 1843.⁶

Meanwhile, Hawaiian envoys William Richards and Timothy Haalilio had succeeded by April of 1843 in gaining a written promise of recognition of independence from Britain, as well as strong assurances of similar action by France and Belgium. Then news of Paulet's seizure of the islands arrived in London. Meeting Paulet's first demands, the Hawaiian government, upon further British requests, had ceded the islands to Britain, contingent upon final action by the London government, which, it was felt, would refuse the cession.⁷ Paulet's virtual dictatorship of five months ended with the arrival of his superior officer, who

⁶Bradley, op. cit., 265, 270, 333, 394-397, 399-400, 409, 424-428; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 65-66.

⁷Acting Commercial Agent W. Hooper to Webster, March 7, 1843, Senate Document No. 77, 41-48; extracts from James F. B. Marshall, "An Unpublished Chapter of Hawaiian History," Harper's Magazine (September, 1883), in Senate Report No. 227, 138-141; extracts from James Jackson Jarves, The History of the Hawaiian Islands (1846), in ibid., 144-149; Bradley, op. cit., 428-434, 447-450; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 64-66; Stevens, op. cit., 14-16.

returned the islands to the King on July 31.⁸ While the British government was quick to stamp Paulet's action as unauthorized, it used the lever of occupation and promised recognition to settle the complaints of its subjects against the Hawaiian government and to insure French recognition of Hawaiian independence. The final joint declaration of the two powers recognizing Hawaii's independence came on November 28, 1843. A new English treaty was signed reluctantly by the Hawaiian king in February, 1844, for it extended to the British the same two restrictions upon Hawaiian sovereignty contained in the Laplace treaty.⁹

After this time, increasing Anglo-French cooperation seemed aimed in part at preventing American possession of the islands. The Hawaiian-American annexation negotiations of 1854 brought strong protests from Britain and even talk of war.¹⁰

The reigns of Kamehameha IV and Kamehameha V were markedly pro-English. The former's preference for English institutions was shared by his half-English queen, Emma. The introduction of the Anglican Church by these two was one manifestation of the British trend; another was

⁸Bradley, op. cit., 436-440; Stevens, op. cit., 19; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 67-68; Furnas, op. cit., 154-155; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 181-182.

⁹For text of the Anglo-Hawaiian treaty of 1844 see, Senate Document, No. 77, 61. See also, E. Everett, U. S. Minister to London, to Secretary of State A. P. Upshur, August 5, 1843, ibid., 133; Bradley, op. cit., 455-463; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 68-69; Van Alstyne, "Hawaiian Independence," 15-16. For text of the joint declaration see, Senate Document No. 77, 60.

¹⁰Ibid., 87, 102-103, 125-126, 120; Richard W. Van Alstyne, ed., "Anglo-American Relations, 1853-1857," The American Historical Review, XLII (April, 1937), 494-498. Hereafter cited as "Anglo-American Relations." See also, Stevens, op. cit., 66-69, 71; Van Alstyne, "Hawaiian Independence," 19-22.

the gradual disappearance of Americans from the cabinet. An unsatisfactory British treaty in 1846 was followed in 1851 by a treaty relieving Hawaii of all claims upon its sovereignty. The nonexecuted British Coolie Convention will be discussed later, but visits of Hawaiian royalty to London continued to disturb the United States. While British concern in the 1870's over the Hawaiian-American Reciprocity Treaty was eased by the conviction that it would prevent annexation, the British did protest the renewal granting the United States the use of Pearl Harbor. The role of the British possessions as a market for Hawaiian sugar threatened American commerce for a short period, but in 1874 the Americans won another round with the election of Kalakaua to the Hawaiian throne instead of the pro-British Emma.¹¹

British-Hawaiian relations during these years, with the exception of the Paulet seizure, were mainly concerned with Hawaii's attempts to gain a fair and equitable treaty of commerce and friendship and Britain's watchful concern over American and French moves toward annexing the islands. But the continued English proclivities of the royal family,

¹¹Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1878 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1878), 382-404, hereafter cited as Foreign Relations; ibid., 1879, 512-520, 525-526; ibid., 1888, Part I, 860-864, 774, 788, 799-800; Senate Document No. 77, 130, 155-158; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 72, 105-107, 114, 130-132; Blake Clark, Hawaii the 49th State (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1947), 78-80; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 184, 629; Stevens, op. cit., 157, 177, 183, 185; Hooley, loc. cit., 140. Britain's decreased concern over the Reciprocity Treaty is shown in an extract from a dispatch, Sackville-West to Lord Salisbury, November 7, 1885, quoted by Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland A Study in Courage (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1933), 550.

in addition to a heavy British population in the islands, left a permanent stamp upon Hawaiian life.¹²

Unlike Britain and France, the United States made no attempts at forcible seizure of the islands, but, as the nineteenth century advanced, American-Hawaiian diplomatic relations assumed mounting significance. However, this development primarily stemmed from American-born or American-descended island residents who created for the United States an undeniable special interest in Hawaii. While the missionary, in time, was overshadowed by his merchant, trader or planter brother, their combined influence made negligible the fact that the conduct of the only United States representative from 1820 to 1839 finally led to his recall at Hawaiian request. Hostile in his attitude toward the missionaries, disrespectful to Hawaiian government authorities, and disliked by American commercial and whaling interests, American Commercial Agent, John C. Jones had been the subject for recall requests since 1829. About this time French and English observers noted that almost all the prominent foreign residents of Honolulu were Americans. The most numerous foreign element, they controlled most of the successful merchant firms and were the principal agricultural experimenters. Not only by 1836 did Americans possess four-fifths of the alien-owned property and merchandise in Honolulu, but soon most of that city had

¹²Furnas, op. cit., 163; Barber, op. cit., 24-25. For strong view of British role in maintaining Hawaiian independence, see Van Alstyne, "Hawaiian Independence," 15.

come to join the Americans in their celebration of the Fourth of July.¹³

Unsuccessful attempts from 1839 to early 1842 to gain American recognition of Hawaiian independence and the almost three-year missionary effort required to get an American pledge of protest against the Laplace affair were balanced against a flourishing, mainly American-controlled trade between the North American west coast and Hawaii. Meanwhile, Californians read Honolulu newspapers and Hawaiian Americans enthusiastically watched the American advance to the Pacific coast.¹⁴

In view of the practical non-existence of an official American policy toward Hawaii, it is not surprising that President Tyler and Secretary of State Webster hesitated over the request of Hawaiian envoys William Richards and Timothy Haalilio in December of 1842 for recognition of Hawaiian independence. But factors were brought to their attention by the envoys, by John Quincy Adams and by other Congressmen--factors such as high public interest in Oregon and California, the opening of China's door, naval schemes for Pacific bases, British and French threats

¹³Bradley, op. cit., 89-93, 301-304, 265-268; Stevens, op. cit., 2, 23. See Foreign Relations, 1883, 564, for official Hawaiian participation in the American holiday in 1883.

¹⁴Bradley, op. cit., 310, 402-408, 315-316, 392-394. For petition from thirty-eight American citizens in Hawaii, protesting Laplace's threatening words against American missionaries and asking for protection from any future happening of like nature, see Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States, 26 Congress, 1 Session (Washington: Printed by Blair and Rives, 1840), 944. Hereafter cited as House Journal.

to Hawaii and Hawaiian missionary and commercial ties--which made ominous Richards' threat that refusal of recognition might lead to a British protectorate. There emerged, therefore, in a note to the Hawaiian envoys, the so-called Tyler Doctrine.¹⁵ In part, this note stated,

The United States . . . are more interested in the fate of the islands, and of their Government, than any other nation can be; and this consideration induces the President to be quite willing to declare, as the sense of the Government of the United States, that the Government of the Sandwich Islands ought to be respected; that no power ought either to take possession of the islands as a conquest, or for the purpose of colonization, and that no power ought to seek for any undue control over the existing Government, or any exclusive privileges or preferences in matters of commerce.¹⁶

Congress and the governments of France and Great Britain were notified immediately of this new policy. Remaining in force, with few deviations, until annexation, the two basic tenets of this policy were (1) that the United States had special interests in Hawaii which no other nation could equal; and (2) the United States would scrupulously respect Hawaiian sovereignty and independence and would demand the same conduct from other nations. There followed in 1843 the appointment of a commissioner of diplomatic rank to represent the United States in Hawaii.¹⁷

¹⁵Hawaiian envoys Haalilio and Richards to Webster, December 14, 1842, Senate Document No. 77, 37-40, 6; Stevens, op. cit., 1-3, 5-12; Bradley, op. cit., 441-444, 446 n.; Randolph G. Adams, "Abel Parker Upshur," in Samuel F. Bemis, ed., The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927-1929), V, 81.

¹⁶Webster to Haalilio and Richards, December 19, 1842, Senate Document, No. 77, 40.

¹⁷House Document No. 35, 27 Congress, 3 Session, 1-2; House Journal, 27 Congress, 3 Session, 250; Senate Document No. 77, 56-60; Bradley, op. cit., 444-446; Stevens, op. cit., 3-5, 6; Matheson, loc. cit., 131; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 64-65; Clyde A. Duniway, "Daniel Webster," in Bemis, op. cit., V, 56; St. George Leakin Sioussat, "John Caldwell Calhoun," in ibid., V, 223.

News of the Paulet seizure in 1843 aroused American public demands for a protest. There was a request to London to disavow Paulet's action, and reassurances were not long in coming. While the United States minister in London kept close watch, Washington reaffirmed the Tyler Doctrine, but the whole question was settled with the return of the islands to the King and the joint recognition by France and England of Hawaiian independence. The United States, with traditional aversion to European alliances, refused to join this pact but voiced again its respect for Hawaiian independence.¹⁸

The missionary and economic influence continued to over-shadow unfortunate diplomatic appointments. The first two commissioners, serving in succession from 1843 to 1849, were replaced because of unsatisfactory conduct.¹⁹

The forties brought the occupation of Oregon, the gold rush and the occupation of California, the latter event termed by one author as "the greatest step toward the annexation of Hawaii."²⁰ These years

¹⁸Foreign Relations, 1879, 520; Senate Document No. 77, 51-56, 65, 106-116. For protest of U. S. Commander Lawrence Kearney against Paulet's rule, July 11, 1843, see Hooper to Webster, August 15, 1843, ibid., 51, 53-54. For appeal of Hawaiian King to the United States for aid in restoring native rule, Kamehameha III to President Tyler, March 10, 1843, ibid., 49-51. See also Bradley, op. cit., 452-456, 463; Stevens op. cit., 16-20; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 68-69; Van Alstyne, "Hawaiian Independence," 15-16.

¹⁹Miller, op. cit., V, 602-606; Senate Document No. 77, 63-67, 85; Stevens, op. cit., 12-13, 20-23; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 73-74; Sioussat, loc. cit., 223-224; St. George Leakin Sioussat, "James Buchanan," in Bemis, op. cit., V, 329-330.

²⁰Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 407.

also brought to Hawaii an unstable, often undesirable, American pioneer element, made more restive by west coast expansionism and rumors of filibustering expeditions. Hawaiian fears of the latter were real enough to be communicated to Washington. But, despite growing public and official recognition of Hawaii's strategic and commercial value to the United States, there was little public desire, except on the West Coast, for annexation of the islands before the Civil War.²¹

Under Presidents Taylor and Fillmore a more able diplomatic representative carried on the Tyler dictum of upholding Hawaiian independence. In the former's administration a treaty of commerce was negotiated, becoming effective in 1850.²²

While the de Tromelin action had brought only slow and ineffectual American protest, the later demands of Perrin brought to the United States in March of 1851 a provisional cession of the islands, to become effective in event of further French threats. Webster, in line with the Tyler Doctrine, promised United States naval protection for the islands, but stressed the maintenance of independence and warned American residents, no longer citizens, that they need not expect United

²¹For San Francisco-based filibustering plans, see Senate Executive Document No. 16, 33 Congress, 2 Session, 101, 108-109. See also Senate Document No. 77, 120; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 74; Stevens, op. cit., 42-45.

²²Senate Executive Document No. 1, 32 Congress, 1 Session, 9. For text of treaty, see Miller, op. cit., V, 591-599. See ibid., 606-628, for extracts from source material, mainly manuscripts of the State Department Archives, covering the negotiations for this treaty and the previous proposal by Hawaii in 1838 for a commercial treaty. See also Stevens, op. cit., 48-49; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 74, 101; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 629; and Mary Wilhelmine Williams, "John Middleton Clayton," in Bemis, op. cit., VI, 14-15.

States protection or connivance in annexationist movements. While there was much Congressional and press criticism of Webster's failure to accept the cession, the policy tended to bolster the United States in the eyes of the Hawaiian government, which had considered annexation only as a last resort, and prevented further Hawaiian moves toward British protection.²³

Despite its policy of supporting Hawaiian independence, the Pierce administration, with William L. Marcy as Secretary of State, found temptation too great when internal unrest, fostered by native concern over their population decline, American residents' annexationist sentiments, threats of California filibustering expeditions, and foreign dissatisfaction with governmental land and tax policies, brought the King to doubt his ability to maintain his throne. By February, 1854, he was willing to cede his kingdom to the United States in return for financial support for himself and dependents. By May informal negotiations were in progress with increasing Hawaiian public support, but when Kamehameha III died in December, the treaty had not been signed. In January, 1855, his successor notified the United States that negotiations were terminated. Failure of these negotiations was due, in Hawaii, to the delaying tactics of Prince Alexander Liholiho, the future

²³Senate Document No. 77, 82-98; Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 32 Congress, 1 Session (Washington: A. Boyd Hamilton, 1851-1852), 572; Stevens, op. cit., 50-58; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 73; Robert McElroy, Grover Cleveland The Man and Statesman (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1923), II, 46; Clyde Augustus Duniway, "Daniel Webster" (2nd term), in Bemis, op. cit., VI, 108-109.

Kamehameha IV, who, with native leaders, feared further incursions of American pioneers, as well as native treatment under American jurisdiction similar to that accorded Negroes. The American residents, while having gained missionary support for cession, still included elements who felt their economic and political ambitions would best be fostered by an independent republic. But American acceptance of the treaty as drafted would have been doubtful, due to Hawaiian insistence upon statehood status and a large financial settlement for the King. Following the failure of negotiations, increased American interest in the islands was overshadowed by events leading to the Civil War, although the West Coast maintained its expansionist dreams. But Hawaii, in 1854, had made its first bid for statehood.²⁴

From 1854 until the end of the Civil War, the outstanding diplomatic events were: (1) failure of the Hawaiian bid for a joint guarantee of its independence by the great powers, (2) declaration of the United States against European meddling in Hawaii, with a pledge to work against any filibustering activities and provide naval protection

²⁴Senate Document No. 77, 102, 117-130; Stevens, op. cit., 60-65, 69-76; H. Barrett Learned, "William Learned Marcy," in Bemis, op. cit., VI, 147, 290-291; Van Alstyne, "Hawaiian Independence," 19-23. Article II of the treaty (Senate Document No. 77, 123) read:

The Kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands shall be incorporated into the American Union as a State, enjoying the same degree of sovereignty as other States, and admitted as such . . . to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of a State as aforesaid on a perfect equality with the other States of the Union.

for its island interests, and (3) the appointment in 1863 of a minister resident to the islands, a move most gratifying to the Hawaiians.²⁵

Because of the annexationist sentiments of President Johnson and himself, it was with reluctance that Secretary of State Seward in 1868, in view of impending elections, keynoted by calls for economy and isolation, had to refuse the suggestion of his secret agent in Hawaii that the time was ripe for pushing annexation. Under President Grant, in 1869-1870, the American minister in Hawaii was urging a naval base at Honolulu and reporting alarm at growing Hawaiian sugar trade with British possessions.²⁶ At first apathetic, the Grant administration, by the 1871-1873 period submitted its minister's suggestions regarding annexation to the Senate for its views and sent a military commission to survey Hawaii's strategic and commercial possibilities.²⁷ The Reciprocity Treaty of 1876 will be discussed more fully later, but the Hayes administration reaffirmed American respect for Hawaiian independence and insisted that reciprocity privileges belonged exclusively to the

²⁵Van Alstyne, "Hawaiian Independence," 22-24; Hooley, loc. cit., 135-137; Stevens, op. cit., 79, 84; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 109-110, 114-115; Senate Document No. 77, 10, 130-133.

²⁶Minister Edward McCook to Secretary of State W. H. Seward, September 3, 1866, Senate Document No. 77, 133-135. For the correspondence concerning the question of annexation of the Hawaiian islands, see correspondence between McCook and Seward, June 7, 1867 and July 13, 1867, ibid., 135-136 and Seward to Z. S. Spaulding, July 5, 1868, ibid., 140. Also see, Stevens, op. cit., 106-110; Clark, op. cit., 11; Senate Document No. 77, 142-145.

²⁷For text of Grant's letter of submittal, April 5, 1871, and dispatch of Minister H. A. Peirce to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, February 25, 1871, see Senate Document No. 77, 12-15. For the work of the military commission, ibid., 150-154; Stevens, op. cit., 110-113; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 407.

United States. Under President Garfield, Secretary Blaine vigorously defended these exclusive privileges and intimated that force would be used to protect the Hawaiian government from foreign pressure for like considerations. Although he opposed the British Coolie Convention, which would have given the British unusual privileges, and suggested some form of American immigration to stem the tide of Oriental labor to Hawaii, Blaine followed the Tyler pattern of reaffirming Hawaiian independence and preferred "commercial assimilation" to "material annexation."²⁸

Blaine's successor, Secretary Frelinghuysen, departed from this doctrine somewhat by suggesting that the United States would protest any domestic policy which might hurt American investments or discourage further foreign capitalization. But he, too, felt commercial relations were the best means to strengthen Hawaiian ties with the United States.²⁹

The Cleveland-Bayard combination did not depart from the old policy, although President Cleveland, in a message to Congress in 1888

²⁸ Secretary of State J. G. Blaine to Minister J. M. Comly, December 1, 1881, Senate Document No. 77, 165, 166; Secretary of State W. M. Everts to Comly, August 6, 1878, Foreign Relations, 1878, 404-406; Blaine to Comly, June 30, 1881 and November 19, 1881, ibid., 1881, 624-626, 633-635. Stevens, op. cit., 154-158; Joseph B. Lockey, "James Gillespie Blaine," in Bemis, op. cit., VIII, 119-121; Philip Marshall Brown, "Frederick T. Frelinghuysen," in ibid., 34; Donald Rowland, "The United States and the Contract Labor Question in Hawaii, 1862-1900," The Pacific Historical Review, II (September, 1933), 255-258, hereafter cited as "Contract Labor."

²⁹ Secretary of State F. T. Frelinghuysen to Comly, May 31, 1882, Foreign Relations, 1882, 343-344; Stevens, op. cit., 158-159; Brown, loc. cit., 35.

spoke of the "natural interdependency and mutuality of interest" between the United States and Hawaii.³⁰ He opposed in 1887 a British loan of two million dollars, which would have been secured by Hawaiian government revenue.³¹ In the same year Bayard re-voiced Frelinghuysen's sentiments in stating that the commercial interests of the United States " . . . must not be jeopardized by internal confusion"³²

With the coming of the Harrison-Blaine administration in 1889 and the appointment of John L. Stevens as minister to Hawaii, American-Hawaiian relations entered a final phase which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Two outstanding diplomatic developments of Hawaiian-American relations during the period were the formulation of and adherence to the Tyler Doctrine and the constant jockeying between reciprocity and annexation moves on both sides of the Pacific. Before discussion of the Reciprocity Treaty, some understanding of the general economic development of the islands is necessary.

The whaling trade, due to successive discoveries of new grounds convenient to Hawaii, was the governing economic factor of the middle years of the nineteenth century and reached its peak period between 1843 and 1860. Whether or not one accepts the statement that Hawaiian

³⁰Foreign Relations, 1888, Part I, xv.

³¹Nevins, op. cit., 550; Foreign Relations, 1887, 558-562, 564, 568-569.

³²Secretary of State T. F. Bayard to Minister G. W. Merrill, July 12, 1887, ibid., 580-581.

economic wellbeing "was almost completely dependent upon the whaling fleets"³³ during these years, it undoubtedly was the life of the Honolulu mercantile business. Its decline in Hawaii was due, not only to the illness of the whole trade, but to the use of San Francisco as a more convenient port.³⁴

The trade, through its demand for meat, put livestock raising on an organized basis; it increased government revenues; and, of course, benefitted the merchants and the shipyards. Hawaiians, proving fine sailors, shipped out in such numbers that some have charged that this movement contributed to the population decline, although this effect is debatable. The development of Hawaii as a whaling transshipment point led to the export of island products that otherwise would not have left the islands. While the early social effects were detrimental to native morality and economic stability, adjustment to western life and the presence of a reputable foreign population of some size tended to counteract the more unfortunate whaling influences in later years.³⁵

One important domestic effect of the decline in the whaling trade was the disappearance of the great stimulus to small-scale, diversified farming, which had supplied the whalers with vegetables and other foods.

³³Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 90.

³⁴Morgan, op. cit., 76-77, 140, 151, 146; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 117-118; Bradley, op. cit., 215. For the local whaling trade, see Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 117-118, and Morgan, op. cit., 82. For description of the various whaling grounds and annual Honolulu income from whaling in thirties, see ibid., 76, 81.

³⁵Ibid., 81-82, 149-150, 85, 149; Bradley, op. cit., 227.

This effect would certainly be deplored by those contemporary critics of Hawaii's centralized, money-crop agriculture, despite one authority's opinion that whaling "probably retarded the development of large plantations, which involved hard work, heavy investments, and high risk of failure."³⁶ The predominance of Americans in the whaling trade is amply mirrored in the fact that, in one twelve-year period, 4,402 American ships vied with only 405 of all other nations. The trade played its part in tying American interests to Hawaii.³⁷

But general commerce also brought Honolulu revenue. After 1830, driven from the Alaskan coast and Oregon by the Russians and British Hudson's Bay Company respectively, Americans monopolized Hawaiian trade with California, Mexico, Peru, and Valparaiso, Chile, which in the 1840's became an important link in Hawaiian trade. The American-dominated trade between California and Hawaii tended, in time, to make the two areas almost interdependent. By 1863 it was reported that Americans dominated four fifths of Hawaiian commerce, while they continued to command the multiplying general and retail merchant establishments of Honolulu.³⁸

The era of the whalers passed over into the era of sugar but American predominance remained the common denominator. Contemporary to both eras, however, were various attempts to develop other agricultural

³⁶Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 90. See also Morgan, op. cit., 151.

³⁷Stevens, op. cit., 40; Senate Document No. 77, 39.

³⁸Ibid., 131; Jarves, loc. cit., 151-152; Bradley, op. cit., 219-227, 392; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 87-88; Morgan, op. cit., 100; Stevens, op. cit., 23, 40.

and industrial enterprises. Salt was early an important export, reaching a high point in 1847, with small amounts being exported until 1881.³⁹

After some experimentation in the twenties and thirties in cotton production and manufacture, little cotton was grown until the American Civil War when a considerable amount was exported. But, by 1875, the lure of sugar and unfavorable production factors led to the virtual abandonment of this crop. Today it is still a dormant agricultural possibility.⁴⁰

A number of coffee plantations appeared in the 1840's, and coffee, as an export, reached its peak about 1870. Tending to suffer from drought, blights and floods, as well as labor scarcity, coffee-growing became a small-scale, individually run enterprise. It still has a minor role in Hawaii, and its greater development is advocated by those who oppose the plantation system.⁴¹

Rice culture, after an early failure, had a boom period in the 1860's, followed by a setback. Thereafter the production of rice steadied and for some years was second only to sugar. It came to be mainly an enterprise of the Chinese in the islands.⁴²

³⁹Morgan, op. cit., 96-97.

⁴⁰Ibid., 159-160; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 94-95; Bradley, op. cit., 363-364.

⁴¹Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 94, 121; Morgan, op. cit., 161-164.

⁴²Senate Document No. 77, 131-132; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 94-96, 121; Bradley, op. cit., 248-250; Morgan, op. cit., 97, 164-168.

Mention has been made of the whaling trade influence on livestock raising. Centered on Oahu and Big Island, ranching at one time rivaled sugar in the production of wealth and by 1870 had reached a stable position which it kept until the end of the century. Exports were mainly in hides and tallow. Goats and sheep also were raised in some quantity.⁴³

An important economic development and a necessary predecessor to the rise of sugar was land reform. The feudal system of landholding, under which neither foreigners nor native commoners owned land in fee simple, had been attacked since the arrival of the white man as a deterrent to foreign capitalization, which, in turn, would have increased native employment opportunities. Early opposition to land reform by the missionaries, who feared alien control of the land, disappeared as they recognized in land ownership an incentive for the natives, who were indifferent to personal economic success. The King and chiefs, standing to be the greatest losers and fearing further haole encroachments could not long resist the combined commercial and missionary pressure. The first break came with the recognition in the "Declaration of Rights" in 1839 and the Constitution of 1840 that the people had property rights.⁴⁴

⁴³Ibid., 168-172; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 96, 121-122.

⁴⁴For a translation of the "Declaration of Rights" see, Sanford B. Dole, "Evolution of Hawaiian Land Tenures," (read before Hawaiian Historical Society, December 5, 1892), in Senate Report No. 227, 99. See also Morgan, op. cit., 123-128; Bradley, op. cit., 277-280.

A Land Commission set up in 1845 to investigate and settle land claims evolved the principle that the King, the chiefs and the commoners were each entitled to one-third of the land. By March, 1848, the land had been divided between the chiefs and the King, the King's part being subdivided into government and royal property. On these lands of the chiefs, King and government the commoners made their claims. Already allowed to buy government lands in fee simple, the natives, to account for their one-third of the land, in 1849 were allowed title without charge to the lands they occupied and cultivated. Despite a lessening of restrictions on foreigners in 1847, it was 1850 before they were able to hold and sell land in fee simple. The commoners made little economic gain from this reform, since they tended to lose their property through sale or foreclosure, preferred port town life, and often found their grants too small and scattered to support a family. However, the reform did raise their social status and legal rights. As feared, the haoles were the great gainers and, by 1896, owned fifty seven percent of the taxable land.⁴⁵

The last great economic development of the period, sugar, had its beginnings in the 1820's when the first plantation effort failed. But small-scale production continued, along with more plantation experiments. Exports grew from 8,000 pounds in 1836 to 750,000 in 1850, at

⁴⁵Morgan, op. cit., 130-133, 135-137, 139. For other discussions of the land reform, see Stevens, op. cit., 33-34; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 70-71; and Sanford B. Dole, loc. cit., 100-102.

least eleven plants for manufacturing sugar being in operation by 1846. The depression following the Gold Rush boom of 1848-1851, plus drought and labor scarcity, reduced the plantations by 1857 to only five of the largest. This survival based on bigness hastened the trend toward the plantation system in contrast to the earlier plan of individual planters sending their cane to central mills. After 1857 the number of plantations began to increase again and, by 1861, there were twenty two. Between 1855 and 1872 exports of sugar increased almost thirty eight times. Overexpansion during the Civil War, when exports increased ten times between 1860 and 1865, brought bankruptcy to a number of plantations in 1867.⁴⁶ But expansion soon resumed, and, although greatly benefitted by the Reciprocity Treaty, "It is not possible to take seriously the legend that Hawaiian sugar was in the doldrums, or declining, until rescued by the Reciprocity Treaty."⁴⁷

Because of the convenience of having the laborers live on the plantations, because of the need both of the happy-go-lucky natives and the non-adjusted foreign laborers for aid in obtaining the necessities of life, and because there was a remnant of the missionary concern for the less able, plantation paternalism developed. While more humane and socially less restrictive, this system produced a hierarchy from

⁴⁶Morgan, op. cit., 174-175, 177-178, 178-181; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 92-93, 119; Stevens, op. cit., 35-36. For other details of the early sugar industry, see Vandercook, op. cit., 9-11, 22-25; Bradley, op. cit., 242-247; Morgan, op. cit., 176.

⁴⁷Ibid., 181.

the Honolulu board member to the field laborer that was not too dissimilar to the old feudal organization of society.⁴⁸ The persistence of this paternalistic system of agriculture into recent times has produced one of the objections to statehood.

Another objection, the great Oriental population, also figured in the rise of sugar. The decline of the native population, in addition to the failure of the Hawaiian to make a good field hand, led the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society in 1851-1852 to import some 300 Chinese laborers on five year contracts. A previous act of the legislature had legalized contract labor. The continued rapid decline of the native people spurred the immigration of some 55,000 laborers between 1877 and 1890, about half of whom were Chinese. Although an excellent field laborer, the Chinese tended to leave the plantation for the city or for small farms or shops, while the government, concerned over the great rise in the Oriental population, began looking for other labor sources.⁴⁹

In 1878, the Hawaiian Bureau of Immigration brought in the first group of Portuguese from the Maderia Islands. This was the beginning of a migration that lasted until 1913, when some 20,000 persons had come from the Maderias or the Azores. These laborers were a great

⁴⁸Ibid., 187-188; Vandercook, op. cit., 54.

⁴⁹Ibid., 53, 56-57; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 96-97, 156; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 681; Stevens, op. cit., 145; Furnas, op. cit., 133; Alex Ladenson, "The Background of the Hawaiian-Japanese Labor Convention of 1886," The Pacific Historical Review, IX (December, 1940), 389, 393; Rowland, "Contract Labor," 249-250, 254.

success, but proved too expensive, due to the high transportation costs and higher wage scales.⁵⁰ An attempt to bring in Polynesians proved unsuccessful, while neither Europeans nor Americans were attracted to the islands for various reasons. But Europeans did come in small numbers, Norwegians and Germans in 1881, Galicians in 1898, and a few Americans the same year.⁵¹

Therefore, Japan had hardly entered the international scene before Hawaii was requesting diplomatic recognition as a prelude to a labor agreement. Foiled in attempts in 1860 and 1867 to get even a commercial treaty, the Hawaiian consul-general in 1868 managed to send to Hawaii 149 Japanese, without official Japanese approval. These laborers filled the sugar planter's bill, and he wanted more. Despite a commercial treaty with Hawaii in 1871 and the tempting offers of the Hawaiian Board of Immigration, Japan refused to send more laborers to the islands. Finally, after many more inducements, the Japanese government in 1883 agreed to permit voluntary emigration. Despite exceptional care by the Hawaiian government to insure good treatment for the Japanese laborers, Japanese complaints led to a labor convention signed in January, 1886. Allowing for free emigration, the treaty also provided for Japanese doctors and interpreters, free diplomatic and

⁵⁰Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 156-157; Vandercook, op. cit., 57-59; Rowland, "Contract Labor," 254.

⁵¹Ladenson, loc. cit., 389; Vandercook, op. cit., 55-56, 64; Rowland, "Contract Labor," 254. See Ladenson, loc. cit., 389-390, for reasons why Americans and Europeans did not come. See also, enclosures, Comly to Evarts, December 22, 1879, Foreign Relations, 1880, 595-596.

consular contact with the laborers, and full responsibility of the Hawaiian government for the well-being of the Japanese. Under this agreement, which ended in 1894, more than 28,000 persons came to Hawaii; but the movement of Japanese to the islands continued until 1908, when some 180,000 had come in, of whom 126,000 left eventually.⁵²

The opposition of the United States government, especially under Blaine's guidance, to Oriental immigration has already been noted. It continued to voice its disapproval against both Japanese immigration and the return to heavy Chinese immigration in the years from 1882 to 1885 and 1890 to 1892.⁵³

By 1890 there were 12,360 Japanese, 15,301 Chinese and 8,602 Portuguese in the islands, although, of 20,536 plantation laborers, only 10,991 were under the contract system. Despite much public and official criticism in the United States of contract labor, the government of Hawaii shared with the planters' association an expenditure of \$3,000,000 in the late eighties and the nineties to bring in laborers.⁵⁴ But Hawaii had imported more than laborers; it had imported the problem of making an East-West melting pot a democratic society.

⁵²Vandercook, op. cit., 59-60; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 157; Ladenson, loc. cit., 390-400; Rowland, "Contract Labor," 260; Forbes Lindsay, "Hawaiian Problems of To-Day," The American Review of Reviews, XI (September, 1909), 306.

⁵³Senate Document No. 77, 138-141; Foreign Relations, 1868, Part II, 342-349; ibid., 1881, 617-619; ibid., 1883, 555-556, 564-566; ibid., 1884, 281-284; ibid., 1885, 470, 475-476; ibid., 1886, 528; ibid., 1888, Part I, 834, 864-865, 868-873; Rowland, "Contract Labor," 250-252, 259-262.

⁵⁴Stevens, op. cit., 144-145; Lindsay, loc. cit., 306.

Economically the islands had passed from the seasonal and unstable whaling trade to general trade and the plantation system of agriculture, with sugar the chief crop. Economic development had brought land reform, large numbers of Oriental residents and still closer ties with the United States. But the link which was to tie the islands permanently to the American economic system was the Reciprocity Treaty. The story of this treaty is one of the most important segments of Hawaiian history.

The Hawaiian government attempted without success in 1848 and 1852 to interest the United States in a treaty whereby Hawaiian sugar products would have free entry into the United States, the latter gaining reciprocal privileges for some of its products. In 1855, during the Pierce administration, a treaty was actually negotiated and ratified by the Hawaiian government. The United States Senate, however, after consideration until 1857, never gave its approval. Opposition of Louisiana sugar producers, fears as to its effect upon most-favored-nations clauses in other treaties, a question of constitutionality, the feeling that Hawaii would derive the chief benefit, and public disinterest were responsible for the Senate action.⁵⁵

Despite advocacy by the United States minister to Hawaii and Senate interest in the 1863-1864 period, Secretary of State Seward

⁵⁵For text of treaty see, Senate Report No. 227, 45-47. See also, Ralph S. Kuykendall, A History of Hawaii (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926), 211; Stevens, op. cit., 47-58-59, 78-83; Hooley, loc. cit., 128-130, 132-133, 140-146; Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: F. S. Crofts and Co., 1947), 3rd Ed., 468.

felt the treaty would not be "advisable" since, among other things, it would reduce war-time revenues.⁵⁶

The end of the Civil War boom with a concomitant drop in sugar prices brought an Hawaiian economic crisis and new demands for reciprocity. While expressing a preference for annexation, Seward in 1867 authorized negotiations ending in a treaty signed in May, 1867. Again Hawaii ratified and again the Senate, after long delay, defeated the treaty in June, 1870. While preoccupation with reconstruction problems, Congressional animosity toward the Johnson administration, loss of revenue, and particularly a constitutional question as to whether the Senate could act upon a revenue-reducing measure were important, a significant development was the fear of obstructing annexation. This latter fear stemmed from the idea that reciprocity would satisfy that element in Hawaii which had been desirous of annexation as a means of gaining economic stability. There was little evidence of Louisiana sugar opposition in the defeat. By February, 1873, public agitation, propelled by economic troubles, forced another Hawaiian try for a treaty. The King was persuaded to offer the United States the use of the Pearl Harbor lagoon as a naval base, but lack of American interest in the entire question and native indignation over the Pearl Harbor offer led to cessation of efforts. But further Hawaiian agitation brought King

⁵⁶Senate Document No. 77, 10, 132; John Patterson, "The United States and Hawaiian Reciprocity, 1867-1870," The Pacific Historical Review, VII (March, 1938), 15-16; Stevens, op. cit., 96-97; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 115.

Kalakaua to the United States in 1874 partly to strengthen the hands of his reciprocity envoys. A treaty was signed in January of 1875, ratified by both countries, but, due to a requirement for a Congressional enabling act, was not effective until September 9, 1876.⁵⁷

As enacted, the treaty provided for the free entry of fifteen Hawaiian products, including sugar, molasses and rice, into the United States, with reciprocal favors for American products, mainly manufactures.⁵⁸ Most important, from the American viewpoint, was the amendment to Article IV, inserted by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. It stated:

It is agreed, on the part of His Hawaiian Majesty that so long as this treaty shall remain in force, he will not lease or otherwise dispose of or create any lien upon any port, harbor, or other territory in his dominions, or grant any special privilege or rights of use therein, to any other power, state or government, nor make any treaty by which any other nation shall obtain the same privileges, relative to the admission of any articles free of duty, hereby secured to the United States.⁵⁹

⁵⁷For Hawaiian ratification of the treaty of 1867 see, Seward to McCook, October 5, 1867, Senate Document No. 77, 139-140. For President Johnson on the importance of reciprocity and annexationist sentiments see, extracts from message to Congress, December 9, 1868, ibid., 142. Also see, ibid., 133, 139, 148-150, 160-163, William M. Malloy, compiler, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1910), I, 918-919; Congressional Record, 43 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 3, Part I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1875), 144; Henry W. Temple, "William H. Seward," in Bemis, op. cit., VII, 113; Stevens, op. cit., 97-98, 100-106, 116-119, 124-125; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 116, 149-151.

⁵⁸Malloy, op. cit., 1916; Kuykendall, op. cit., 252; Morgan, op. cit., 212.

⁵⁹Malloy, op. cit., I, 917. For whole treaty, see ibid., 915-917. For Grant's submittal to Congress for enabling act, December 7, 1875, see Foreign Relations, 1875, I, xxvii.

This had the effect of preventing any other power gaining territorial or political preferences and, in denying reciprocity to any other nation, this clause meant the end of the further growth of trade with the British possessions.⁶⁰ This amendment made approval of the treaty by the United States possible. As noted in the appendix to a report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1894:

The Hawaiian treaty was negotiated for the purpose of securing political control of those islands, making them industrially and commercially a part of the United States and preventing any other great power from acquiring a foothold there, which might be adverse to the welfare and safety of our Pacific coast in time of war.⁶¹

Real concern that the growing trade of Hawaii with the British possessions of Australia, New Zeland and British Columbia would give Great Britain first commercial and then political supremacy in the islands was one of the chief motivations for passage of the treaty.⁶²

The importance of "Reciprocity, the Wonder Worker"⁶³ is difficult to exaggerate. The unbelievable increase in sugar production (a ten-fold export increase in fifteen years), the strengthened economic

⁶⁰Stevens, op. cit., 125-126.

⁶¹"The Hawaiian Treaty, A Review of its Commercial Results," Senate Report No. 227, 103. Hereafter cited as "Hawaiian Treaty."

⁶²"Hawaiian Treaty," loc. cit., 103; Morgan, op. cit., 211-212; Stevens, op. cit., 126-127. See also Kuykendall, op. cit., 253, and Barber, op. cit., 30.

⁶³Chapter heading, Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 149.

ties with the United States and increased attention to Hawaii as a strategic base, better wages, the stimulus to improved transportation and government public works are discussed at length by many authors.⁶⁴ But more pertinent to the statehood question are the following results of the treaty: (1) the native Hawaiian was pushed further into the background, since he neither liked nor was skillful in plantation management or labor;⁶⁵ (2) the planters' use of poor land led to "disadvantageous application of labor and capital;"⁶⁶ (3) the treaty fortified the trend toward a one-crop economy; (4) the treaty probably accelerated the concentration of capital and economic control in fewer hands; and (5) it stimulated further the importation of Oriental labor.⁶⁷ In general it tended to emphasize the very points which would bring criticism to Hawaii as a prospective state: concentrated wealth, the plantation system of social organization, a heterogeneous population, and the lack of economic diversification. But it tended also to foredoom the monarchy, since it concentrated economic, social and, consequently, political power in the hands of the very elements most critical of the native government.⁶⁸

⁶⁴Morgan, op. cit., 193, 213-215; Stevens, op. cit., 141; Kuykendall, op. cit., 257-258; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 152; Barber, op. cit., 32.

⁶⁵Stevens, op. cit., 143; Edwin G. Burrows, Hawaiian Americans (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), 41-43.

⁶⁶Morgan, op. cit., 215.

⁶⁷Ibid.; Stevens, op. cit., 142-143; Kuykendall, op. cit., 256.

⁶⁸Stevens, op. cit., 141.

he treaty might be abrogated by either power after September 9, 1883. By this date United States opposition, composed of fears of a Pacific coast sugar monopoly, the argument of loss of revenue, Oregon charges that the chief benefits went to San Francisco, criticism of the contract labor system, and dislike of competition to domestic sugar production and east coast refining industries, had reached a high point.⁶⁹ Both the Arthur and Cleveland administrations pressed for simple renewal of the treaty, but again the Senate Foreign Relations Committee offered an amendment in April of 188 . Included in the treaty as Article II, it read, in part, that the Hawaiian King

. . . grants to the Government of the United States the exclusive right to enter the harbor of Pearl River, in the Island of Oahu, and to establish and maintain there a coal- ing and repair station for the use of vessels of the United States,⁷⁰

Even with this added inducement, it was January, 1887, before renewal was approved. The United States had to ease the Hawaiian fears as to the effect of Article II on its sovereignty before the King would sign the new agreement. Going into effect in November of 1887, this treaty governed commercial relations until annexation. The United States did not take advantage of its Pearl Harbor privileges before

⁶⁹"Hawaiian Treaty," loc. cit., 103-113; Morgan, op. cit., 213, 216; Krykendall and Day, op. cit., 159-160; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 408-409; Stevens, op. cit., 160, 162-164, 165-167; Donald Marquand Dozer, "The Opposition to Hawaiian Reciprocity, 187 -1888," The Pacific Historical Review, XIV (June, 1945), 158-160; Foreign Relations, 1879, Part I, 529-541; ibid., 1883, 545-546, 552-555, 557, 558-561, 561-563, 573, 574.

⁷⁰Malloy, op. cit., I, 919-920.

annexation, so that, in general, the renewal merely continued the effects of the previous treaty.⁷¹

While the Reciprocity Treaty was working its wonders, the final effects of early missionary work in education was also becoming evident. By 1890 some sixty percent of the native population was literate. When various factors had brought a serious decrease in the effectiveness of the missionary common schools (as differentiated from boarding schools), the government, in 1840, had established a public school system, soon directed by a cabinet minister. As the system developed, former sectarian influences disappeared; English schools were established, the use of the Hawaiian language finally being discontinued as an educational medium; American textbooks came into use; and some forty percent of the teachers by 1890 were American. By 1888 all English-language public schools were tuition free, but public secondary education had yet to appear in 1890.⁷² However, public education was but one phase of Hawaiian political development during the period.

Hawaii's first written constitution of 1840 produced innovations in an elective House of Representatives and a Supreme Court. But the

⁷¹Congressional Record, 49 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 18, Part I, 914-915; Part II, 1288-1289; Merrill to Bayard, November 8, 1887, Foreign Relations, 1887, 588-592; ibid., 1888, Part I, 835-837.

⁷²According to a witness in the 1894 Senate investigation of the 1893 revolution, not more than one-twentieth of the schools used the Hawaiian language by that time, Senate Report No. 227, 269. Frear, op. cit., 141, 143, 146; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 79-82, 241-243; Stevens, op. cit., 9, 145; Bradley, op. cit., 127-132, 135-136, 147-154, 338-353, 354-365.

hereditary House of Nobles was but an extension of the council of chiefs which had been for many years an important law-making body, since the long minority of Kamehameha III had tended to make the kingdom an oligarchy rather than a monarchy. Old, too, was the peculiar official, kuhina nui, who had powers of veto and consent over all the King's actions. The basic law of the kingdom had grown up in the twenties when various decrees and codes covered murder, theft, Sabbath-breaking, gambling and adultery. After Kamehameha III's brief fling at absolutism, during which he abrogated most of these laws, a fairly comprehensive penal code was established in 1835. The next year, the chiefs, aware of their political ineptness, had begun the search for a mentor, and their choice, William Richards, in 1838 delivered a group of lectures on political science and economics, based mainly, it would seem, upon the Bible and the Declaration of Independence. As a result of these lectures, a declaration appeared in 1839 which guaranteed to the people their rights of life, liberty and the products of their minds and labor. It also provided a broad civil code. Another result was the constitution, which restated the rights of 1839 and was notable for two things: (1) it stemmed from the felt need of governing authorities for definitive political organization and represented the King's voluntary recognition that his subjects had certain rights, and (2) the King remained, with the kuhina nui, the executive, legislative and

judicial head of the kingdom, despite the constitutional provision for three branches of government.⁷³

In 1842 the setting up of a board to control government revenue and taxes brought many economies and an eventual end to the national debt. By 1844 John Ricord, American-born attorney general, had devised an organizational plan, supplementary to the constitution, which was instituted in a series of Organic Acts. These acts, dating from 1846 to 1848, provided for five executive departments and their operation, a privy council which took on the attributes of a cabinet, and an improved judicial system, with circuit and district courts under a superior court. Civil and legal codes were improved during the forties to give the kingdom a comprehensive basic set of laws.

While no foreigners were elected to the legislature before 1851, a small group of foreigners, mainly Americans, had by 1850 gained control of the judicial and executive departments, as well as having become important policy makers. A monarchy with houses of nobles and commoners, seen by some as a British derivative, was actually an outgrowth of Hawaiian governmental history, while the written constitution, universal suffrage and town meetings eloquently bespoke American ideas.

⁷³For a complete translation of the Constitution of 1840, see Senate Report No. 227, 121-127. For constitutional development, see Jarves, *loc. cit.*, 141-143; Kuykendall and Day, *op. cit.*, 40, 49-55; Bradley, *op. cit.*, 271-277, 307-310, 319-325; Henry E. Chambers, "Constitutional History of Hawaii," in Herbert B. Adams, ed., *Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1896), XIV (January, 1896), 10-17.

Certainly the American missionaries had done much, indirectly, to forward the idea that the common people had certain rights.⁷⁴ As King Kalakaua would admit, much later, in a speech to the American Congress, "Your laws and your civilization have been in a great degree our model."⁷⁵

An improved constitution of 1852 provided: (1) definite separation of powers between the three branches of government, (2) further checks upon the King, although he retained absolute legislative veto, (3) partial ministerial responsibility through annual reports to the legislature, of which the ministers were members, (4) enlarged membership of the lower house which originated revenue bills, and (5) definite provision for universal suffrage.⁷⁶

No significant changes in this constitution were made during Kamehameha IV's reign (1854-1863), but his brother, Kamehameha V (1863-1872), desiring more power and fearing the effects of universal suffrage toward increasing American influence, refused to support it. Calling for an extra-legal convention to revise the constitution, he found the majority of delegates opposed to his wishes. A deadlock over voting qualifications led him to dissolve the convention, abrogate the constitution, and impose a new one, effective in August, 1864, more to

⁷⁴Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 69-72; Chambers, loc. cit., 16-17; Bradley, op. cit., 326-332; Jarves, loc. cit., 150-151; Stevens, op. cit., 25-28.

⁷⁵Congressional Record, 43 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 3, Part I, 144.

⁷⁶Chambers, loc. cit., 17-20; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 75; Senate Report No. 227, 160; Stevens, op. cit., 38-39.

his liking. This constitution of 1864 made the following changes of importance: (1) removed the guarantee of vote by ballot and provided property and literacy franchise qualifications, (2) weakened the separation of powers, (3) provided a unicameral legislature, (4) allowed removal of judicial officials, formerly appointed for life, and (5) gave the privy council less control over the King and the King more control over the cabinet. The King was responsible to no one. Operative for twenty-three years, this constitution started a long controversy between its supporters and those who preferred the more democratic Constitution of 1852.⁷⁷

Reestablishment of universal suffrage in 1874 was the only one of many amendments which met with success during the brief reign of Lunalilio. But the new king, Kalakaua, elected in 1874, used every power afforded by the Constitution of 1864 and turned universal suffrage to his benefit by appeals to the native voters. His dismissal of unobliging cabinets and susceptibility to bribes and adventurers marked the years from 1876 to 1880. From the latter year until 1887, Kalakaua's rule became more questionable with odd deals with sugar baron Claus Spreckels, legalization of the sale of liquor, unparalleled extravagance leading to a great public debt, and provision for government licensing of the sale of opium. Even progress in leper treatment was injured by government sale of exemptions from segregation requirements.

⁷⁷Chambers, loc. cit., 20-22; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 111-114; Stevens, op. cit., 91; Senate Report No. 227, 160-168.

Racial antagonism was deliberately aroused, while the King advocated a return to the native religion and embarked upon an ambitious scheme for leadership of a Polynesian League, a confederation of the South Sea islands.⁷⁸

These policies produced opposition leading to the organization in 1887 of the Hawaiian League, composed of foreigners and some natives. The League majority wanted only reform, but a radical minority wanted a republic and eventual American annexation. Election of a reform-minded legislature was blocked by the King's control of elections through bribes and ballot-box stuffing. Therefore, the League armed itself in event peaceful change became impossible. In addition to the political factors, governmental extravagance and increased taxation were made all the more baneful to the planter and commercial interests by an economic depression. It took only public knowledge of the King's connivance in an opium license bribe to ignite the tinder box. A League-led mass meeting in June of 1887 was intimidation enough to force the King to accept a new constitution, effective in July. The King no longer could act without cabinet consent, appoint members of the House of Nobles, which became elective, nor arbitrarily dismiss the cabinet. The latter

⁷⁸Stevens, op. cit., 91-94; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 162-164, 166-169; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 411-412; Chambers, loc. cit., 22-23. For American political influence in Kalakaua's reign, see Stevens, op. cit., 117-118, 148-149. For Mark Twain's favorable impressions of Lunalilio, see Frear, op. cit., 31-33. For treaty of confederation between Samoa and Hawaii, see enclosure, dispatch, Merrill to Bayard, March 29, 1887, Foreign Relations, 1887, 569-570.

body was responsible to the legislature which could both remove the cabinet and override the King's veto by a two thirds vote. Less liberal were property qualifications for both the Nobles and their electors, which put this body almost completely under foreign control. There was a literacy qualification for electors of lower house members. Further foreign influence was gained by providing suffrage for all foreign residents willing to take an oath to support the constitution.⁷⁹

Unrest continued, however, due to native antagonism toward the increased power of the foreigners and the degradation of their highest representative, the King, and also due to dissension among the reform group. A pro-native insurrection in 1889 was quickly put down, but, in 1890, due to native support of the King's party and division of the reform party, the latter lost its legislative majority and a coalition cabinet came into office. The King's attempt to revise the constitution failed and his death in early 1891 brought his sister, Liliuokalani, to the throne. While she took an oath to support the constitution, Queen Liliuokalani's desire for power was to prove both stronger and more meaningful to Hawaiian history than any absolutist tendencies of her predecessors.⁸⁰

⁷⁹Chambers, loc. cit., 23-27; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 169-171; Stevens, op. cit., 149-153; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 412. For text of 1887 constitution, see Merrill to Bayard, July 11, 1887, Foreign Relations, 1887, 574-579. For resolutions adopted at mass meeting on June 30, 1887, see Merrill to Bayard, July 30, 1887, ibid., 583-584.

⁸⁰Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 171-173; Stevens, op. cit., 190-192; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 412; Bennett, loc. cit., 156-159; Merrill to Blaine, August 1, 1889, Senate Document No. 77, 174-176.

The years from 1830 through 1890 saw the beginning or fuller development of those characteristics which today either enhance or detract from Hawaii's standing as a prospective state. Upon some of these characteristics, it is too soon to pass judgment. In 1890, Hawaii had only begun to assimilate her Oriental population. It would be many years before the paternalism of the plantation system would come to grips with organized labor. The intrinsic weakness or strength of a money-crop economy had yet to be fully tested. But, on some questions at least partial judgment is possible. It was to Hawaii's credit that a scant thirty years after Kamehameha I united the islands, a public school system had been established, and its advancement was surprisingly similar to public school growth in the United States. Hawaii, by 1852, was approaching self-government, although the King still retained considerable power. However, democratic advance had been imposed from above; it was not the result of popular initiative. This fact partly explains the later retreat toward absolutism. But another factor in that retreat was the growing antagonism of the natives toward foreign political influence, a signal in itself of advance toward political maturity. By 1890 Hawaii had developed the structure for self-government and a growing popular desire to exercise it.

In maintaining her independence, Hawaii was indebted to the jealous concern of Great Britain, France and the United States that no one of them gain the opportunity to seize her. Obviously, she could not have withstood actual attack from any of these nations,

but their jealousy would have lost much vitality had Hawaii not used it to play one power against the other. Furthermore, unlike China, Hawaii never closed her doors. By making her ports available to all comers, no nation, for commercial gain, found it necessary to seize the islands. When her feudal land-holding system or her laws threatened to provoke foreign interference, she made them conformable to foreign standards. When forced treaties ate at her sovereignty, she worked patiently but persistently for better terms. Probably Hawaii's maintenance of independence was her outstanding achievement in this period. Hawaii, the state, should have no trouble in dealing with her sisters after her long experience in international relations.

The most obvious development of the era was the continued process of Americanization. Americans had preached Hawaii's sermons, helped write her constitutions, taught her children, developed her economy and become her citizens. Since 1843 Hawaii had benefitted from the protective cloak of the Tyler Doctrine, and, since 1876, she had shared the wealth of the American economic system. By 1890, Hawaii had few virtues and few faults for which Americans were not, to some extent, responsible.

CHAPTER III

THE YEARS OF CHANGE

Perhaps no period in Hawaiian history vies in incident, pace and controversy with the years from 1890 to 1898, but most significant to the statehood issue was Hawaii's attainment of territorial status. In general, despite political upheaval, the previously outlined economic and cultural trends which would later affect the statehood question continued with little change. However, the period brought climaxes in the fields of Hawaiian-American diplomatic relations and domestic political growth.

Hawaiian-American diplomatic relations from 1889 to 1892 centered around sporadic attempts to effect a more comprehensive reciprocity treaty. In early attempts the Hawaiian Reform Party cabinet was handicapped by native fears of jeopardizing island autonomy--an apprehension the political opposition used tellingly. Furthermore, Kalakaua, on three occasions, refused to sanction negotiations; the cabinet lost political strength in the election of 1890; and American interest strayed. By May, 1890, negotiations had come to a halt.

Disturbed by Congressional debate on tariff changes which would threaten reciprocity benefits, the Hawaiian cabinet had seen the treaty as a means of assuring long-term continuation of those privileges upon which the Hawaiian economy so largely depended. Other objectives were a larger number of duty-free products to encourage diversification of

agriculture and industry and the long-sought, definitive American guarantee of Hawaiian independence. Also desired for Hawaiian growers was a share in any bounties or other benefits accorded American producers of similar goods. The Harrison-Blaine administration seemed mainly concerned with bolstering American predominance in the islands and answering Hawaii's threat to seek non-American commercial fields if reciprocity benefits were curtailed.¹

Despite Minister John L. Stevens' stout support of a stronger treaty and his warnings regarding tariff changes, the McKinley Tariff Bill was passed in October, 1890. Eliminating all tariff duties on foreign sugar and granting a bounty to American producers, it destroyed Hawaii's advantage over other foreign sugar growers. For a time it even nullified benefits to other treaty-stipulated Hawaiian products, but this effect was rectified by Congressional action. Two years later Stevens estimated that sugar planters and their associates had lost not less than \$12,000,000, while Queen Liliuokalani called for legislative measures to stem a depression she attributed to American tariff policy.

A November legislative request was fulfilled in March, 1891, when Hawaii recommenced treaty negotiations. It was hoped that an enlarged free list would develop agricultural products to replace the

¹Foreign Minister J. Austin to A. Rosa, et al, October 4, 1889, House of Representatives Executive Document No. 48, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 27-29. Hereafter cited as House Document No. 48. See also Merrill to Blaine, September 7, 1889, ibid., 23-24; Minister John L. Stevens to Blaine, October 7, 1889, February 7, 1890, February 10, 1890, with enclosures, ibid., 26-27, 35-36, 37-48; Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), 36-37, 41-42; Stevens, op. cit., 196-199.

sorely pressed sugar industry in island economy. Although the treaty was a political issue in the 1892 election, even the nativistic Liberal Party curbed its opposition, so vital was the treaty to the economy. This time, however, American politics intervened. President Harrison failed to sign the treaty because of its connection with the whole tariff issue, imminent elections and opposition by domestic economic interests. The victory of the Democrats in 1892 ended further moves toward the treaty.²

By late 1892 Hawaiian-American relations had reached a stalemate. So prominent had these relations become, that, in 1890, the United States raised Stevens to the rank of minister plenipotentiary. Yet political conditions in the two countries prevented further cementing of bonds. Hawaii needed and desired greater economic concessions from the United States. But it had little to offer in return except greater infringement upon its sovereignty, a step the 1889-1892 cabinets found impossible to take because of growing native nationalism. No American president dared offer more concessions without commensurate returns. The idea of a protectorate, as virtually proposed early in the first series of negotiations, had been rejected by Secretary of State Marcy as early

²Stevens to Blaine, March 20, 1890, May 20, 1890, May 28, 1890, September 5, 1891, October 15, 1891, February 8, 1892, November 14, 1890, House Document No. 48, 51, 53-55, 84-87, 73; Stevens to Secretary of State J. W. Foster, November 20, 1892, *ibid.*, 116-118, 97-107; Liliuokalani to Legislature, Speech, May 28, 1892, *ibid.*, 94; Congressional Record, 51 Congress, 2 Session, Part IV, 3637-38, 3760; Blaine to Harrison, November 27, 30, 1891, in Albert T. Volwiler, editor, *The Correspondence Between Benjamin Harrison and James G. Blaine, 1882-1893* (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1940), 211-212; Stevens, *op. cit.*, 188, 200-202, 205; Kuykendall and Day, *op. cit.*, 175; Pratt, *op. cit.*, 42-48.

as 1854, as it was again by Stevens in 1892. With the suspension of negotiations, that idea lost more prestige, and its alternative, annexation, gained in stature in many eyes, both Hawaiian and American. By 1893 it was evident that some drastic political change in either Hawaii or the United States would be necessary before closer relations could become a reality. By 1893 such a change in the islands was underway.³

Already outlined through the reign of Kalakaua, domestic political growth reached a turning point in 1893. In any summary, emphasis belongs on the fact that early constitutional growth in Hawaii was under the guidance, to a great extent, of the missionary element. As the American Board became less active, those whites were lost who held the middle ground between the natives and the haoles less interested in Manaka wellbeing. Lost, too, as time went on, were two sources of native leadership, the politically adept Kamehameha dynasty and the chieftain class. Race antagonism, spurred by leprosy segregation laws even before the tremendous increase in foreign investment and population made its mark, flared openly during the reign of Lunalilio (1873-1874). Kalakaua's penchant for despotism, extravagance and corruption had brought on the white-led revolution in 1887, which merely increased the tension. A native insurrection in 1889 against the Reform Party

³Stevens to Blaine, September 17, 1890, House Document No. 48, 69; Marcy to Gregg, April 4, 1854, House of Representatives Report No. 1355, 55 Congress, 2 Session, 70. Hereafter cited as House Report No. 1355. Stevens to Blaine, February 8, 1892, ibid., 83; Stevens, op. cit., 202-203.

administration was quelled, but both Kalakaua and the future Queen Liliuokalani had been, at the least, interested and hopeful bystanders. The leader of the revolt, half-caste Robert W. Wilcox, despite proven guilt, was acquitted by a native jury, so intense was native feeling against the 1887 constitution, which Wilcox tried to overthrow. The landing of American troops to protect American life and property in 1889, as in the election riot of 1874, set a precedent for the greater revolution yet to come.

Kalakaua's death in 1891 brought to the throne the controversial Liliuokalani, a mature woman of education and experience in both politics and social work. Most striking, however, were her courage and will--both of which she employed toward regaining royal powers lost in the Constitution of 1887, to which she took oath reluctantly.⁴

⁴House of Representatives, Executive Document No. 47, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 197-199, hereafter cited as House Document No. 47; Merrill to Blaine, May 8, 1889, July 26, 1889, August 1, 1889, September 7, 1889, House Document No. 48, 5, 14-18, 23-24; Article 22, Constitution of 1887, House Document No. 47, 340; Liliuokalani to Commissioner James H. Blount, n. d. /1893/, Blount to Secretary of State W. Q. Gresham, July 17, 1893, *ibid.*, 391, 109; Stevens to Blaine, February 5, 1891, House Document No. 48, 74-75; Stevens to Blaine, October 17, 1889, November 4, 1889, *ibid.*, 30, 32; Senate Report No. 227, 195-196, 283-286, 292, 312, 439-441, 496-497, 506, 524-525. For minor political developments, 1889-1891, see Stevens to Blaine, November 14, 1889, February 10, 1890, May 28, 1890, June 26, 1890, August 19, 1890, September 25, 1890, November 14, 1890, House Document No. 48, 33-34, 37, 55, 66-68, 70, 72-73; Senate Report No. 227, 524-525. For discussions of Liliuokalani's character, see Senate Report No. 227, 177, *et passim*; Stevens to Blaine, May 21, 1892, and Stevens to Foster, October 19, 1892, House Document No. 48, 92, 96. See also Kuykendall and Day, *op. cit.*, 174 and Stevens, *op. cit.*, 192-193.

Upheld by the Supreme Court of Hawaii, Liliuokalani won a victory against the "missionary" faction in appointing her own coalition cabinet. The following months were quiet, although the wary Stevens asked for the presence of an American warship during the 1892 elections. These elections brought into the legislature three parties: the National Reform, or Queen's party, the "missionary" Reform Party, and a Liberal Party, made up mainly of malcontents such as R. W. Wilcox. This latter party, while anti-white, allied itself for some months with the Reform group because of its opposition to the influence of the Queen's marshal, C. B. Wilson. Together, these parties ousted three successive cabinets chosen by the Queen. But some of the Liberals, disgruntled at lack of representation in the all-Reform cabinet appointed in November and impatient at cabinet delay in removing Wilson from office, threw their weight to the Queen's party. There followed in succession the passage of an opium-sales licensing bill and the Reform-opposed bill establishing a national lottery. Finally came the voting out of the Reform cabinet on Thursday, January 12, 1893.⁵

⁵In House Document No. 48, see the following dispatches: Stevens to Blaine, February 22, 1891, 77-78; April 4, 1891, 81; August 20, 1891, 82; February 8, 1892, 87; May 21, 1892, 91-93; Stevens to Foster, September 9, 1892, 94; September 14, 1892, 95; October 19, 1892, with inclosures, 96-107; October 31 and November 1, 1892, 108-109; November 8, 1892, 110. See also Senate Report No. 227, 290-293, 295, 312, 323-324, 519-520, 761-764; Blount to Gresham, July 17, 1893, House Document No. 47, 114; *ibid.*, 94; Julius W. Pratt, "The Hawaiian Revolution: a Re-Interpretation," The Pacific Historical Review, I (August, 1932), 290-292.

A detailed description of events of the week following is not pertinent to the statehood issue. Briefly, with a friendly cabinet in office, the Queen prorogued the legislature on Saturday. That afternoon she failed to get her cabinet's signatures to a new constitution which she planned to impose through executive action alone. This constitution would have destroyed white political dominance. The cabinet's refusal to sign had been advised by a group composed mainly of white planters and businessmen who formed that afternoon a Committee of Safety of thirteen. The Queen announced a postponement in the proclaiming of the new constitution, but the Committee continued to be active. On Sunday a canvass of arms and men available for its support was made and a mass meeting called for the following day. Disturbed by these events, the cabinet, on Monday, persuaded the Queen to declare publicly that she had been under pressure from native agitation and would make no further attempts at extra-constitutional change. Her marshal was unable to get the Committee to cancel either its own activities or its mass meeting, while the Committee could not persuade any of the cabinet to enter its plot to dethrone the Queen. The Queen's supporters called a counter mass meeting at which her apology was accepted. More significant was the Committee's mass meeting, at which the action of the Queen was denounced and the Committee authorized to take all steps necessary for public safety. It would seem, however, that the majority at this meeting did not have in mind actual revolutionary action. The Committee then asked Minister Stevens to land troops from the U.S.S. Boston, a request fulfilled in the late afternoon in spite of protests

from the Queen's government and the governor of Oahu. Several meetings on Monday and Tuesday morning completed the Committee's plans for overthrow of the government. On Tuesday afternoon, from the steps of the Government Building, a Provisional Government was proclaimed. Recognition of the new government by Minister Stevens came before the Queen's submittal under protest or the surrender of the Honolulu station house where a large royal police force was under arms. This recognition was later approved by Washington as "discreet and in accordance with the facts." With the surrender of the royal barracks and palace on Wednesday, the islands entered upon a new political venture. The Revolution had occurred without loss of life.⁶

The proclamation of January 17 set up a Provisional Government "to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed upon." A council of four men, with Sanford B. Dole acting as president, was to handle executive duties. An additional advisory council of fourteen men was appointed to "have general legislative

⁶Quotation from Foster to Stevens, January 28, 1893, House Document No. 48, 133. Some of the best sources for information on the Revolution are found in testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December, 1893, to February, 1894, Senate Report No. 227, 173, et passim, and House Executive Document No. 47, which contains the correspondence and report of Commissioner Blount. See especially in House Document No. 47: Blount to Gresham, July 17, 1893, 114-120, 123-128; Queen's constitution, 581-590; Minister W. H. Cornwell to Blount, April 24, 1893, 27-30; Minister J. F. Colburn to Blount, April 15, 1893, 30-35; S. B. Dole to Stevens, January 17, 1893, 99; Queen's ministers to Blount, May 31, 1893, 82; Damon-Blount Interview, April 29, 1893, 47; in House Document No. 48: Stevens to Foster, January 18, 1893, with inclosures, 120-131; in Senate Report No. 227, 37-39, 176, 218-219, 221-223, 293, 297, 493. See also Pratt, op. cit., 79-81, 83-84, 86.

authority." With the exception of the Queen, her cabinet, and her marshal, all other officials of the deposed monarchy were requested to continue their duties. The Constitution of 1887, where it did not conflict with the terms of the proclamation, continued in force. This proclamation, signed only by the Committee of Safety, obviously did not install a government chosen by the people nor responsible to them. Among its acts, while in power, were the repeal of the opium and lottery bills, provision for a national guard, and the distribution of crown lands among the natives in an effort to stop Kanaka population decline. It seems to have provided ample protection for the Queen and made no political arrests. On the whole, it was an able government and held firm against all attempts, foreign or domestic, to dislodge it from power.⁷

This government sent to Washington a five-man commission to negotiate a treaty of annexation. As President Cleveland was later to note, no time had been lost. The commission sailed two days after the Provisional Government had been proclaimed. Thirty-two days later, Harrison recommended to the Senate a treaty for ratification. Requesting speedy action, Harrison denied any American responsibility for the Revolution, which, he wrote, resulted from Liliuokalani's attempt at unconstitutional

⁷Quotations from Proclamation, House Document No. 47, 322; see also ibid., 321-323, 327; Blount to Gresham, April 26, 1893, ibid., 20; Senate Report No. 227, 225, 227, 247, 260, 306, 312, 358-359, 369-371, 488, 504, 511; Theo. H. Davis, "The Hawaiian Revolution," The Nineteenth Century, XXXIII (May, 1893), 830, 834; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 179.

action and the general inability of the monarchy to provide security and good civil administration. Harrison further stated that restoration of the Queen was "undesirable, if not impossible," and that only American aid could bring it about without great disorder.⁸ He found annexation preferable to a protectorate for guarding American island interests, which he characterized as "not wholly selfish."⁹ The treaty so recommended provided, in essence, that the islands "become and be an integral part of the territory of the United States";¹⁰ that the existing government continue until Congress provided a permanent governmental structure; that further Chinese immigration be prohibited; and that a financial settlement be made for the Queen and her heiress.¹¹ It is notable that the Hawaiian commissioners, while requesting "full, complete and perpetual political union" with the United States, suggested a local government like that in the territories--not statehood.¹² Later in arriving

⁸President Harrison to the Senate, February 15, 1893, Senate Executive Document No. 76, 52 Congress, 2 Session, 2, hereafter cited as Senate Document No. 76; see whole message, ibid., 1-2. See also President Grover Cleveland to Congress, December 18, 1893, House Document No. 47, iv; Foster to Harrison, February 15, 1893, Senate Document No. 76, 2-6; Stevens to Foster, January 19, 1893, House Document No. 48, 131-132; Hawaiian Minister J. Mott Smith to Foster, February 3, 1893, Senate Document No. 76, 26; Dole to Foster, January 18, 1893, ibid., 23; Commissioners to Foster, February 3, 1893 - February 11, 1893, Senate Document No. 76, 28-42.

⁹President Harrison to Senate, February 15, 1893, ibid., 2.

¹⁰Treaty, ibid., 7.

¹¹Ibid., 6-9.

¹²Commissioners to Foster, February 4, 1893, ibid., 39.

in Washington were the spokesmen for the Queen, whose purpose was to block the treaty. The Queen, on January 19, had written to Harrison and stated that Stevens had aided the revolutionaries. She further wrote that her surrender had been made with the idea that the United States would make restitution for the "wrongs" done her and her government.¹³

Meanwhile, on February 1, at Provisional Government request, the American flag was raised over Hawaii and American troops occupied government buildings. At no time, it would seem, did the Provisional Government allow, or Minister Stevens attempt, American control of government administration. This protectorate, according to Stevens, was necessary to give the Provisional Government time to organize efficient police and military forces. He emphasized that a poorly defended government would be prey to interference by the British, to an Oriental uprising, and particularly to trouble from the large Japanese population, whose spokesman, a commissioner, long had been demanding suffrage for his emperor's subjects. Secretary Foster approved this protectorate insofar as it was needed to maintain civil order, but he disavowed any step which might jeopardize Hawaii's sovereignty. Stevens, evidently feeling his action in line with this policy, kept the flag flying, although American forces on land were gradually reduced. While the

¹³Liliuokalani to Harrison, January 19, 1893, House Document No. 47, 401; Stevens to Foster, January 26, 1893, House Document No. 48, 132-133.

protectorate probably served to ease tension, it was a step neither necessary nor in line with American policy.¹⁴

In Washington Liliuokalani's protest went unheeded by the Harrison administration, which, from all evidence, had been prepared for some time to push annexation at the first opportunity. While the Queen also sent President-elect Cleveland a plea to consider her case against Stevens and the Provisional Government, time became her first ally. Despite a favorable Senate committee report, the treaty was not ratified before Harrison's term of office ended. Possibly the Senate had awaited the views of the new executive.¹⁵

Cleveland's views, if his immediate action is any indication, were formed as early as late February. With a brief message, he withdrew the treaty from the Senate on March 9 and then sent to Hawaii a special investigator. By not sending a Senate-approved representative of diplomatic rank, Cleveland unnecessarily exposed himself to much

¹⁴Senate Report No. 227, 32-33, 203, 306, 338, 340-342, 473-474, 553-556, 582; Stevens to Foster, February 27 and March 1, 1893, and Stevens to Gresham, March 15 and 24, 1893, Provisional Government to Stevens, January 31, 1893, Stevens to Wiltse, February 1, 1893, Stevens to Foster, February 1, 1893, Wiltse to Secretary of the Navy, February 1, 1893, Foster to Stevens, February 14, 1893, Stevens to Gresham, April 4, 1893, House Document No. 48, 137-139, 140-141, 143-145, 149-153, 488-489.

¹⁵Liliuokalani to Cleveland, January 31, 1893, House Document No. 47, 401-402; Foster to Stevens, February 22, 1893, House Document No. 48, 142; Pratt, op. cit., 61, 69-73; Stevens, op. cit., 195, 208-212; Matheson, loc. cit., 134; Donald Rowland, "The Establishment of the Republic of Hawaii," The Pacific Historical Review, IV (September, 1935), 202, hereafter cited as "Republic;" Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 413.

criticism. His choice of a representative, Commissioner James H. Blount, was a retired Georgia Congressman and one-time Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. While Blount denied having any preconceived ideas concerning the Hawaiian Revolution, his later testimony revealed an attitude, if not of hostility, at least of great doubt toward the events of the Revolution and the question of annexation. His previous Congressional activities had not favored expansionism for the United States. Blount further testified that the only administration view with which he left the United States was to end the protectorate, if possible. He felt, he said, that his only job was to get information.¹⁶

Blount's instructions were to gather facts about the Revolution, its causes, and the sentiments of the people toward it and annexation. If opportunity afforded, he was to offer his services toward a settlement between the two factions, royalists and revolutionaries. For this job Blount had "paramount" authority in Hawaiian-American relations in the islands. Arriving in March, 1893, Blount faced no easy task. With the great uncertainty as to which regime--the monarchy or the provisional government--would eventually be in power, the fears of reprisal must have colored much of the testimony given Blount. Furthermore, his maintenance of secrecy, a policy he felt wise, must also have hampered a full

¹⁶Cleveland to Congress, December 18, 1893, House Document No. 47, v; Senate Report No. 227, 385-389, 403-406; Nevins, Study, 552; McElroy, op. cit., II, 53; Allan Nevins, editor, Letters of Grover Cleveland, 1850-1908 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1933), 312; Montgomery Schuyler, "Walter Quintin Gresham," in Bemis, op. cit., VIII, 243, 245, 247; Pratt, op. cit., 121-123; George Roscoe Dulebohn, Principles of Foreign Policy Under the Cleveland Administrations (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1941), 40; House Report No. 243, Part 2, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 1.

investigation. Provisional Government supporters accused Blount, not without justice, of giving royalist testimony the greater weight. His two interviews with the Queen, however, both with Provisional Government knowledge, seem to have been entirely within the spirit of his task. No doubt, gallantry toward the Queen, as well as a certain distaste for both factions, played its part in his attitude toward his mission. Blount's final report was sent from Honolulu on July 17, 1893. His departure from the islands, after refusing to remain as American minister, followed shortly, while Hawaii remained in a quandary as to future American policy toward it.¹⁷

One other result of Blount's visit was the ending of the protectorate on April 1. Whatever the undercurrent, there were no demonstrations either of joy or sorrow by island residents at this event. Blount felt the continuance of the protectorate neither necessary nor conducive to a fair investigation. Stevens protested this action in view of what he considered a Japanese menace, but Blount thought this fear unwarranted.¹⁸

¹⁷Gresham to Blount, March 11, 1893, Blount to Gresham, April 6, 1893, April 26, 1893, May 24, 1893, July 31, 1893, House Document No. 47, 1-3, 4-5, 13-15, 21-22, 68, 164; Dole to Willis, January 11, 1894, Senate Executive Document No. 46, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 19, hereafter cited as Senate Document No. 46; Senate Report No. 227, 201, 309, 389-392, 394-396, 412-414, 447, 450-454; Blount to Gresham, June 1 and May 24, 1893, House Document No. 48, 163, 155; Rowland, "Republic," 205.

¹⁸Captain C. L. Hooper to Blount, April 2, 1893, Blount to Gresham, April 6, 1893, April 26, 1893, July 17, 1893, Admiral Skerrett-Blount Interview, April 8, 1893, Admiral J. S. Skerrett to Blount, April 1, 1893, House Document No. 47, 8-9, 6-7, 21, 102-103, 11, 8; Senate Report No. 227, 305, 339, 343, 397, 401-402, 561.

The main conclusions of the Blount report were: (1) that the voting out of the Reform ministry--not the Queen's attempt to proclaim a new constitution--was the immediate cause of the Revolution; (2) that Stevens had actively and knowingly assisted the revolutionaries with the purpose of achieving annexation; (3) that the Queen surrendered with the idea that the United States would re-establish her throne, once the facts concerning the Revolution were known; (4) that the Revolution was led by men at least half of whom held allegiance to foreign countries--mainly Americans and British; (5) that the people of Hawaii were against both annexation and the Provisional Government; and (6) that economic motives involving hopes for a sugar bounty and special legislation to protect contract labor, as well as a desire for the economic benefits of a Pacific cable and Pearl Harbor improvements, were vital parts of the move for revolution and annexation.¹⁹

Even with due consideration for his difficult working conditions and the pressure of time, Blount displayed, in his report, little real understanding of Hawaiian history, and some of his statements about that history were inaccurate. Perhaps the fairest judgment would be that, in his zeal to see fair play for the native Hawaiians, he failed to take into account the dominant forces which had developed from Hawaii's past. His judgment of Stevens' activities, a contemporary series of

¹⁹Blount to Gresham, July 17, 1893, House Document No. 47, 115, 117-121, 125-127, 129-130, 133.

events, was fairly accurate. What he did not realize was that, while American expansionism in 1893 was having its first great public test, it had been active as a force in Hawaii since 1820.²⁰

Although he accepted the Blount report in full, it was October before Cleveland asked the advice of his cabinet on Hawaiian policy. Based mainly upon the ideas of Gresham and Attorney-General Richard Olney, the policy selected was essentially to use any means short of force to restore the Queen to power. It was also decided to drop the annexation treaty from further consideration. Like the Blount report, this policy did not become public knowledge until November.²¹

The new minister to Hawaii, Albert S. Willis, was instructed to inform the Queen of the President's belief that Stevens had been instrumental in the overthrow of her government. Furthermore, Willis was to promise the Queen Cleveland's aid in her restoration, provided she would agree to a general amnesty and to the acceptance of all obligations assumed by the Provisional Government. Having achieved the

²⁰ Blount to Gresham, July 17, 1893, House Document No. 47, 108, 135; Senate Report No. 227, 228, 310-312, 324; Dole to Willis, December 23, 1893, House Executive Document No. 70, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 40, hereafter cited as House Document No. 70; McElroy, *op. cit.*, II, 57-58; Schuyler, *loc. cit.*, 245; Rowland, "Republic," 205; Nevins, Study, 554-555; Bailey, *op. cit.*, 472.

²¹ Rowland, "Republic," 205; Nevins, Study, 555-557; McElroy, *op. cit.*, II, 59-61; Schuyler, *loc. cit.*, 245-248.

Queen's agreement to these conditions, Willis, in the name of the President, was to ask the Provisional Government to relinquish power.²²

Willis, in a tense, excited Honolulu, first approached the Queen on November 13 with Cleveland's proposals. But the Queen was adamant in her desire for revenge--she talked in terms of exile, confiscation of property, and even beheading. Her attitude caused Willis to feel that restoration would also mean absolutism for Hawaii. While uneasiness mounted, Gresham curtly instructed Willis to inform the Queen that she must either accept the President's conditions or lose his support. The Provisional Government, meanwhile, through its Washington representative, cited to Gresham the world-wide recognition of the Provisional Government's legality. It further stated that the United States had never been accepted by it as a mediator, nor had the United States observed the international rules governing mediation. It warned that restoration would require either foreign troops or a bloody revolt. But Cleveland, in his annual message, had already announced that, in view of the Blount report, his only honorable recourse was to "undo the wrong that had been done by those representing us."²³ However,

²²Gresham to Willis, October 18, 1893, House Document No. 47, xxi-xxii; Schuyler, loc. cit., 248. Stevens' resignation had been accepted earlier. See Gresham to Stevens, April 25, 1893, and Stevens to Gresham, May 18, 1893, House Document No. 48, 154-155.

²³Message to Congress, December 4, 1893, Foreign Relations, 1894, xi. See also Willis to Gresham, November 6, 11, and 18, 1893, and Gresham to Willis, November 24 and December 3, 1893, House Document No. 48, 164-167, 169-171; L. A. Thurston to Gresham, December 5, 1893, ibid., 171-176; Willis to Gresham, November 16, 1893, and December 5, 1893, House Document No. 70, 1-3, 6-7; Rear Admiral John Irwin to Secretary of Navy, January 2, 1894, House Executive Document No. 76, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 6-7, hereafter cited as House Document No. 76.

the difficulties encountered in the person of the obstinate Queen led Cleveland and his cabinet, on December 7, to decide to place the whole matter in the hands of Congress.²⁴

As a result of this decision, Cleveland sent to Congress on December 18, 1893, a special message. He admitted the inability of the executive to act further. He wrote that his action had been hampered not only by the Queen's attitude but by "unfortunate public misrepresentation of the situation and exaggerated statements of the sentiments of our people" His offer to cooperate in any legislative action "consistent with American honor, integrity and morality" seemed to indicate that he hoped the Congress would continue to work for restoration.²⁵

Willis earlier had reported more signs that a restored monarchy would hardly produce the best of governments. But, just before Cleveland's message to Congress, Willis reported limited concessions by the Queen. Finally, on December 18, the Queen agreed not only to full amnesty and assumption of Provisional Government obligations, but to government under the 1887 Constitution. But her action came too late. For, when Willis informed the Provisional Government of the Queen's agreement to Cleveland's conditions and of the President's expectation that it would "promptly relinquish to her her constitutional authority," the Provisional Government stood firm.²⁶ Sanford B. Dole answered that the project of

²⁴Evins, Study, 559-560.

²⁵Cleveland to Congress, December 18, 1893, House Document No. 47, iii-xvi. Quotations on xvi.

²⁶Willis to Gresham, December 20, 1893, House Document No. 70, 35; see also ibid., 34-35; Willis to Gresham, December 9, 18, 19, 20, 1893, and Liliuokalani to Willis, December 18, 1893, ibid., 17-30.

annexation would be dropped only until the advent of a new American administration. He refused to accept Blount's report as final or to recognize the right of the United States to mediate between the Queen and his government. Finally, he refused to accept the proposition of the President that the Provisional Government should step down for the Queen. Dole considered the whole matter at an end with the news of Cleveland's submittal of the problem to Congress. The defeat, already admitted by the President in his message five days before, had arrived in fact.²⁷

With growing military strength, with mounting popularity, and with the conviction that the American people would not allow force to be used against their Hawaiian kind, the Provisional Government became increasingly confident. In a subsequent series of notes, Dole charged Willis and the slow-moving, secretive Cleveland policy with the responsibility for his government's having to bear heavy military expenditures. Even Willis felt that the failure publicly to announce that the United States would not use force to restore the Queen had created an explosive atmosphere in the islands.²⁸

²⁷Dole to Willis and Willis to Gresham, December 23, 1893, and Gresham to Willis, January 12, 1894, House Document No. 70, 35-42, 44; Senate Report No. 227, 459; Dole to Willis, December 29, 1893, House Document No. 76, 6.

²⁸Senate Report No. 227, 304-305, 257, 250, 357; Admiral Skerret to Secretary of Navy, June 28, 1893, July 25, 1893, August 14, 1893, September 12, 1893, October 10, 1893, House Document No. 48, 504-506; Dole to Willis, December 27, 1893, House Executive Document No. 79, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 4-5, hereafter referred to as House Document No. 79; Willis to Gresham, January 12, 1894, House Executive Document No. 95, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 2; Dole to Willis, January 11, 1894, Senate Document No. 46, 18-23; Willis to Gresham, January 16, 1894, House Executive Document No. 112, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 2-3; Dole to Willis, February 14, 1894, Senate Executive Document No. 65, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 2-4; Nevins, Study, 557-558; McElroy, op. cit., II, 67-68.

After turning the Hawaiian question over to Congress, Cleveland scrupulously kept it informed of all developments and supplied it with all diplomatic correspondence.²⁹

The Cleveland policy gained no new lease on life at the hands of Congress. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations conducted a lengthy investigation of American involvement in the Revolution from December, 1893, to early February, 1894. Its report has been variously described as "remarkable"³⁰ and "an amazing series of contradictions."³¹ The report of the chairman managed to clear everyone in both the Cleveland and Harrison administrations of improper conduct, with the exception of Stevens' declaration of a protectorate, which was characterized as invalid and dangerous as a precedent. Only the chairman subscribed in full to the report. The four Republican members of the committee, while accepting in main the chairman's findings, claimed that Cleveland had no right to question the legality of the Provisional Government once it had been accorded diplomatic representation. Furthermore, they felt the activities of Blount and Willis had been disturbing to island affairs and prejudicial to the Provisional Government. The four Democrats of the committee, two of whom favored annexation, roundly criticized Stevens as being instrumental in the overthrow of the monarchy and subject to strong rebuke.³²

²⁹Cleveland to Senate, February 19, 1894, Senate Document No. 46, 1.

³⁰Pratt, op. cit., 183.

³¹Stevens, op. cit., 265.

³²Senate Report No. 227, 1-36; Schuyler, loc. cit., 249; Nevins, Study, 561; Stevens, op. cit., 265-266; Pratt, op. cit., 183.

The partisan character of these dissenting opinions is indication enough of the tenor of much of the Senate debate upon the questions of the Revolution and annexation. It was May 31, 1894, before a resolution finally was agreed upon. It declared for non-interference in Hawaiian domestic affairs, and, in the old Tyler tradition, declared that the United States would not suffer other nations to interfere. The House, with less debate, had passed, on February 7, a set of resolutions of similar meaning but also declaring against annexation and Stevens' conduct.³³

From the events of the revolutionary period and the American involvement therein arose three points fascinating to contemporaries and historians alike: (1) the actual effect of the attitude and activities of Minister Stevens upon the success of the Revolution; (2) the motives for and wisdom of President Cleveland's policy; and (3) the primary causes of the Revolution.

Partisanship characterized both Hawaiian and American testimony concerning the events of the Revolution, but there emerged from this maze some definite facts. Stevens landed American troops against the protest of the Queen's government. The main body of these troops was so located, during the most critical days of the Revolution, that any royalist attack upon Provisional Government headquarters almost certainly

³³Congressional Record, 53 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 26, Part VI, 5499-5500; ibid., Part II, 2001, 2007-2008; for Senate debate, see ibid., Part I, 19-31, 61-73, 127-132, 204-206, 430-434, 482, 523, 567, 621-628, 694-707; for House debate, see ibid., Part I, 397-401, and Part II, 1813-1822, 1825-1852, 1942-1969.

would have endangered American sailors and marines. However, despite much evidence to the contrary, this location did afford an available and central position for protection of American life and property. The conduct of the troops was impeccable. There were no threatening demonstrations or even patrols, and the men were closely confined to their encampment. However, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the very presence of these troops was a source of intimidation to the Queen. While estimates as to her military and police forces vary, their numbers must have been sufficient to partially explain the call by the revolutionaries for American troops to land in the interest of peace and order. Even before the troops landed, it was probably the well-known annexationist sentiments of Stevens and his diplomatically improper contacts with revolutionary leaders, rather than any sense of military inferiority, which dissuaded the Queen's cabinet from employing force of any nature against the Committee of Safety. Finally, Stevens' immediate recognition of the Provisional Government must have weighed heavily in the Queen's decision to surrender. Whether Stevens was the most discreet of conspirators or merely the most assiduous of ministers in the protection of his country's interests, his attitude and action undoubtedly gave comfort to the revolutionaries.³⁴

³⁴Cornwell to Blount, April 24, 1893, Colburn to Blount, April 15, 1893, C. J. McCarthy to C. B. Wilson, May 1, 1893, A. S. Cleghorn to Stevens, January 16, 1893, Foreign Minister Samuel Parker to Stevens, January 16, 1893, Dole to Stevens, January 17, 1893, Blount to Gresham, May 6 and July 17, 1893, Waterhouse-Blount interview, May 2, 1893, Skerrett to Blount, May 20, 1893, House Document No. 47, 27-30, 30-35, 599-600, 572, 591, xviii, 60-61, 117-119, 123, 125-128, 141, 55, 72;

Partisanship, too, dominated contemporary estimates of the motives and wisdom of President Cleveland's policy in blocking annexation. There were charges that Cleveland had allowed free rein to Gresham's personal enmity for Harrison and the late Blaine, a close friend of Stevens. The President's decision in favor of restoration of the Queen brought him under fire from church groups, sympathetic to the Hawaiian missionaries' heirs. He faced the full flood of expansionist propaganda, as exemplified in the writings of Captain A. T. Mahan and Admiral George E. Belknap and the criticism of expansionist-minded political opponents. If Cleveland was not actually distrustful of Harrison's handling of the Hawaiian question, he was openly suspicious of the speed with which the treaty of annexation had been negotiated. But Cleveland's main motives seem to have been: (1) concern that the will of the Hawaiian people as to government and annexation be carried out; (2) opposition to expansionism and annexation as an American policy; and (3) determination that American national honor not be sullied by any acquisition of territory under doubtful circumstances. Cleveland's policy attained success in only two particulars, a temporary delay in expansionism and the presentation to the

ibid., 57-59; Hawaiian Commissioners to Foster, February 3 and 11, 1893, Senate Document No. 76, 29, 41; Senate Report No. 227, 184-186, 208, 232-233, 307-308, 337-340, 345, 369, 378-379, 381, 384-385, 444-446, 449-450, 452, 454, 457, 469, 472, 491, 493-494, 499-500, 513, 543, 550-551, 568, Maps Nos. 7 and 9; Bailey, *op. cit.*, 470; Pratt, *op. cit.*, 85, 91, 93, 95-99, 104, 107-109; Schuyler, *loc. cit.*, 244; Stevens, *op. cit.*, 222-229; Nevins, *Study*, 551. For Stevens' annexationist sentiments, see Stevens to Blaine, February 8, 1892 and April 2, 1892. Stevens to Foster, November 20, 1892 and February 1, 1893, House Document No. 48, 87-88, 90-91, 114-115, 134-136.

world of an example of high national morality in dealing with a small nation. On the debit side, Cleveland showed, at the very least, a lack of foresight in his selection of an issue in which to display national morality. Whether morally right or not, the Provisional Government had been correct in stating that the issue as to who would govern Hawaii had been settled with the Queen's surrender. Without foreign aid, the Queen never could have regained her throne. Cleveland had not the power, nor would Congress grant the power, to give that aid. There is the further question as to whether a nation has more right to enhance its national honor at the expense of a weaker government than to enhance its economic or territorial status. Finally, the cumbersome handling of the Cleveland policy kept the islands in a state of turmoil for almost a year. Cleveland could have accomplished his purpose, with less harm to Hawaii, by simply announcing the permanent withdrawal of the treaty from further consideration.³⁵

³⁵Cleveland to Congress, December 1893, House Document No. 47, iii-v; Senate Report No. 227, 127-137; Cleveland to Senator William F. Vilas, May 29, 1894, Cleveland to Richard Olney, June 19, 1897 and July 8, 1898, Cleveland to Associated Press, January 24, 1898, Cleveland to Thomas F. Bayard, February 13, 1895, Charles F. Adams, Jr., to Cleveland, November 18, 1893, Nevins, Letters, 353, 478, 502, 491-492, 377-378, 339; A. T. Mahan, "Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power," The Forum, XV, (March, 1893), 1-11; George E. Belknap, Boston Herald, January 31, 1893, Senate Report No. 227, 169-171; H. C. Lodge, "Our Blundering Foreign Policy," The Forum, XIX (March, 1895), 8-10, 16-17; Davis, loc. cit., 834; Schuyler, loc. cit., 243-245, 247, 249-250, 268-269; McElroy, op. cit., II, 45, 59, I, 241; Nevins, Study, 552-554, 558, 560-562; Rowland, "Republic," 203-204; Bailey, op. cit., 471-473; Dulebohn, op. cit., 41-43. For a defense of Harrison's quick work on the 1893 treaty, see John W. Foster, Diplomatic Memoirs (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1909), II, 167-168.

As to the primary causes for the Revolution, the following are the main theories: (1) a conspiracy by the small, secret Annexation Club to make Hawaii an American territory; (2) a movement by the sugar interests for economic gain through absorption into the American economic system; (3) a moral crusade against political and personal immorality within the Hawaiian government and court; and (4) a drive for a government which would provide economic and political security from both foreign and domestic threats.

The first theory rests upon the role which Annexation Club members played in the Revolution and a statement, made on May 27, 1892, by one member in which the actual events of the Revolution almost were predicted in detail. This theory maintains that the Queen's move to abrogate the Constitution of 1887 was merely the mistake for which these men waited, although many supporters of the Provisional Government later denied any knowledge of a revolutionary plot previous to the Queen's action. However, without at least the tacit support of much of Hawaii's population, either through sympathy or indifference, it is not likely that the Provisional Government could have stood long. Whatever the role of the Annexation Club, its motives were shared by a much larger group.³⁶

The picture of the Revolution as the work of the Hawaiian sugar barons, discontented under the McKinley Tariff and eager for American

³⁶Pratt, *op. cit.*, 57-62; Pratt, *loc. cit.*, 286-288; Stevens, *op. cit.*, 206-208, 212-214, 217; Senate Report No. 227, 223-224, 300, 452-453, 508.

bounties and expenditures on a cable and Pearl Harbor improvements, has many flaws. The leading sugar baron, Claus Spreckels, was very late to join the annexationist movement--almost four months after the Revolution. The sugar planters stood to lose, under American laws, their profitable contract labor system, and the continuance of the bounty system was dependent upon the whim of Congress. Although some planters supported the Revolution, sound business principles hardly pointed to annexation as the best solution to their problems. However, since most revolutionary leaders owned sugar stock and most haoles were affected, because of sugar's economic dominance, by any variation in its prosperity, the desire for a government providing economic stability would concomitantly mean a government protecting sugar interests and investments. The theory that sugar was the basic cause of the Revolution through its responsibility for the Asiatic population increase, which, supposedly, drove the whites to revolution to prevent Oriental political control has less to recommend it. While the fear of Asiatic dominance was a force in the later moves for annexation, this fear had not fully developed at the time of the Revolution.³⁷

³⁷Cornwell to Blount, April 24, 1893, and Blount to Gresham, July 17, 1893, House Document No. 47, 27-30, 133; Pratt, loc. cit., 274-275, 278-280; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 413; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 175; Rowland, "Republic," 201; Nevins, Study, 555; Senate Report No. 227, 301; Stevens, op. cit., 214, 214n.; Richard D. Weigle, "Sugar and the Hawaiian Revolution," The Pacific Historical Review, XVI (February, 1947), 57-58, 44; William A. Russ, Jr., "The Role of Sugar in Hawaiian Annexation," The Pacific Historical Review, XII (December, 1943), 343-344, 349-350.

As to the moral crusade, there has been suggested a resurgence of missionary wrath against a government, vulnerable to charges of bribery, which enacted distillery, lottery and opium bills. Furthermore, the theory runs, there was revulsion against the immorality of the Queen and her court. But the Queen had been accepted in the best Hawaiian social circles and the evidence as to her immorality was almost exclusively heresay. The opium and lottery bills, hardly excuses for a revolution, would have increased the revenue of a government not too wealthy. The former possibly would have allowed the legal control of a long-existing opium trade and the latter, by its own terms, provided for the expenditure of the lottery income on badly needed public works. While the need for improved morality, both political and personal, may have been recognized, it was hardly a main force in bringing about the Revolution.³⁸

The last theory, the desire for a stable government, seems to have been the underlying cause of the Revolution. Undoubtedly the Anglo-Saxon sense of superiority had its part in this white-led revolution for government by American standards, but Hawaiian history had hardly proven Kanaka political abilities to be outstanding. The property-holding elements no longer could trust a native-controlled government to protect their financial interests. A recent near panic in withdrawals from the postal savings bank was but one more indication of the need for sounder

³⁸Senate Report No. 227, 176-177, 214-215, 301, 584, 761-764; Wundenberg-Blount interview, May 15, 1893, House Document No. 47, 91; Pratt, loc. cit., 275-277, 280-284; Stevens, op. cit., 192-193.

government financing. There seemed to be a conviction that the monarchy could no longer unify politically the fractious, heterogenous population of the islands. With the ousting of the Reform cabinet, followed by the Queen's threat of a new constitution denying the property-holding interests even partial control of the government, the Revolution was at hand. While the presence of a sympathetic American minister may have influenced the timing of the Revolution, the monarchy was at the point of disintegration. It could no longer meet the needs of its powerful white subjects and residents. The past made it inevitable, too, that, in seeking the fulfillment of its need for protection and stability, this white element should turn to the United States.³⁹

As to annexation, it seems clear that, at the time of the Revolution, a majority of the people of Hawaii were opposed. While most of the foreign element was favorable, with the exception of some of the English, the native vote surely would have defeated the issue in any plebiscite.⁴⁰

³⁹Blount to Gresham, July 17, 1893, Cornwell to Blount, April 24, 1893, House Document No. 47, 115, 133, 27-30; Damon-Blount interview, April 29, 1893, *ibid.*, 44; Stevens to Foster, January 18, 1893, House Document No. 48, 121; Bailey, *op. cit.*, 469; Rowland, "Republic," 201; Nevins, *Study*, 551; Kuykendall and Day, *op. cit.*, 175; Stevens, *op. cit.*, 227-229; Pratt, *loc. cit.*, 284, 293-294; Pratt, *op. cit.*, 36; Senate Report No. 227, 180, 190, 194, 204, 207, 218, 225-226, 238, 211, 311, 447-448, 451-452, 503-504, 510-511; Blount to Gresham, April 26, 1893, House Document No. 47, 19-20. Foreigners paid an estimated four fifths of the taxes. See Senate Report No. 227, 497.

⁴⁰Blount to Gresham, April 26, 1893, May 24, 1893, June 1, 1893, July 17, 1893, Wundenberg-Blount interview, June 5, 1893, Damon-Blount interview, April 29, 1893, Petitions against annexation to Blount, n. d., House Document No. 47, 24, 66-68, 77, 133, 97, 46, 683-684; Senate Report No. 227, 197-199, 509; McElroy, *op. cit.*, II, 57.

Long before the Senate resolution of May 31, 1894, ended all hopes of immediate annexation, Provisional Government leaders were preparing a new government for Hawaii. Willis, shortly after his arrival, reported much excitement about rumors that the Provisional Government was planning a republic, while specters of attack continued to trouble both the government and the royalists, each suspicious of the other.⁴¹

The Provisional Government obviously had been a temporary affair, its only purpose being to govern until annexation was achieved. With annexation now a thing of the future and with even government supporters becoming increasingly critical of oligarchic control, some more satisfactory political structure was demanded. The revolutionary leaders, however, had in mind some definite qualifications for this new government. It had to keep the revolutionary element in control and it had to provide a clear right-of-way for eventual annexation, not only in its nature, but in its appeal to the American people.⁴²

In its provisions of March 15, 1894, for a constitutional convention, the Provisional Government took care not only to keep the revolutionary group in the majority, but to exclude any Asiatic influence. The convention was to be composed of eighteen elected delegates in addition to the Provisional Government's president and executive and

⁴¹Willis to Gresham, November 6, 11, and 18, 1893, House Document No. 48, 164-166, 169-170; Stevens, op. cit., 267-269.

⁴²Willis to Gresham, February 14 and 15, 1894, Senate Executive Document No. 57, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 2, 11, hereafter cited as Senate Document No. 57; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 183; Pratt, op. cit., 188; Stevens, op. cit., 270-271; Rowland, "Republic," 206-208.

advisory councils, the latter element commanding nineteen votes. The elected delegates and their electors had to be of Hawaiian, American or European descent and had to take an oath to support the Provisional Government and disavow any intent to re-establish the monarchy. As a result, the convention was dominated by men of American birth or descent. A royalist mass meeting, held April 9, with an estimated two to three thousand people in attendance, protested the oath requirement and the lack of provision for a plebiscite on the completed constitution. Its resolutions provided for non-cooperation in the elections and claimed that the oath stipulation disenfranchised native Hawaiians, who, of course, would feel loyalty for the monarchy.⁴³

The elections, held on May 2, were orderly, with an estimated one-half to two-thirds of the registered voters participating, and the first session of the convention was held May 30. Dole acted as president of the convention to which the executive council submitted a proposed constitution upon which debate was based. Dole later attributed authorship

⁴³ Willis to Gresham, March 24, 1894, Senate Executive Document No. 77, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 1-2; Willis to Gresham, April 14, 1894, Senate Executive Document No. 92, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 2, hereafter cited as Senate Document No. 92; Willis to Gresham, April 5, 1894, Senate Executive Document No. 85, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 1-2; Stevens, op. cit., 271; Pratt, op. cit., 189; Rowland, "Republic," 209. The Provisional Government, in February, 1894, separated the office of President from that of Foreign Minister, thus adding an additional member to the Executive Council. See Act 63, Provisional Government, February 8, 1894, Senate Executive Document No. 57, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 3.

of this constitutional draft, which the convention changed considerably, to himself and L. A. Thurston, with close review by "a dozen or more thoughtful men."⁴⁴

If the careful provisions for the convention had not presaged the type of government which would result, the correspondence of President Dole with a Columbia University political science professor would have made prophecy easy. In this correspondence, Dole quite frankly stated that some restrictions upon the franchise power of the natives and Portuguese would be necessary if "good government" were to be attained.⁴⁵ Dole expressed the belief of some that, at the risk of "some permanent discontent," government should be kept from "control of the irresponsible element"⁴⁶

The Republic which came into power on July 4, 1894, was headed by a president, elected by the legislature for a term of six years, and a cabinet appointed by the president. Members of the bicameral legislature had to be literate in either the Hawaiian or English language and

⁴⁴Dole to Professor John William Burgess, December 18, 1894, Henry Miller Madden, editor, "Letters of Sanford B. Dole and John W. Burgess," The Pacific Historical Review, V (March, 1936), 75. See also Willis to Gresham, March 24, 1894, Senate Executive Document No. 77, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 1-2; Willis to Gresham, May 10, 1894, Senate Executive Document No. 103, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 1-2; Willis to Gresham, May 31, 1894, and June 2, 1894, Senate Executive Document No. 117, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 1-2; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 184; Rowland, "Republic," 210, 212-213.

⁴⁵Dole to Burgess, March 31, 1894, in Madden, loc. cit., 72.

⁴⁶Ibid.

meet certain property qualifications, those for Senate members being considerably higher than those for members of the House of Representatives. Also provided was a Council of State, representing equally the House, Senate and president, with emergency appropriation powers during legislative absences, as well as duties as advisors to the president. Literacy in Hawaiian or English and strict citizenship or denizenship requirements applied to all electors, while those voting for senators needed additional property qualifications. The literacy qualification practically eliminated Oriental suffrage. Both legislators and voters had to take an oath to support the Republic and to repudiate the monarchy. Naturalization provisions barred from citizenship all Orientals except those born in Hawaii. Finally, a special provision in the new constitution authorized the president, with cabinet consent, to negotiate an annexation treaty with the United States, subject to Senate ratification. One of the reasons for barring Asiatics from the suffrage was the fear that the United States would find Oriental voters unacceptable. Like the Provisional Government, the Republic was democratic neither in conception nor operation. It was essentially a stop-gap structure to guarantee revolutionary control until final union with the United States was attained.⁴⁷

Royalist hopes of eventual return of the monarchy were further dimmed when, in response to Liliuokalani's request that the United

⁴⁷Senate Report No. 681, 55 Congress, 2 Session, 90; House Executive Document No. 256, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 8-29; hereafter cited as House Document No. 256; Chambers, *loc. cit.*, 34-38; Kuykendall and Day, *op. cit.*, 184; Rowland, "Republic," 213, 215, 220; Stevens, *op. cit.*, 272; Pratt, *op. cit.*, 191-192.

States not recognize the new government, Willis replied that the Senate resolution of non-interference constituted the final American decision. In late August, Willis, who had conditionally recognized the Republic on July 5, presented Cleveland's acknowledgement of the establishment of the new government. He said that the right of the Hawaiians to choose their own form of government had "been formally acknowledged both by the executive and legislative departments of the United States."⁴⁸ Recognition of the Republic was extended by all other powers having relations with the islands.⁴⁹

The new Republic had, economically, an auspicious beginning. The Wilson-Gorman Tariff Bill of 1894, by abolishing the American sugar bounty, restored to Hawaii its favored position under the Reciprocity Treaty. Politically, the Republic soon had trouble. A long-planned royalist attack upon the government was discovered on the eve of its scheduled beginning, January 7, 1895. A government assault upon the Waikiki headquarters of the plotters cost the life of one prominent government supporter. During the next few days, as the royalists were rounded up from the surrounding hills to which they fled, there were several skirmishes. In all, three royalists were killed. Several sentences of death

⁴⁸ Willis to Gresham, August 27, 1894, Foreign Relations, 1894, 359; see also Cleveland to Dole, August 17, 1894, Nevins, Letters, 363-364; Cleveland to Dole, August 7, 1894, and Gresham to Willis, August 8, 1894, Foreign Relations, 1894, 358-359; Willis to Gresham, July 8, 1894, House Document No. 256, 1-2; Willis to Gresham, June 23, 1894, Senate Executive Document No. 156, 53 Congress, 2 Session, 1-2.

⁴⁹ Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 185.

and life imprisonment were passed by a military commission upon royalist leaders. However, these and many lesser sentences were eventually suspended or commuted, many pardons being granted. This treatment earned for the Republic new respect. By February 2 Willis reported that business had resumed its normal course. Martial law, declared January 7, was lifted in March, and, by June, Hawaii was peaceful again.⁵⁰

Liliuokalani, who was detained as a suspected plotter, on January 27, 1895, issued a statement in which she renounced all rights to the throne, recognized the republican government as legal and took an oath to support it. She was later granted a full pardon and her citizenship rights were restored.⁵¹

Throughout the disturbance Hawaiian Minister Thurston assured the American government that the Republic could meet all domestic challenges. However, his publication of letters implying that the Cleveland

⁵⁰ Willis to Gresham, January 30, February 2, February 23, March 7, March 20, April 25, 1895, Willis to Richard Olney, July 5, 1895, January 6, 1896, Willis to Adee, September 4, 1895, Willis to Uhl, June 26, 1895, Foreign Relations, 1895, Part 2, 818-820, 823, 840, 851, 854, 861-862, 867, 864-865, 861; Willis to Gresham, January 11, 1895, House Executive Document No. 282, 53 Congress, 3 Session, hereafter cited as House Document 282, 3-4; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 185-186; Stevens, op. cit., 274-277; Pratt, op. cit., 196-200.

⁵¹ Liliuokalani to Dole, January 24, 1895, Foreign Relations, 1895, Part 2, 820-821; Willis to Olney, October 29, 1896, Foreign Relations, 1896, 388.

administration had encouraged the royalist revolt led to a request for his recall. The Republic complied.⁵²

Its strength tested and found sufficient, the government turned to another problem--labor supply. With the return of reciprocity benefits under the Wilson-Gorman bill, the need for labor rose. However, by 1896, the Japanese composed almost one quarter of the population. There had been recurrent uneasiness regarding the Japanese during the whole decade. The fears expressed by Minister Stevens have been noted. Willis, too, was disturbed by the growing numbers of Japanese. Consequently, the government again began encouraging Chinese immigration. There was some thought of importing American Negroes, but it was felt the South would resent such a move. From 1895 to 1897, despite restrictions, Japanese continued to out-number the Chinese and occasional European immigrants. Convinced that Japanese immigration agencies were ignoring the new restrictions, the government in 1897 refused to admit over a thousand Japanese. This step, inviting, as it did, Japanese ire, was indicative of the deep concern felt about future Japanese immigration. There was an immediate reaction from the Japanese government. The diplomatic exchange became

⁵²Thurston to Gresham, January 20, 1895, House Document No. 282, 4-5; Gresham to Willis, February 21, 1895, Foreign Minister Hatch to Willis, May 3, 1895, Willis to Uhl, June 3, 1895, Foreign Relations, 1895, Part 2, 876-878, 880-881. For Hawaiian-American controversy regarding American citizens involved in royalist revolt, see Foreign Relations, 1895, Part 2, 819, et passim. For controversy over Hawaiian demand for prosecution under American neutrality laws of American arms smugglers for shipments of arms to royalist revolutionists, see ibid., 867, et passim. For discussions of revived Congressional debate over Hawaii and expansionism as result of revolt, see Pratt, op. cit., 200-209, and Stevens, op. cit., 277-279.

heated, and arbitration was unsuccessful. Finally, after the annexation resolution in 1898 made the United States anxious for settlement before Hawaii formally transferred its sovereignty, the islands paid Japan \$75,000, although never recognizing Japanese claims as justified. After annexation there was a rush to bring in as much contract labor as possible before American laws became effective. Although Japanese immigration was again restricted in 1899, almost 30,000 Nipponese arrived in the 1898-1899 period. Chinese immigration stopped immediately upon annexation. By 1900, in spite of all restrictive tactics, the Japanese made up two fifths of the islands' population.⁵³

Long before its settlement, the immigrant dispute emphasized the precarious nature of continued independent existence. The appearance of a Japanese warship in Honolulu Harbor in 1897, while the dispute was in progress, had been frightening. Frightening, too, were the growing Asiatic population and the inability of the government to solve satisfactorily the problem of labor supply. In the background, as always since 1876, was the fear that Congressional tariff changes might plunge the islands into depression. Annexation took on brighter hues.⁵⁴

⁵³Blount to Gresham, April 6, 1893, July 17, 1893, House Document No. 47, 6-7, 103; Willis to Gresham, December 20, 1893, House Document No. 70, 32; Senate Report No. 227, 342-343, 482; McKinley to Congress, December 5, 1898, Foreign Relations, 1898, lxxviii; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 186-187, 189; Rowland, "Contract Labor," 265-266; Thomas A. Bailey, "Japan's Protest Against the Annexation of Hawaii," The Journal of Modern History, III (March, 1931), 46-49, 56-60, hereafter cited as Bailey, "Japan." Mr. Bailey feels that Hawaii did not, as some have suggested, create the immigration dispute to advance annexation. However, as will later be pointed out, annexationists, both Hawaiian and American, did not overlook the propaganda value of the dispute once it became a reality.

⁵⁴Stevens, op. cit., 282-284.

A joint resolution in May, 1896, declared the Hawaiian legislature to be "firmly and steadfastly in favor of . . . annexation . . . ," a sentiment it felt was shared by the Hawaiian voters.⁵⁵ The 1896 victory of the Republican Party in the United States, with a platform including annexation, omened well. Although McKinley had shown little pre-election interest in the subject, the annexationist-minded, both American and Hawaiian, were quick to reach his ear. Their efforts were successful. In April, 1897, the Hawaiian minister relayed to Secretary of State Sherman the Republic's desire for immediate annexation. Both the minister and other Hawaiian advocates used Hawaiian troubles with Japan to such effect that American action was probably accelerated. While McKinley insisted upon first attention being given to action on the American tariff, Hawaii entered this issue because the Reciprocity Treaty complicated efforts to evolve new sugar schedules. The sugar trust and sugar beet industry were working for abrogation of the treaty. It has been suggested, with strong evidence, that one reason for McKinley's decision to try an annexation treaty was to counter this opposition to reciprocity and also to hasten action on the tariff.⁵⁶

The task of drafting the treaty went to John W. Foster, former Secretary of State. The new treaty differed little from that of 1893 except in dropping the financial settlement for the former Queen. Again

⁵⁵Senate Report No. 681, 91.

⁵⁶Matheson, loc. cit., 134; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 187; Bailey, op. cit., 473-474; Lester B. Shippee, "William Rufus Day," in Bemis, op. cit., IX, 33; Pratt, op. cit., 215-218; Stevens, op. cit., 284-286, 290-291.

Hawaii was to become "an integral part" of the United States, with the title of Territory of Hawaii.⁵⁷ Also provided was a commission of five, two of whom were to be Hawaiian residents, to recommend to Congress a suitable political structure. Signed on June 16, 1897, the treaty was recommended to the Senate for ratification on the same day by President McKinley. McKinley wrote, ". . . annexation is not a change. It is a consummation."⁵⁸ The accompanying message of Secretary Sherman, also probably the work of Foster, stated that the ideas of a commercial union, an alliance and a protectorate had all been discarded as either ineffectual, unfavorable to the United States, or inconsistent with American political principles.⁵⁹

If, as has been suggested, McKinley was using the treaty to test public opinion regarding expansionism, he was successful in provoking renewed discussion of America's future role beyond its continental borders. In Hawaii, quick ratification by the Senate and signature by President Dole had been accomplished by mid-September, 1897. The American Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported the treaty favorably in July, but no action was taken during the special summer session. When the matter came before the regular session, it soon became evident

⁵⁷Treaty, Senate Report No. 681, 96-97.

⁵⁸McKinley to Senate, June 16, 1897, ibid., 66; see ibid., 65-67.

⁵⁹Secretary of State John Sherman to McKinley, June 15, 1897, ibid., 75; see ibid., 74-76; Foster, op. cit., 172; Shippee, loc. cit., 34.

that, despite much support, a two thirds majority was unattainable. Responsible for this deadlock were the Democratic opposition, some anti-expansionist sentiment among the Republicans and the powerful sugar interests, especially the beet sugar industry. There was an active, if not formal, Hawaiian lobby at work for the treaty in Washington, and Dole's visit in February was calculated to be of aid. Meanwhile, in the islands, sensitive as always to Congressional activities, the anti-annexation faction derived strength from treaty delay, while earlier concern over the Republican tariff policy toward reciprocity had shaken the economy. Always present was continued apprehension regarding Japan.⁶⁰

With action on the treaty blocked, the McKinley administration turned to the precedent of Texas' entrance into the union to introduce in the Senate a joint resolution for annexation on March 16, 1898. This resolution made no progress. The accompanying report by the Committee on Foreign Relations exhausted all available arguments for annexation--political, strategical, economic, and historical. Possible Japanese aggression in the islands was underscored. A resolution, introduced in the House in May, also received appropriate committee sanction. However, it was the impetus of the Spanish-American War and Dewey's victory at Manila that finally brought success. The House passed the joint resolution on June 15, 1898, by a vote of 209 to 91. The Senate, by a vote of

⁶⁰Foster, op. cit., 174; Bailey, op. cit., 474; Shippee, loc. cit., 37, 40; Stevens, op. cit., 288-293; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 187-188; Pratt, op. cit., 219, 225; Thomas A. Bailey, "The United States and Hawaii During the Spanish-American War," The American Historical Review, XXXVI (April, 1931), 552-553, hereafter cited as Bailey, "Spanish-American War."

42 to 21, approved the measure on July 6. The President signed the resolution the following day.⁶¹ The joint resolution, as later explained by McKinley, accepted "the offered cession" made by Hawaii in ratifying the 1897 treaty.⁶² Implied, therefore, was the idea that the conditions and terms of the treaty were to stand as if the treaty were actually ratified. The commission appointed by McKinley to study and recommend a government for the new territory included President Dole and another Hawaiian resident, Walter F. Frear. The officials of the Republic, under McKinley's supervision, were to guide island affairs until such government was provided. In the islands passage of the resolution was received with much elation. At ceremonies on August 12, 1898, Hawaii formally was annexed.⁶³

At news of the signing of the treaty in the summer of 1897, the Japanese government had protested vigorously. It claimed that annexation would alter the status quo in the Pacific, would jeopardize its interests and those of its subjects in the islands, and would interfere with settlement

⁶¹Report, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 16, 1898, Senate Report No. 681, 1-17; see ibid., 27-39, 47-48, 63-88, 98-107, 111-116, 118-119; Report, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 17, 1898, House Report No. 1355, 1-7; Congressional Record, 55 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 31, Part VII, 6019, 6712, 6806.

⁶²McKinley to Congress, December 5, 1898, in James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), X, 185.

⁶³McKinley to Congress, December 5, 1898, Foreign Relations, 1898, lxxviii, lxxvii, lxxviii; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 414; Bailey, "Spanish-American War," 556; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 188; Bailey, op. cit., 475; Pratt, op. cit., 320, 323-326; Stevens, op. cit., 294; James F. Rhodes, The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, 1897-1909 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1923), 114; William Franklin Willoughby, Territories and Dependencies of the United States, Their Government and Administration (New York: The Century Company, 1905), 62-63.

of its claims against the Hawaiian government in the immigration dispute. The United States reassured Japan that its interests and rights in the islands would be respected, and, finally, in December, Japan withdrew its protest. However, the State Department had taken the precaution to prepare for a provisional protectorate over Hawaii, if Japan became aggressive.⁶⁴

As to the role of the Spanish-American War and the acquisition of the Philippines in hastening annexation, Hawaii used every shred of this double-barreled opportunity to further itself in American favor. Upon the commencement of hostilities, the Republic went so far as to offer a formal alliance. This offer was made despite domestic fear, in royalist and some foreign quarters, of Spanish reprisals. It was made, too, before Dewey's startling victory at Manila. These attending circumstances increased American appreciation of the offer and had their effect upon the passage of the annexation resolution. Living up to early promises, Hawaii made Honolulu Harbor available as a transshipment and supply base for the Philippine operations. American soldiers were royally entertained en route to the east, and coal supplies were made available to the United States. Spanish protest was to no avail in stopping these un-neutral activities.⁶⁵

⁶⁴McKinley to Congress, December 6, 1897, Foreign Relations, 1897, xxi; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 188-189; Bailey, op. cit., 474; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 414; Shippee, loc. cit., 38-40; Foster, op. cit., 173; Pratt, op. cit., 220-221; Stevens, op. cit., 287; Bailey, "Japan," 50-52, 54-55, 58-59.

⁶⁵Matheson, loc. cit., 134; Bailey, "Spanish-American War," 553-556; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 188; Pratt, op. cit., 318-319.

This cooperative attitude gave the annexationists a new argument-- American moral responsibility to annex the islands, since the United States had allowed Hawaii to assume so vulnerable a position in its behalf. An appealing argument, it had little basic value. Of greater weight in the public mind was the belief that Hawaii was irreplaceable as a way station in Philippine military operations. Overlooked, however, was the fact that there was a shorter, northern supply route to the Philippines, with the newly acquired Kiska in the Aleutians well located for a coaling station. Also the United States already had been granted every military assistance which annexation could have obtained. That this argument of military necessity had little real value was proven by the fact that Senate passage of the resolution came several days after Spanish Admiral Cervera's defeat made American victory certain. Most valid was the argument of Hawaii's importance to American west coast defense and to protection of Pacific commerce. The fear aroused during the war that Admiral Cervera would attack the undefended east coast of the United States impressed the American public with the value of outlying naval defenses. The vision of Japanese or other foreign use of Hawaii as a stepping stone to the American Pacific coast had taken on reality.⁶⁶

There has been a strong opinion that the war and the acquisition of the Philippines were not only an acceleration to, but probably the only possible means of pushing through annexation. To take such a stand is to deny the peculiar position which Hawaii had come to fill in the

⁶⁶ Congressional Record, 55 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 31, Part VII, 6264-6268; Pratt, op. cit., 319-320; Bailey, "Spanish-American War," 556-560.

American scheme. The islands in 1898 represented almost a century-old investment by the United States not only of capital and business know-how, but of American culture, American political ideology and American labors. The Tyler Doctrine was still very much alive, and the picture of Asiatic domination of the islands was no more palatable than the earlier French and British versions. The Reciprocity Treaty had joined Hawaii indissolubly to the American economic system--Hawaii was as dependent upon the United States economically as it was for its continued independence. Furthermore, the strategic value of the islands to the American nation was advertised by every map. The conclusion, therefore, of one authority that the rising tide of "Manifest Destiny" must have inevitably joined Hawaii's dependence upon the United States to produce annexation is valid. The war accelerated annexation--it neither caused it nor was necessary to its consummation.⁶⁷

The years from 1890 to 1898 had brought to Hawaii a revolution, four types of government, and union to the United States. In this short span the long years of work by the American missionary, the American trader, and the American planter and business man had come to fruition. The Kanakas and the Asiatics had to accept with grace the final result of continued Anglo-Saxon effort. Hawaii, in 1898, was in the peculiar position of having two sets of laws and two Presidents, while it awaited Congressional provisions for a permanent government, but it had become

⁶⁷Stevens, op. cit., 289-290, 296-299; Matheson, loc. cit., 134; Hardy and Dumke, op. cit., 414; Rhodes, op. cit., 122; Bailey, "Spanish-American War," 560.

the Territory of Hawaii--a candidate for statehood. Of the cultural trends of the era which would most affect statehood, the rising apprehension concerning the large Japanese population was notable.⁶⁸

Of statehood itself some mention had been made or implied. In its supporting data, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report of 1898 included the statement that Hawaii was not coming into the union as a state, nor was she then so qualified. However, the statement noted, "It [statehood] will be a question for our successors and not for us to settle."⁶⁹ Annexationists John W. Foster and L. A. Thurston had agreed that territorial status was preferable to statehood. There was the alternate suggestion that Hawaii be made a part of the state of California. Yet the fear of Hawaii's entrance into the union as a state was one argument against annexation.⁷⁰ Even in the full flood of expansionism there was some effort to avoid the taint of colonialism. As one senator rationalized, ". . . we can reasonably expect that the people we acquire will, in due time and on suitable conditions, be annexed to the United States as an equal part of a self-governing Republic."⁷¹ Suggestive of statehood were the statements of the two heads of state. President Dole in 1893 wrote,

⁶⁸Vandercook, op. cit., 48.

⁶⁹Senate Report No. 681, 51. This idea was attributed by Senator S. D. McEnery of Louisiana to L. A. Thurston. Congressional Record, 55 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 31, Part VII, 6269.

⁷⁰Ibid., 6141, 6190, 6269, 6663; Pratt, loc. cit., 288; Foster, op. cit., 171; Senate Report No. 227, 259; Louis Martin Sears, "John Sherman," in Bemis, op. cit., IX, 8; Pratt, op. cit., 323-324.

⁷¹Senator G. F. Hoar of Massachusetts, Congressional Record, 55 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 31, VII, 6665.

" . . . we have stood ready to add our country, a new star, to its /the United States' / glory. . . ."72 In Washington, five years later, President McKinley reminded Congress of its responsibility "to give such shape to the relationship of those mid-Pacific lands to our home Union as will benefit both in the highest degree, realizing the aspirations of the community that has cast its lot with us and elected to share our political heritage. . . ."73 It is not surprising that these beginnings of the statehood issue should have produced their own legend--that Secretary of State William R. Day sent to the Hawaiian government, upon its demise, an American flag with an extra star.⁷⁴ Whatever the legends, Hawaii has never lost sight of that star.

⁷²Dole to Willis, December 23, 1893, House Document No. 70, 42.

⁷³McKinley to Congress, December 5, 1898, in Richardson, op. cit., 186.

⁷⁴Furnas, op. cit., 17.

CHAPTER IV

BACKGROUND FOR THE STATEHOOD MOVEMENT

The period from August 12, 1898, to 1950 has been for Hawaii a time of preparation for statehood. One by one, Hawaii has marked up on its ledger those qualifications which law and precedent have previously required of aspirants to full partnership in the American union. Not always has this bookkeeping been done consciously. While a small group of stalwarts never ceased to cry for statehood, a much larger part of Hawaii's population remained for many years fairly content with territorial status. Moreover, there was, on the part of an influential portion of the Hawaiian community, a quiet but determined opposition to statehood. Yet, dimmed though it was by indifference and opposition, the star of statehood never completely ceased to shine in the Hawaiian sky.

So closely woven into the fabric of everyday territorial life have been the issues relative to the statehood question that some artificial division becomes necessary for the purpose of adequate discussion. Therefore, coverage of the political development of the territory and what might be called the formal movement for statehood will be reserved for a later chapter. The present chapter, after a brief description of the interval from 1898 to 1900, will cover the economic, social and cultural development of Hawaii to the present. Also included will be a description of Hawaii's role as the Pacific bastion of the United States and the relation of that role to the plea for statehood.

From 1898 to 1900 Hawaii had a foretaste of the inconveniences sometimes attendant upon government from a long distance. By December, 1898, the commission appointed by President McKinley had reported its recommendations for a political structure for Hawaii and a bill creating such a government had been introduced in Congress. Yet, a year later, McKinley found it necessary to remind Congress, absorbed in issues created by the Spanish-American War, that this territory was in need of a definitive political structure. Hawaii, meanwhile, under two sets of laws, was having difficulty in settling questions arising about public lands, Chinese immigration, copyrights, elections and the judiciary--in short, the everyday business of government.¹

Hawaiian life was further disturbed by an outbreak in December, 1899, of bubonic plague so serious that it was the end of April, 1900, before quarantined Hawaiian ports were again free for commerce. In efforts to control the disease, which cost eighty lives, a fire set to burn infected buildings got out of control and destroyed some thirty-eight acres of the Honolulu slum area. Left without shelter were some 4,000 people, mainly Japanese and Chinese. As a result of this fire, Hawaii had a glimpse of another future problem--the assimilation of the Japanese immigrants. Most severely affected by the fire damage and efforts to stem the plague had been the Japanese, especially the businessmen whose

¹McKinley to Congress, December 5, 1899, Foreign Relations, 1899, LII - LIII; Kuykendall and Day, *op. cit.*, 189. For petition of Honolulu citizens to Congress, November 23, 1899, requesting speedy provision of a territorial government, see Congressional Record, 56 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 33, Part I, 559.

trade virtually ceased in that section of Honolulu in which their establishments were located. Losses were suffered, too, through a government prohibition of further Asiatic imports, as well as an order to destroy cargoes previously shipped in. Unable to get a satisfactory financial settlement for their losses, the Japanese turned to their homeland government. Some three and one-half years later, approximately half the amount of the Japanese claims, \$400,000, was appropriated by the American Congress. Already apparent, however, was the sensitivity of the Japanese to haole dominance in the islands and their penchant for appealing to Japan for remedial measures in time of stress.²

The territorial government provided by Congress in 1900 was something new to Hawaii, but there was no corresponding innovation in the economy. Sugar still reigned.

Despite competition from Puerto Rico, the Philippine Islands and Cuba, all recently brought under the influence of the United States, the sugar industry grew apace. By 1909 it furnished employment for about one-fourth of the islands' population and furnished ninety-five percent of island exports. The adverse effects of short-lived tariff legislation in 1913 were soon overcome during World War I and the post-war boom. Increased efficiency in production and milling processes in the twenties eased the readjustment to a normal, peace-time world market. A hard blow was dealt the industry by the Jones-Costigan Sugar Control Act, passed by

²Barber, op. cit., 131-132, 139; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 190; Congressional Record, 56 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 33, Part II, 1930.

the United States Congress in 1934, which forced a ten percent decrease in island production. However, the Sugar Act of 1937 was much more favorable to Hawaii in increasing Hawaii's quota and eliminating her former designation as a foreign producing area. Today, the industry operates under the Sugar Act of 1947, which allots to Hawaiian planters a production quota amounting to approximately fourteen percent of American domestic needs.³

During this century the sugar industry has met many challenges: scarcity of land and suitable soil, irrigation and labor supply problems, and adverse national legislation. Through its voluntary, unincorporated Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, established in 1895, and that body's experiment station, the industry has applied science to agriculture perhaps more successfully than anywhere in the world. Its achievements in irrigation, development of improved varieties of cane, soil conservation, and in the fight against parasites and plant diseases deserve high praise. The HSPA's activities have been wholly financed by the industry, each member plantation contributing in accordance with the amount of its production. Because of its close connection with the sugar industry and its interest in every factor, economic or political, connected with that industry, the HSPA has often been coupled with the "Big Five" in discussions of economic power in the islands. It represents practically all the

³Lindsay, loc. cit., 308; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 233-235; Vandercook, op. cit., 169-178; Statehood For Hawaii, Hearings, Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 18, Joint Committee on Hawaii, 75 Congress, 2 Session, 136, hereafter cited as Hearings, Con. Res. 18.

plantation companies and maintains an office in Washington, D. C., to keep close watch on legislation affecting the sugar industry.⁴

Little sugar refining, except for home consumption, is carried on in the islands. Most of the sugar is refined by the Western Sugar Refining Corporation at San Francisco and the California and Hawaiian Sugar Refining Corporation at Crockett, California. The latter company, operating the largest refinery in the world, is owned by a majority group of the island plantations.⁵

Sugar's present position in the Hawaiian economy is easily assessed. In 1946, the industry paid \$37,500,000 in wages and employed a monthly

⁴Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 151, 75 Congress, 3 Session, 49-50, hereafter cited as Senate Document No. 151; Statehood for Hawaii, Hearings, on H. R. 49 and S. 114, Subcommittee on Territories and Insular Affairs of the Committee on Public Lands, United States Senate, 80 Congress, 2 Session, 21-22, hereafter cited as Hearings, H. R. 49 and S. 114; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 227, 232; John Wesley Coulter, "The Territory of Hawaii," in William H. Haas, ed., The American Empire, A Study of the Outlying Territories of the United States (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1940), 236; Lindsay, loc. cit., 308-309; Vandercook, op. cit., 44-45; Barber, op. cit., 43, 51-52, 263-264. For further details covering the activities of the HSPA and the development of the industry, see Barber, op. cit., 52-54; Vandercook, op. cit., 44-45, 66-76, 126-144; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 228; Simpson, loc. cit., 571, 575, 597, 600; William Atherton DuPuy, Hawaii and Its Race Problem (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1932), 64-67, 70-71; Coulter, loc. cit., 235, 237, 239.

⁵Senate Document No. 151, p. 50; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 233; Coulter, loc. cit., 239-240. The exact number of sugar plantations now operating is difficult to determine, since several have been liquidated since World War II. Pre-war figures varied from 38 to 39. In 1946, there were 35. A safe estimate at the present time would probably be around 32. "Report, Subcommittee of the Committee on the Territories, House of Representatives," transmitted to Hugh Peterson by Henry D. Larcade, Jr., January 24, 1946, in House of Representatives Report No. 254, 81 Congress, 1 Session, 16. Hereafter cited as Larcade, "Report," and House Report No. 254, respectively.

average of 28,000 employees. The previous year it earned \$6,000,000 in dividends for some 16,000 stockholders. In 1949 its installations and investments were valued at \$175,000,000. In 1948 sugar and its by-products brought the islands an income of \$101,000,000. Both the federal and territorial governments realize much revenue from this all-important island industry.⁶

The sugar industry today is not without problems. The costs of irrigation, heavy fertilization, increased mechanization and transportation bear heavily upon the industry. Labor costs continue to increase, while the plantations must provide year-round employment in order to insure a steady, satisfied labor force. Harvesting must be done quickly to avoid loss, while steady operation of heavy equipment and milling machinery is mandatory if profits are to be realized. Furthermore, there is the danger that mechanization will reduce soil fertility.⁷

While commenting upon the increase in production per acre during the century and noting that sugar in 1947 produced 47 percent of the total Hawaiian income, Governor Ingram M. Stainback, in his annual report for the fiscal year ending in June, 1948, wrote: ". . . the future of

⁶Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 235; Simpich, loc. cit., 600; Statehood for Hawaii, Hearings, on H. R. 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 579, 1125 and 1758, Committee on Public Lands, House of Representatives, 80 Congress, 1 Session, 182, hereafter cited as Hearings, H.R. 49-56; Hearings, Con. Res. 18, p. 633.

⁷Coulter, loc. cit., 237-239; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 227; Simpich, loc. cit., 597, 600; J. C. Furnas, "Will Hawaii Become a State?," The Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 218 (April 6, 1946), 133; Vandercook, op. cit., 116-125; Du Puy, op. cit., 64, 67-69.

this basic crop is in doubt due to production costs rising above the current commodity value."⁸ Three plantations, he noted, had ceased operations at the end of 1947. Increased mechanization in order to reduce labor costs had so depleted the soil that fertilization expenses had risen.⁹

Any careful consideration of Hawaii as a prospective state cannot ignore the present challenge, implied in Stainback's report, to that industry which produces almost half Hawaii's income and provides employment for so many of its people. Historically, the sugar industry prospered not because Hawaii was ideally situated for such an enterprise but in spite of isolation from world markets, uneven rainfall distribution, uncertain labor supplies and poor soil. In addition, the threat of American tariff policy changes has always haunted the industry. To meet all these obstacles required capital, cooperative planning and centralized organization seldom found in agricultural enterprises. Whether this expensive, vulnerable industry can continue to prosper in the face of high production costs, especially the rising wage demands of labor, is a vital question. Certainly the industry's place in Hawaii's future economy is disputable. Any future state government will have the problem either of protecting the sugar industry or of aiding in the discovery of a new enterprise to take its place in the economy.

⁸Annual Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior, Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1948 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949), 1-2. Hereafter cited as Annual Report. See also ibid., 1, 67.

⁹Ibid., 2.

A younger addition to the Hawaiian economy has been the pineapple industry, ranking only below sugar in importance. It complements its elder brother in that its operations are suited to the higher, colder, more arid areas of the islands which are unsuited for cane production. Fortunately, there is no irrigation problem here. Experiments in the commercial production of pineapple were being made in the 1880's, but it was not until a successful canning process was developed by James D. Dole in the first decade of the twentieth century that the industry hit full stride. Like sugar it early became a highly centralized industry rather than a field for individual enterprise. Less than one percent of the present production is raised by small farmers. Like sugar, too, it early found cooperation more profitable than competition. The Pineapple Growers Association of Hawaii and the Association of Hawaiian Pineapple Packers were organized early. By the 1920's there had been established the predecessor to the present Pineapple Research Institute, serving this industry in much the same fashion as the HSPA's experiment station serves sugar growers. Cooperative effort was especially needed to educate the world to the use of pineapple, to which end much advertising was done. Furthermore, the industry has always met stiff competition from other types of canned fruits. There was much expansion of the industry after World War I, but the depression years were difficult. As a result, the Pineapple Producers Cooperative Association, active until 1943, was formed to gauge industry-wide production to world consumption. Producing almost 90 percent of the world's pineapple are nine companies, controlling thirteen plantations and nine canneries. Approximately 10,000 workers are

employed on the plantations and in the canneries. An additional 11,000 work during the harvesting season of the summer. Dominating the industry are the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Libby, McNeill & Libby, and the California Packing Company. Besides canned fruit, there are valuable by-products--juice, citric acid and cattle bran are foremost. This industry, like sugar, has made outstanding use of scientific knowledge. Its use of additional workers for harvesting increases employment opportunities in what is an off-season on many sugar plantations. Like sugar, too, the crop is slow to mature and must be harvested immediately if losses are to be avoided. The importance of timing in harvesting operations, incidentally, makes both industries particularly vulnerable to strikes. The value of pineapple production averages about \$60,000,000 annually.¹⁰

While this industry, which grows America's second most important canned fruit, has made great strides in soil conservation, the governor's report for 1947-1948 notes that it has reached full economic expansion, unless present sugar land were to be converted to pineapple production.

¹⁰Senate Document No. 151, p. 53; Hearings, Con. Res. 18, p. 637; Statehood For Hawaii, Hearings, Pursuant to H. Res. 236, Subcommittee of the Committee on the Territories, House of Representatives, 79 Congress, 2 Session, 705, hereafter cited as Hearings, H. Res. 236; "Should Hawaii Be Admitted to Statehood Now?", Town Meeting Bulletin, XV (October 4, 1949), 4, hereafter cited as Town Meeting Bulletin; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 235-239; DuPuy, op. cit., 63, 76, 79, 82; Coulter, loc. cit., 250-251; Simpich, loc. cit., 599-600. For further details concerning the development of this industry, see Barber, op. cit., 54-56, and Coulter, loc. cit., 247-250, 253-254; and Annual Report, 67. Some sources list one less pineapple company and plantation, see Hearings, H.R. 49-56, p. 183.

This fact has led several of the large pineapple producers to search for foreign producing areas such as Mexico and Cuba.¹¹

Animal products rank third in importance in Hawaiian agriculture. Ranching, dovetailing sugar and pineapple land-use, occupies the highlands useless for crop production. In the tradition of large-scale agriculture, the Parker Ranch is probably the second largest ranch under the American flag. It has the largest herd of pure-bred Hereford cattle in the world. This ranch, established early in the last century, has led the way in breeding and in the introduction of better forage grasses. About one-third of the islands' area is in grazing lands, while there are some forty-five ranches of varying size. Together with poultry products, various livestock marketings represented about eleven percent of the agricultural income in 1947. The products of both beef cattle and dairy-
ing enterprises are consumed locally. Only hides and skins are exported. Horses and mules are also bred, the latter for plantation work. It is possible that improved animal food will make the islands self-sufficient in meat. Sheep, goats and swine are also raised in considerable numbers. In 1944 the combined value of marketed beef cattle, hogs and dairy and poultry products amounted to an estimated \$12,000,000. In this field small-scale agriculture seems to have taken hold, since animal product enterprises were operated, in 1944, on some 2,800 farms.¹²

¹¹Annual Report, 2; Senate Document No. 151, p. 53; Simpich, loc. cit., 600.

¹²Senate Document No. 151, p. 54; Annual Report, 2, 67; Coulter, loc. cit., 224-225, 255-257; DuPuy, op. cit., 83-88; Hearings, H. Res. 236, pp. 687-688; Carpenter, op. cit., 473; Statehood for Hawaii, Senate Report, to accompany H. R. 49, 80 Congress, 2 Session, 3, hereafter cited as Cordon Report; Carpenter, op. cit., 473.

Emphasizing the agricultural dominance of sugar and pineapple is the fact that in 1947, other fruits, vegetables and miscellaneous crops accounted for only five percent of the total agricultural income. Of this total, rice, cotton and taro formed a small part. Of more importance was coffee, raised mainly on the Kona coast of Big Island. Because of its excellent blending qualities, Kona coffee brings high prices on the mainland to which most of it is shipped. This crop is raised by small farmers on an estimated 1,200 farms. In the 1944-1945 season the crop was valued at over \$1,000,000. Approximately 6,000 acres are devoted to truck farming, mainly in the higher areas. Transportation problems, lack of water, and insects have always plagued this endeavor. The value of the truck crops dropped almost a million dollars between 1947 and 1948, due to mainland competition. Territorial laws and advanced marketing practices have begun to overcome the previous lack of grading and standardization of market fruits and vegetables. But Hawaii continues to be dependent upon many imported food supplies. While comparisons in the same year are not available, the total imports of fruits and vegetables in 1940 amounted to well over a fourth of similar produce of local origin in 1947. Honolulu is the chief market for island fruits and vegetables.¹³

Because of isolation and the absence of minerals, Hawaii's economic well-being almost certainly will continue to be dependent upon its soil. Yet only about seven percent of the land area is suitable for cultivation.

¹³Annual Report, 45-46, 67; Hearings, H. Res. 236, pp. 687, 690, 692-693; Senate Document No. 151, pp. 54-55; Cordon Report, 3; Coulter, loc. cit., 257-261.

On this land Hawaii must produce not only food but its chief sources of income. It is not surprising that money crops have dominated agriculture. The past has been marked by appeals for wiser use of land, advice to eliminate the dangerous dependence upon shipping for food and the great search for a third money crop. At various times, sisal for manufacture of cordage, rubber, rice, bananas, coffee, tobacco and the macadamia nut have been cultivated. While a few of these have assumed minor importance, problems of transportation, labor and world competition have excluded these products from consideration as a third money crop. Crop experimentation has been encumbered by the fact that Hawaii's light cycle does not meet requirements for many mainland, income-producing crops. Sugar and pineapple, therefore, have found no important partner--and these products, for various reasons, show little possibility of further expansion. Hawaii's main economic problems of the future would seem to be: (1) development of a third money crop; (2) intensive soil conservation to protect its vital land resource; (3) increased and improved production for local food needs; and (4) development, if possible, of small, individual farms to offset the centralized plantation system. There are, at present, hopes for increased export of the macadamia nut, canna starch, vegetable oils, and beef and poultry products. Air transport has opened the way for experimentation in exporting frozen fish and other foods. Air transport has already pushed the growing of exotic flowers for mainland markets into the million-dollar bracket. The possibility of orchard crops is also tempting. Hawaii hardly needs to be reminded by its governor that, "The need for research in the economic adaptability of other crops to the

soils and climate of Hawaii's limited tillable areas is more necessary than ever before if the fullest economic value is to be obtained from the soil resource.¹⁴ An increase in population of 26.7 percent between 1940 and 1948 is another reminder that the Hawaiian soil must produce more revenue and more employment opportunities.¹⁵

Closely allied to agriculture are the forests of Hawaii. A forest reserve system was introduced early in territorial life and today forests cover almost one-fourth of the islands' area. Their chief value has been considered their role as a source of water and an aid to better rainfall distribution. Outside the reserve system are some native hardwood forests used commercially to some extent. Governor Stainback recently suggested that marginal lands could well be utilized for the production of highly valued exotic woods, on a commercial basis. Such suggestions as this emphasize the determination and ingenuity with which Hawaiian leaders are searching for new wealth in Hawaii's soil.¹⁶

The soil dominates even Hawaii's scant manufacturing enterprises which are almost completely dependent upon agriculture. In this category are the one sugar refinery, pineapple canneries, sugar mills, a can-manufacturing plant, coffee processing plants, a commercial fertilizer concern, and the manufacture of locally grown cotton into a padding popular with the Japanese for household use. The manufacture of wallboard from bagasse (residue from crushed sugar cane) finds a local market but has strong mainland competition. Other concerns manufacture such articles

¹⁴Annual Report, 2; see also ibid., 1, 29; Cordon Report, 3; Senate Document No. 151, pp. 51, 55-56, 85-86; Frank J. Taylor, "Labor Moves in on Hawaii," The Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 219 (June 28, 1947), 100, 102; Clifford M. Zierer, "Reviews of Books," The Pacific Historical Review, III (March, 1934), 97-98. Mr. Zierer was reviewing John Wesley Coulter's Land Utilization in the Hawaiian Islands (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1933).

¹⁵Annual Report, 64.

¹⁶Ibid., 2-3; Senate Document No. 151, pp. 85-86; Coulter, loc. cit., 225, 255.

as mattresses, paper boxes, concrete pipe and ukuleles. An early industrial development, the Honolulu Iron Works, produces machinery, engineering supplies and some steel. However, its chief specialty is the production of equipment for sugar mills, not only in the islands but in the Philippines and southeast China. Except for small concerns supplying local needs, it is not likely that manufacturing will play a great role in Hawaii's future.¹⁷

Hawaii's second most important resource might be considered the sea, since commerce still figures vitally in the life of the Pacific's chief way-station. During 1947, Honolulu's harbor was host to 818 ships from transoceanic ports. As in the past, trade with the mainland dwarfs all foreign commerce, and, since Hawaii is subject to United States coastwise navigation laws, all mainland commerce must be carried on by American ships. This commerce is no small factor in the continued strength of the Pacific coast maritime fleet. Exports and imports in both mainland and foreign commerce each averaged over one hundred million dollars in value in the 1937-1940 period. War-time merchant marine losses, the war in China, dollar restrictions in various countries, and Australian austerity have brought a decrease in foreign vessels entering Hawaiian ports since World War II.¹⁸

Ironically, the sea has not been too kind to the fishing industry of this island community. Commercial fishing does not fully supply local

¹⁷Senate Document No. 151, p. 55; Coulter, loc. cit., 262-264; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 239.

¹⁸Senate Document No. 151, pp. 57-58, 60; Annual Report, 67; Simpich, loc. cit., 571; Crawford, op. cit., 73.

needs. Ranking fourth in dollar value in the economy, inshore fishing has been limited by the small amount of shallow shoal water around the islands--a result of Hawaii's volcanic origin. The surrounding waters abound in tuma, but deep-sea fishing has been restricted because of the small size of the fishing boats, sparse knowledge concerning the deep-sea fisheries and lack of sufficient bait for tuma. Congress in 1947 appropriated funds to aid in overcoming the present obstacles to deep-sea fishing. Once these are surmounted, tuma fishing can become a great economic boon to the islands. In 1947, fish production was valued at over \$3,000,000, but the islands have found it necessary to import ten percent of their fish supply. There is one cannery producing tuma for export.¹⁹

A third resource for Hawaii has proven to be its scenic and climatic attractions. One of the most promising factors in the Hawaiian economic picture is the tourist trade, already estimated to be the third money-maker of the islands. The native government had financed construction of a tourist hotel, and visitors in the 1890's noted Hawaii's charm as a vacation resort. With the aid of a self-appointed press agent, Alexander Hume Ford, and the reports brought back by Spanish-American war veterans and famous visitors such as Jack London, tourist trade grew during the first two decades of this century. However, it was the combined efforts of the "Big Five" and the Matson Line in the 1920's

¹⁹ Senate Document No. 151, p. 55; Carpenter, op. cit., 474; Coulter, loc. cit., 261-262; Simpich, loc. cit., 602; Annual Report, 3; Cordon Report, 3; Clark, op. cit., 264-266.

that led to the construction of luxury liners and the Royal Hawaiian Hotel to lure visitors. Government funds were added to those of private enterprise to spread abroad information about Hawaii's exotic charms. The funds were not spent in vain. After a depression lapse, tourist trade soared, and about 30,000 visited the islands annually before World War II. In 1947 over 100,000 came to Hawaii by air transport alone, leaving an estimated \$10,000,000 in Hawaiian coffers. Construction of more tourist accommodations is already underway. The provision of transportation and hotel facilities within the moderate price range and further development of tourist facilities in the outer islands (i.e., beyond Oahu) should greatly enhance the money-making possibilities of this enterprise.²⁰

More serious visitors to the islands have also boosted Hawaiian wealth. From a purely economic standpoint, the United States armed forces are big business for Hawaii. Not only do the military services purchase food and other supplies from local producers and carry on considerable construction work, but, in 1947, the combined service payrolls, for both civilian and military personnel, amounted to almost \$147,000,000. Much of this money finds its way into Hawaiian cash registers in payment for rent, food, retail goods, and recreation. While this source of revenue has gradually decreased since the war, it undoubtedly will continue to be a strong contributor to the Hawaiian economy.²¹

²⁰Annual Report, 67-68; Senate Document No. 151, pp. 63-64; Furnas, op. cit., 184-186; Coulter, loc. cit., 264-265; Barker, op. cit., 64-65.

²¹Ibid., 227-230; Annual Report, 68; Cordon Report, 4.

Vital to the economy of the isolated and scattered islands is transportation. Only one railroad now operates in the territory, but, even before highway transport became dominant, railways were used primarily for cane transport rather than passenger service. The outstanding development in post-war transportation has been the growth of air traffic. In inter-island traffic, there is a scheduled passenger-freight line, a scheduled freight line, and several charter lines. It is expected that the volume of business will soon require another scheduled passenger line. Both Pan American Airways and United Air Lines maintain daily air service between Hawaii and the mainland, while Northwest Airlines more recently installed service to the Pacific Northwest. There is also regular service to the Orient and Australasia. To handle this traffic in 1947 there were sixteen airports, exclusive of military installations. While air traffic has now outstripped by a large margin sea transport in passenger load, both the Matson Navigation Company and the American President Lines have regular passenger schedules for the mainland run. By June, 1948, however, full pre-war schedules still had not been resumed, due in part to air competition. Freight, of course, remains predominantly sea-borne in ocean transport. Air traffic has been even more effective in reducing passenger traffic by water in inter-island travel. Furthermore, tugs and barges are replacing steamship freighters. The Inter-Island Navigation Company has cut its service in half and may reduce present schedules in the near future.²²

²²Vandercook, op. cit., 113-115; Annual Report, 16-19, 50-51; Gordon Report, 4; Simpich, loc. cit., 571-573; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 272; Clark, op. cit., 263-264.

Facilitating commerce and business alike is a highly developed communication system which has expanded some since the war. This system includes inter-island wireless telephone and telegraph service, land telephones, transoceanic radio telephone and telegraph, and ship-shore service.²³

Despite the discontinuance in 1947 of two large sugar plantations, an event the Governor characterized as a "severe blow to the economy of the Territory,"²⁴ and a number of business failures, the governor's annual report was optimistic. Indices, such as bank deposits, value of business, establishment of new businesses and increased retail sales, all pointed to a sound economy, as had the same indices for the previous year.²⁵

Despite manifest weaknesses, the Hawaiian economy in 1948 held promise. But not so promising to many during the years had been the economic and political role which they feared the "Big Five" would have in the State of Hawaii. Strictly defined, the term "Big Five" refers to the following Honolulu-based factors or business agencies: American Factors, Ltd., C. Brewer and Company, Ltd., Alexander and Baldwin, Castle and Cooke, Ltd., and Theo. H. Davies, Ltd. Together these five firms represented in 1946 plantations responsible for 96.5 percent of Hawaii's total sugar production. Each of the three largest produced more than twenty percent of the total. Sugar plantations independent of these factors have been rare in Hawaiian history. Usually overlooked are three

²³Annual Report, 68; Senate Document No. 151, pp. 63, 76.

²⁴Annual Report, 46.

²⁵Ibid., 23, 46, 66-67; Cordon Report, 4.

smaller agencies: F. A. Schaefer and Company, Ltd., F. L. Waldron, Ltd., and Bishop Trust Company. Time and usage have given the term "Big Five" the erroneous connotation of five families or even five men. Despite agency efforts to eliminate its use, the term remains as inseparable a part of the Hawaiian vocabulary as Aloha, and is used almost as often.²⁶

This agency system grew out of the need of the early, isolated plantations for a representative in Honolulu to handle cane shipments, purchase supplies and machinery, manage funds and aid in procuring labor. As the system developed, the agencies, in times of depression, bolstered the plantations with heavy loans or purchases of stock. Gradually, too, they came to supervise plantation insurance, accounting, legal, real estate and tax matters. For these services the factors received commissions based on the gross proceeds earned by the individual plantations. But the main economic power and profits of the agencies came, in time, to emanate from stock ownership, interlocking directorates, family relationships and trusteeships. As previously stated, profitable sugar production in Hawaii required much capital, astute management and high organization. The "Big Five" furnished these needs and reaped the profits. Obviously, those having the greatest voice in the affairs of sugar also came to have the most power over the whole economy. As in the past, both the factors and the plantations are organized as common stock companies. Often the agency owns stock in the plantations it serves, while the plantation may

²⁶Larocade, "Report," loc. cit., 17; Vandercook, op. cit., 155, 158; Barber, op. cit., 67-69; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 271-272. For German origin of American Factors, Ltd., see Barber, op. cit., 47; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 271; and Senate Document No. 151, p. 67.

well own stock in the agency. Today there are approximately 16,000 stockholders in the plantation companies. Stock ownership in the agencies is less scattered. "Big Five" stock can be bought on the Honolulu Stock Exchange, but its high price limits turn-over, and it tends to remain in the same hands. In 1941 two of the factors were almost entirely within family control.²⁷

Had the factors limited themselves to the sugar industry, however vital, they would have avoided much criticism. However, other firms soon sought the counsel of the employers of probably the ablest business and professional minds in the islands. Sometimes these firms gave positions on directors' boards to "Big Five" leaders. Gradually the "Big Five" spread out, not only because of their business "know-how" but because they had capital to invest. While there is disagreement as to the amount of power the "Big Five" has come to wield in the pineapple industry, it is safe to say that the factor system has never penetrated as deeply here as in the sugar industry. What control the factors have gained in this industry dates mainly from the year 1932 when the depression would have decimated Hawaii's second industry without financial aid from "Big Five" and mainland investors. Two of the largest growers of pineapples are mainland firms, which, incidentally, have always worked easily with the "Big Five."²⁸

²⁷Daniel James, "Hawaii's Claims to Statehood," The American Mercury, LXIII (September, 1946), 330-331; Hearings, H.R. 49-56, pp. 193-194; Larcade, "Report," loc. cit., 16; Barber, op. cit., 41-42, 44-51; Vandercook, op. cit., 157; Coulter, loc. cit., 240; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 226-227, 272.

²⁸Hearings, H.R. 236, p. 233; Larcade, "Report," loc. cit., 17; Senate Document No. 151, p. 69; Barber, op. cit., 42, 55-57; Furnas, op. cit., 183; Coulter, loc. cit., 250; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 272; Clark, op. cit., 236; Hearings, Con. Res. 18, p. 637.

A "Big Five" affiliate has been the Matson Navigation Company, Ltd., which for many years practically controlled mainland-Hawaiian freight and passenger traffic. With the aid of the United States Maritime Commission, the American Presidents Line now offers competition, while Matson attempts to gain a weighty interest in Pan American Airways were checked first by the Civil Aeronautics Board and later by federal legislation. Other shipping lines, hotels, docks, utilities, banks, retail and wholesale stores, export-import businesses and insurance--all have been "Big Five" interests. "Big Five" money and advice found its way into almost all economic ventures of note. Furthermore, by wise management, such as retiring bonds in prosperous years, the "Big Five" and the plantations maintained a sound basis for their varied operations.²⁹

But to the "Big Five" came difficult times. The first break in its prestige came with the speculation-born losses in the 1929 market crash and the effects on Hawaiian public opinion and Hawaiian economy of the legislation, especially concerning labor, of the anti-monopolistic New Deal administration. So damaging were these two forces alone that the "Big Five," in the early thirties, hired and heavily financed a press agent to return the "Big Five" to the good graces of Hawaiian public opinion and to improve mainland impressions of the islands. Island-inspired articles and pictures soon flooded the mainland press and magazines. Later, mainland writers, photographers and columnists were lured to Hawaii on

²⁹Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 272-273; Barber, op. cit., 43-44; Furnas, op. cit., 183; Clark, op. cit., 236; Vandercook, op. cit., 156-157.

pre-paid vacations. A part of this campaign was the publication in 1939 of John W. Vandercook's King Cane, the publishing costs of which were shared with the publisher by the sugar industry. Similar efforts were made in the islands, especially among students and teachers, to press the values of Hawaii's economic system.³⁰

Attributed to the "Big Five" was another measure to enhance its prestige--the instituting of a spying system to discourage employee criticism of "Big Five" methods and policies. The alleged policy of employee intimidation will be discussed later in connection with the 1937 Congressional investigation in Hawaii.³¹

Despite all efforts, however, the assaults on "Big Five" power continued. Extremely damaging were the invasions of mainland firms such as S. H. Kress and Company and Sears, Roebuck Company. This competition hurt "Big Five" interests in the retail trade. Also government defense construction contracts prior to World War II brought in new firms, with their own personnel, as well as new business ideas and methods. These contracts, too, provided minimum labor standards and government accounting supervision. The war-time infusion of new business blood is still acting upon island business methods and organization.³²

Another challenge to the "Big Five" was the business debut in the 1920's of the American-born, American-educated immigrants' children who,

³⁰Barber, op. cit., 65-66, 81-90, 93-97; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 272.

³¹Barber, op. cit., 77-79, 95-96.

³²Ibid., 66-69; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 273-274.

for the first time, gave Hawaii a substantial and numerous middle class. Even as this second generation left the plantations for small businesses, farms, crafts and professions, mechanization further depleted the number of workers which the "Big Five" could, at the least, guide in their thinking and voting. The last war only strengthened this middle class. Bank deposits increased two- or three-fold between 1941 and 1946, while an estimated 1,000 or more comparatively poor islanders had gained comfortable fortunes by 1945. These gains were largely made by restaurant owners, taxi company operators, printers, theater owners and similar small business people. Among these, the Chinese and Japanese were predominant.³³

The post-war consensus of opinion seems to be that Hawaii offers many opportunities for both small and large business and that the "Big Five," whatever its past power, is no longer impervious to able competition. Even in its stronghold, agriculture, small farming is on the increase. In that field, where Hawaii pays plantation labor almost three times as much as does its competitor, Cuba, a sugar price drop could be very injurious to the plantation system, where the "Big Five's" basic power lies.³⁴

The trend of testimony in the various Congressional investigations into Hawaii's readiness for statehood certainly indicates a waning of "Big Five" power. Impressively numerous in the 1935 investigation were

³³Clark, op. cit., 262; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 272-274; Barber, op. cit., 61-64; Taylor, loc. cit., 25.

³⁴Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 273; Taylor, loc. cit., 102; Annual Report, 67; Clark, op. cit., 236-266; Cordon Report, 3.

charges that the "Big Five" used intimidation to control elections and to quash opposition to statehood. Fears were expressed that statehood would give the "Big Five" complete control of the islands. Some believed that many citizens would not testify against statehood for fear of losing their jobs. Some opposed statehood simply because the "Big Five" supported it, the implication being that what the agencies wanted must be bad for the ordinary citizen. "Big Five" labor policies, too, were criticized. Testimony of other witnesses refuting these charges could not completely eradicate their force.³⁵ The 1937 investigation produced similar outbursts, but there was no way to definitely verify the repeated charges that many opposed to statehood were afraid to appear before the committee.³⁶ The report of this joint committee gave considerable attention to the "Big Five." While justifying the existence of large-scale agriculture, the report stated, "Today Hawaii's industry is largely controlled by a number of closely integrated corporations."³⁷ There was an analysis of "Big Five" stock ownership and the conclusion that there was a "fairly wide" distribution of stock in industrialized agriculture.³⁸ The committee's

³⁵Hearings, H.R. 3034: Testimony against "Big Five," pp. 25-26, 45-47, 57-58, 65, 71, 73-74, 136, 138, 155-158, 191-192, 194-195, 208, 233, 267, 269-271; testimony favoring "Big Five," pp. 55, 153, 181-182, 201, 204, 209, 282, 229, 291.

³⁶Hearings, Con. Res. 18: Testimony against "Big Five," pp. 71-74, 55-56, 76, 81, 94, 157-158, 174-182, 203-206, 225-226, 276-278, 283, 384, 448, 468; testimony favoring "Big Five," pp. 51, 65-66, 128-129, 131, 133, 155-156, 282, 305-306, 389-390, 422, 466, 483, 576.

³⁷Senate Document No. 151, pp. 65, 64-65.

³⁸Ibid., 66, 67.

findings, however, tended to mirror the confusion of the testimony. While admitting that economic policies were determined by very few and that the number of persons who privately approached the committee because of fear of reprisal was impressive, it did not find conditions as bad as in some mainland areas where corporations held sway.³⁹ But, by 1946, witnesses seemed much less concerned about the "Big Five." There was testimony either charging or admitting interlocking interests of agencies, plantations, and steamship lines, and there was some fear expressed regarding political and economic control by the "Big Five." However, representatives of what logically should have been the chief critics of "Big Five" power, the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the American Federation of Labor, expressed the opinion that the "Big Five" could no longer dominate the Hawaiian economy or suppress labor. With the exception of a few, the "Big Five's" critics gave much more temperate appraisals than in previous years.⁴⁰

The final report of the 1946 committee, generally accepted to have made the most exhaustive of all surveys of Hawaiian life, contains the following statement:

. . . the Big Five dominates a great portion of Hawaii's economy, but this economic dominance has not prevented the establishment of many and varied businesses. There are good prospects for small business in Hawaii. Further, the influence of the Big Five has not prevented the enactment of progressive legislation in the field of labor, education, health, and welfare.⁴¹

³⁹Ibid., 68-70.

⁴⁰Hearings, H.R. 236, pp. 113-114, 133-134, 138-139, 222-236, 359, 474, 484-485, 783-821.

⁴¹Larade, "Report," loc. cit., 20.

The committee further found nothing that ". . . indicated the existence in business life of collusion or fraud or any agreement or combination in restraint of trade."⁴²

In the Congressional investigation of March, 1947, the "Big Five" was not mentioned as an obstacle to statehood, although Secretary of Interior Julius A. Krug characterized it as ". . . the potent economic group."⁴³ The 1948 committee found scant attention paid by witnesses to the "Big Five." There were statements that "Big Five" domination was exaggerated and that labor had broken its power. There was one mention of fear of reprisal.⁴⁴ In the same year Senator Guy Cordon, as a result of his investigation, stated: ". . . they dominate the financial life of the islands only to the extent that other large industries and corporations dominate financial affairs in the States." Agreeing essentially with the 1946 committee's findings, Senator Cordon felt independent enterprise was free to develop, progressive economic legislation possible and restraint of trade not in evidence.⁴⁵

The results of a survey of the business-financed Hawaiian Economic Foundation in 1948 tended further to explode domination charges against

⁴²Ibid., 20. For expressions in 1946 of mainland sentiment against statehood on the basis of "Big Five" power, see various letters to committee and members of Congress, Enabling the People of Hawaii To Form A Constitution and State Government to be Admitted into the Union on an Equal Footing with the Original States, Hearing, Pursuant to H.R. 3643, House Committee on the Territories, 79 Congress, 1 Session, 10, 21-24, 35-36. Hereafter cited as Hearing, H.R. 3643.

⁴³Hearings, H.R. 49-56, p. 45; see ibid., 16, 118, 129, 182.

⁴⁴Hearings, H.R. 49 and S. 114, pp. 24, 48, 273-274, 277, 465, 447.

⁴⁵Cordon Report, 8.

the "Big Five." The survey found that all Hawaii's 831 corporations had in total assets less than one large mainland steel company. It further found 34,000 stockholders in these companies--an average of one stockholder to every three families. It found that the "Big Five" controlled twenty percent of Hawaiian corporation assets, while they were themselves owned by 4,500 stockholders.⁴⁶

To picture the "Big Five" as no longer an economic power in the islands would be inaccurate. But the evidence points both to a decrease in their power and an increase in competition. In 1947 there were over 38,000 business enterprises in Hawaii.⁴⁷

There seems no reason longer to brand the "Big Five" as a deterrent to statehood. If their testimony is any indication, the Hawaiian people, themselves, no longer consider the "Big Five" a great political or economic threat. Furthermore, to a great extent, credit belongs to the leaders, past and present, of these concerns for the remarkable achievements of Hawaiian agriculture and therefore Hawaiian economic progress. Their predecessors literally created the wealth in sugar and pineapple which is still the basic source of island revenue. Their policies have often been selfish; they have tended to take upon themselves too much responsibility for what they felt was island welfare; but certainly they have earned some share in Hawaiian wealth.⁴⁸

⁴⁶Newsweek, Vol. 32 (October 4, 1948), 68-69.

⁴⁷Cordon Report, 4; Barber, op. cit., 260-262.

⁴⁸Crawford, loc. cit., 73; Barber, op. cit., 76-77.

It seems, however, that the following charges can be made against the "Big Five": (1) they clung over-long to the paternalistic system of employer-employee relationships; (2) they undoubtedly attempted to wield more political power than was their due; (3) they opposed too long the growth of the labor union; and (4) they have been over-sensitive to criticism and advice in the past. It seems evident that these mistakes of the "Big Five" tended to build up a resentment against management and a solid tradition of real or imagined grievances among workers which has led to an over-dependence of labor upon any leaders who would show the way to higher living standards. Paternalism, itself, must have tended to weaken the laborers' initiative and independence of thought. If the labor movement in Hawaii today shows many signs of immaturity and lack of responsibility, part of the blame for that weakness lies with the "Big Five."⁴⁹

Of all the factors contributing to the decline of "Big Five" power, the rise of labor stands foremost. So great has labor's power become that one of the "Big Five" leaders said several years ago, "It's now the Big Six--the Big Five and Harry Bridges."⁵⁰ The businessman was referring to the leader of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, the strongest labor organization in the islands. But Hawaiian labor's upsurge to power has been recent--almost precipitant.

⁴⁹For discussions of paternalism in the islands, see *ibid.*, 70-74, 252-253; Kuykendall and Day, *op. cit.*, 271; Crawford, *loc. cit.*, 73; Furnas, *op. cit.*, 186-187; Vandercook, *op. cit.*, 78-97.

⁵⁰Taylor, *loc. cit.*, 25. In the spring of 1950 Harry Bridges was convicted of perjury when he swore he was not a Communist and was sentenced to a prison term. As a result, he has lost his American citizenship.

Hawaii's beginnings under American sovereignty found contract labor still in force. Prior to the provision of a territorial government, measures were introduced in Congress, one passing in the House, to outlaw contract labor. However, it was the Organic Act of 1900 which finally made further contract labor valueless by providing that criminal proceedings against labor contract violators could not be carried through the courts. This provision applied to all labor contracts, even those entered into before the passage of the Organic Act.⁵¹

One obstacle to effective labor organization was removed, but many hindrances remained. Pitting an improved paternalism against unionization, employers, with considerable success for many years, turned public opinion against labor "agitation," utilized a trespass law to bar organizers from the plantations, and periodically bettered wages and living standards to stem unrest. The Hawaiian public, itself, had little understanding of the aims and methods of organized labor, often felt high-principled paternalism made unions unnecessary, and, especially in earlier years, confused moves for better labor conditions with racial unrest. The later union policy, especially of the C. I. O., to import mainland organizers little versed in Hawaiian conditions antagonized public opinion. Even the workers delayed unionization. They had no traditions of labor organization; their leaders were usually inexperienced, inept, and inclined to be personally ambitious. Racial division and suspicion, and, later, jurisdictional squabbles weakened labor. Furthermore, workers, accustomed to personal

⁵¹Congressional Record, 56 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 33, Part II, 1983, 1985; Part III, 2319-2324; Rowland, "Contract Labor," 266-269; Barber, op. cit., 57-59.

dealings with their employers, at first found the more formal union-management relationship foreign. Over all hung a traditional Hawaiian distaste for any activity suggestive of industrial strife.⁵²

The early membership in skilled trade unions, the first established in 1884, was small and usually composed of newcomers from the mainland. A central labor council and affiliation with national organizations did not develop until the early 1900's. Except for a few strikes in 1919 and 1920, these unions made little impression on territorial life until the 1930's.

Plantation labor disturbances came earlier. The majority group of plantation laborers, the Japanese, tended in increasing numbers to settle permanently in the islands and to consider plantation labor their life's work. Consequently, they set out to improve working conditions. Unfortunately, their activities gave a racial caste to early labor movements which hurt both labor and the Japanese community. A series of strikes gaining minor concessions began in the 1890's. The climax came in 1909 when a four-month strike cost the plantations an estimated \$2,000,000. Better wages and improved working conditions resulted, but this strike, arousing racial fears, led to the search for another labor source. The Philippine Islands thereafter became the center for recruitment. As World War I ended, labor unrest brought the formation of the Federation of Japanese Labor in Hawaii and the Filipino Laborers' Association. Similar demands made by both organizations were rejected by the H.S.P.A.

⁵²Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 274-276; Furnas, loc. cit., 133; Barber, op. cit., 69-70.

The resulting strike in 1920, in which the Japanese held out for seven months, gained a thirty percent wage increase and abolition of Caucasian-Oriental wage differentials. Destructive to the amount of \$12,000,000, the strike indirectly caused the deaths of some 1,200 members of strikers' families, who, evicted from the plantations, had crowded into influenza-infested Honolulu. At this point the territorial legislature unsuccessfully petitioned Congress for renewal of Chinese immigration to overcome what it considered a Japanese conspiracy. But further dependence upon Filipino labor did not end labor troubles. An eight-month Filipino strike in 1924 was marked by extreme violence. Thereafter labor peace marked plantation life through most of the 1930's. By 1935 one writer was reporting plantation wages higher than those enjoyed by mainland farm labor.⁵³

Perhaps the combined effects of the depression, increased mechanization and a growing native-born labor force in reducing plantation labor needs strengthened management's hand during the fourth decade of the century. There was a Filipino strike in 1937, which resulted in a wage increase, and a pineapple plantation strike. But minor strikes in 1939 made no headway. Most significant in this period were the organizing efforts of the I.L.W.U., C.I.O. affiliate, which had entered Hawaii through organization of waterfront workers. Under the leadership of Jack W. Hall, active in Hawaii in the late thirties, the I.L.W.U. sounded out plantation

⁵³Andrew W. Lind, Hawaii's Japanese, An Experiment in Democracy (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1946), 20-22; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 279-282; Barber, op. cit., 132-135; Crawford, loc. cit., 73. In 1909 there was a government-financed attempt to recruit labor in southern Europe. See Lindsay, loc. cit., 310. See ibid. for contemporary alarm over Japanese labor activities.

workers. In 1939 the first election under the National Labor Relations Act gave a C.I.O. local exclusive bargaining rights on one plantation and the next year the first union contract with a sugar company was signed. The American Federation of Labor also organized one plantation. However, due to employer and employee resistance, these efforts were mainly in the nature of experiments.⁵⁴

A series of Pacific coast shipping strikes in the mid-thirties spread enthusiasm for labor organization to the Hawaiian waterfront. One of these strikes, covering a three-month period in late 1936 and early 1937, also brought home to the Hawaiian people their vulnerability to shipping stoppages. The first labor contracts were signed in 1935 between shipping companies and locals of the Sailor's Union of the Pacific, A.F. of L. affiliate. The I.L.W.U. became a strong force on the waterfront the next year. Both this organization and the A.F. of L. participated in a strike against the Inter-Island Steamship Company in 1938 in which violence flared.⁵⁵

⁵⁴Barber, op. cit., 59-61; Clark, op. cit., 172-173; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 282; Taylor, loc. cit., 100. For early activities of Jack Hall, see Clark, op. cit., 159-172; "Hawaii--Struggle for Control," Newsweek, Vol. 29 (April 7, 1947), 26; and Taylor, loc. cit., 102. For description of plantation working and living conditions in the thirties, see Hearings, Con. Res. 18, pp. 633, 637; Vandercreek, op. cit., 102-103; DuPuy, op. cit., 120-121; Coulter, loc. cit., 242-243; Clark, op. cit., 149-156; Barber, op. cit., 74. A rise in wage scales was spurred by the necessity for plantations to meet Department of Agriculture standards in order to receive benefits under the Sugar Control Act of 1937. See Barber, op. cit., 74.

⁵⁵Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 276-277; Barber, op. cit., 69, 221.

But it was the effects of World War II which fashioned Hawaiian labor into possibly the strongest economic force in the islands today. The transformation began in 1939 when the invading mainland defense workers brought with them not only the higher mainland wage standards but infectious enthusiasm for unionism. Decisive, however, in converting Hawaiian labor to organization was the attitude and policies of the military government which took charge of the islands on December 7, 1941. Throughout the war general community resentment of high-handed military usurpation of civil authority reinforced the laboring man's conviction that his particular grievances were very real. Wages and jobs were frozen. Control boards, usually composed of an Army officer and leading businessmen or planters, dealt with recalcitrant workers. Fines and/or imprisonment awaited workers who attempted to change jobs or were absent from their assigned tasks without permission. The immediate danger to Hawaii during the first months of the war made these restrictions bearable, but, as the war moved west, discontent grew. There were charges, with some foundation, that the military government actively discouraged further unionization. Heavy work loads, as well as blackout and curfew restrictions, practically eliminated union activity during the first two years. The active membership in the unions suffered a precipitant drop. While the plantations furnished Army engineers with work crews, the war-time need for sugar led to a policy of freezing plantation labor to the fields. Barred both from higher-paying construction work and enlistment in the services, plantation labor resented its confinement to seemingly non-essential work. The success of revived I.L.W.U. organizing activities in 1944 among certain

classes of sugar workers indicated that the Hawaiian worker was, at last, ready for unionization.⁵⁶

Hawaiian management, meanwhile, had not been blind to the changing labor climate. Convinced by 1943 that evidences of irresponsible labor leadership and mounting indignation over war-time labor restrictions boded ill for post-war industrial peace, business firms organized the Hawaii Employer's Council. By 1947 it represented a majority of all Hawaiian business enterprises, small and large, haole and non-white. Financial contributions to the Council's upkeep are made in accordance with the size of the individual member's business. It has stated its main objectives to be the striking of a balance between the responsibilities of labor and management and the protection of the interests of the general public in labor-management relations. It hopes also, through planning, to provide maximum employment opportunities and to further industrial peace. Undoubtedly, it also hopes to gain for industry the high opinion of the general public. Recruited to lead its activities was a mainland industrial relations expert, James P. Blaisdell, supported by a trained staff. Following Blaisdell's recommendations, the Council has already made progress in standardizing employer-employee relations, working conditions and wages throughout Hawaiian industry. Mr. Blaisdell often acts

⁵⁶Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 277-279; Clark, op. cit., 158-159, 174-175; Taylor, loc. cit., 100. For charges of military intimidation and repression regarding union activities, see Iohiro Izuka, The Truth About Communism in Hawaii (Honolulu: Privately Printed, 1947), 12-13; Clark, op. cit., 174-175. For resume of strikes, 1940 to September, 1945, see Larcade, "Report," loc. cit., Exhibits, 712-714. During the actual war years, January, 1942, through August, 1945, there were a total of 17 strikes, involving approximately 805 men and a loss of approximately 2,366 man days.

for member firms in negotiating labor contracts. The existence of such an organization indicates that private enterprise in Hawaii is not only alive but alert, as in the past, to every new addition to man's knowledge, whether in agriculture or industrial relations, which may advance its cause. There seems present, too, if disguised, some remnant of the old missionary zeal for the welfare of all Hawaii's people.⁵⁷

While the A.F. of L. grew during the war and lent aid to an unsuccessful revolt of a sugar worker's local from the I.L.W.U. in 1948, its progress cannot compare with the phenomenon of the I.L.W.U. Workers in no field of employment have been rejected by the I.L.W.U. in its organizing zeal--to the longshoremen have been added architects, cooks, office workers, teachers, drivers, government employees, laundry workers, firemen and nurses. But most fruitful has been its work in the pineapple and sugar industries, over which it now exercises an almost complete monopoly.⁵⁸

The passage by the 1945 territorial legislature of the Hawaiian Labor Relations Act, or "Little Wagner Act," extended to plantation field labor the bargaining and organizational rights of previous federal legislation. Plantation elections found workers not only overwhelmingly pro-union but almost unanimous in their selection of the I.L.W.U. as their bargaining agent. In the summer of 1945 the sugar industry signed with the I.L.W.U. the first industry-wide labor contract, which included

⁵⁷Clark, op. cit., 163-169; Taylor, loc. cit., 100; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 283-284.

⁵⁸Furnas, op. cit., 187; Taylor, loc. cit., 100; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 279; Clark, op. cit., 174-175; Larode, "Report," loc. cit., Exhibits, 710; Thomas Lawrence O'Brien, The Plot to Sovietize Hawaii (Hilo, Hawaii, T.H.: The Hawaii News Printshop, 1948), 55.

substantial wage increases, provision for classification of jobs and a settlement of \$1,500,000 for back wages.⁵⁹

Of significance in the union movement since the war has been the prominent role in membership and leadership taken by workers of Japanese ancestry, who, in May of 1946, represented almost 40 percent of plantation union membership. While common union membership of all races should aid interracial relations, the predominance of the Japanese in a group tending to disturb community life may bring future criticism to the Japanese as it did in the early days of the century.⁶⁰

The industrial troubles foreseen by members of the Hawaii Employer's Council were not lacking in 1946 when every month brought strikes or strike threats. Trucking, transit, shipping and tuna-packing companies all were affected. But the main industrial conflict came to revolve around the I.L. W.U.'s campaign to end paternalism. The perquisite system under which management furnished free housing, utilities, and medical and recreational facilities came under fire. The union was caught by surprise when the Hawaiian Pineapple Company in 1946 lent full support to the campaign. It turned over its housing to a separate agency, from which workers could rent their homes, and offered a pay boost which more than covered the estimated cost of former services.⁶¹

⁵⁹Clark, op. cit., 176-177; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 285; Hearings, H.R. 236, p. 697.

⁶⁰Land, op. cit., 253-254, 253n.

⁶¹Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 278-279, 282; Taylor, loc. cit., 101; Furnas, op. cit., 187.

Uneasy over this victory, the I.L.W.U. demanded more of the sugar industry: increased wages, a 40-hour week, and a union shop. When the industry refused to meet the full wage demands, workers struck, August 31, 1946, on thirty-three plantations. This 79-day strike is estimated to have cost the Territory's people \$20,000,000, the strikers alone losing from seven to eight million dollars in wages. One plantation is said to have lost \$3,000,000. Further, a tremendous amount of potential sugar was lost while the mainland still was under rationing. The final settlement abolished the perquisite system and boosted the average daily wage to over seven dollars. The additional cost to the sugar industry annually was estimated at between ten and seventeen million. One plantation ceased operation. From this strike issued a move toward increased mechanization to counter rising wage costs. Also, it offered proof of the vulnerability of Hawaii's main industry to strikes. The worker, suffering from wage losses, found his take-home pay less than before.⁶²

Mutual distrust and much bitterness marked union-management relations during the strike. Particularly, the union found it difficult to understand the industry's willingness to end the perquisite system. However, both labor negotiations and preparation of various government-required data on wages had been increasingly plagued by the lack of agreement at any one time of either government or private authorities as to

⁶²Cordon Report, 14; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 283; Taylor, loc. cit., 101-102; Clark, op. cit., 179-182.

the exact cash value of perquisites. Paternalism's value had been exceeded by its disadvantages.⁶³

Hawaii meanwhile suffered as usual from shipping strikes. These strikes, originating either in Hawaii or the West Coast, had complicated island life in 1934, 1936, 1939-40, and 1946. They extended in length from 53 to 98 days.⁶⁴

By December of 1945, numerically at least, Hawaiian labor had come of age. The A.F. of L. represented 46 organizations and the C.I.O., 68. In addition, there were several independent and government employee unions. Membership, not including government employees, was estimated to be between 55,000 and 60,000 by 1947.⁶⁵

Politically, labor had made tremendous gains. The C.I.O. Political Action Committee, organized under the leadership of Jack Hall, now regional director for the I.L.W.U., saw a majority of its approved candidates elected to the territorial legislature in 1944. It was this legislature, incidentally, which passed the "Little Wagner Act." It has been charged that the P.A.C., by approving popular candidates, had made an impression far in excess of its actual strength. If it was just a ruse to impress political aspirants and union membership, it certainly succeeded. A Hilo

⁶³Purnas, op. cit., 188; Taylor, loc. cit., 101; Clark, op. cit., 179-182.

⁶⁴Statehood for Hawaii, Communist Penetration of the Hawaiian Islands, Report Relative to Investigation with Reference to H.R. 49, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, 80 Congress, 2 Session, 10. Hereafter cited as Butler Report.

⁶⁵Larsade, "Report," loc. cit., Exhibits, 709-711; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 283.

radio commentator has described the long line of political candidates who went before the P.A.C. endorsement committee on Big Island in 1946. In this election, P.A.C.-backed candidates numbered 51, mainly Democrats, of whom 35 were elected. The resulting territorial legislature, convening February 19, 1947, was deadlocked because of an even number of Republicans and Democrats in the lower house. For eighteen days legislative work awaited the outcome of the struggle for the speaker's chair, which represented control of the legislature. Jack Hall and his lieutenants worked openly and feverishly to gain the chair for the Democrats--a victory which would have meant virtually a P.A.C.-controlled legislature. Finally one Democrat broke ranks and voted with the Republicans. Since the P.A.C. had failed in the elections to tie the Senate, the I.L.W.U. failed in what seems to have been a deliberate, long-planned scheme to dominate the legislative branch of the Hawaiian government. The time lost in moves for power was never recovered. The 1947 legislature accomplished little. Among the issues for which the P.A.C. had campaigned were redistribution of land to small owners by confiscation of large estates, prohibition of racial discrimination in employment, extension of existing labor legislation, unlimited property taxation and government housing. It is not surprising that Hall could tell a House investigating committee in 1946 that Big Five political power was dead. There were, at this time, expressions of fear that the Democratic Party had fallen completely into the hands of the I.L.W.U. Because of the close connection between later I.L.W.U. moves, both political and economical, to the general question

of Communist infiltration of the islands, these developments will be described in the next chapter.⁶⁶

Labor received the full attention of Congressional committees a little later than had the "Big Five." In the 1935 investigation, mentions of labor conditions were rare.⁶⁷ Complaints were made two years later to the joint investigating committee of long working hours and poor living conditions on the plantations. The committee also ferreted out the fact that Hawaiian labor legislation left much to be desired. The present delegate to Congress, Joseph R. Farrington, intimated that these shortcomings would soon be remedied. The joint committee's report showed concern about existing restrictive measures, such as the anti-picketing law, a riot law giving police immunity in cases where they took punitive action in dispersing labor demonstrators, and an anti-trespass law, used by the plantations to prevent organizers from reaching the workers. In general, however, the committee commended plantation labor conditions. Among its recommendations were the establishment of a labor department and the adoption of "a more definite labor policy" by the territorial government.⁶⁸ It commented that ". . . the Territory is substantially without modern labor legislation." In this case the committee was thinking of the absence of a child labor law and minimum wage and maximum hours law.⁶⁹

⁶⁶Hearings, H.R. 236, p. 133; O'Brien, op. cit., 1, 14, 16-21; Taylor, loc. cit., 25, 102; Kykendall and Day, op. cit., 199-200, 284.

⁶⁷Hearings, H.R. 3034, pp. 15, 70-71.

⁶⁸Senate Document No. 151, p. 81; ibid., pp. 50, 70, 77-79; Hearings, Con. Res. 18, pp. 77-79, 422; Furnas, loc. cit., 133.

⁶⁹Senate Document No. 151, p. 70.

True to Farrington's promise, modernization of labor legislation was soon forthcoming. Provided for in 1939 was a Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, activated January 1, 1940. Child-labor, wage-and-hour and social-insurance laws were passed. Mention has already been made of the "Little Wagner Act," the provisions of which were duplicated in only one state, Wisconsin, at the time of passage of the bill. Practically all federal labor legislation now extends to the islands, such as the Social Security Act, National Labor Relations Act, acts giving special protection to railroad, farm and maritime labor, the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act.⁷⁰

In view of this legislation and the rapid unionization beginning in the last days of the war, it was not surprising that the 1946 committee found little fault with the Hawaiian labor situation. It reported labor legislation progressive, the Labor Department capable, and unionization strong. Senator Cordon's report in 1948 revealed practically the same conditions.⁷¹

In the same year Governor Stainback reported very favorably on the work which the territorial Labor Department had been doing, especially its success in providing a more temperate climate for discussion of labor

⁷⁰Annual Report, 20; Larcade, "Report," loc. cit., 18-19; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 285. See Larcade, "Report," loc. cit., Exhibits, 696-704, for complete list of labor legislation on books in 1946.

⁷¹Ibid., 18-19; Cordon Report, 14.

disputes. He also pointed to several developments which he thought indicated a trend toward a more stable labor-management relationship in the islands.⁷²

By any standards Hawaii today qualifies for statehood, if the bases of judgment be adequate labor legislation and equitable representation of the laboring man in the economic and political councils of the territory. The labor unions, by their unqualified approval of statehood, exhibit confidence that they can well protect their interests under a state government.⁷³

However, the peculiar vulnerability of the island economy and island life to any considerable disruption of its shipping schedules or the operations of its basic sugar and pineapple industries lays upon labor, as well as management, a heavier responsibility for public welfare than that borne by the average union on the mainland. Note must be taken, therefore, of the comments of various observers, including the present governor, upon the suddenness of the growth of unionism in the islands, the tendency of union members to follow their leaders without question, and the inexperience of both management and labor in industrial relations. However, another observer, with first-hand experience in Hawaiian labor relations, informed the 1946 investigating committee that Hawaiian employer-employee relations were improving rapidly in quality. He further felt

⁷²Annual Report, 9, 21.

⁷³Hearings, H.R. 49 and S. 114, pp. 26-31, 53-56, 89-91; Hearings, H.R. 236, pp. 131-140. The Central Labor Council of the A.F. of L. in 1946 would not commit itself on statehood because of division of opinion. However, various A.F. of L. locals did support it. See Hearings, H.R. 236, pp. 137-138.

that the post-war labor disputes in Hawaii provided no valid excuse to deny statehood. Consideration of both favorable and unfavorable comments, as well as the history of the labor movement in Hawaii, makes some conclusions possible. The very vulnerability of the islands to shipping and industrial strikes will, in all likelihood, develop in the Hawaiian people a public opinion more informed and more outspoken on industrial relations than is found in most mainland states. Such a public opinion would be the strongest defense against industrial relationships so poor as to hurt beyond repair the Hawaiian economic structure. Furthermore, Hawaii is not alone in its need for improved labor-management relationships and responsible leadership within the labor unions. It seems safe to assume that, barring the control of labor unions by subversive elements, Hawaiian labor today offers no obstacle to statehood. More will be said later, however, concerning the possibility of a strong subversive element within the labor movement.⁷⁴

One other aspect of Hawaii's economy deserves mention--the land distribution. The gradual passing of private lands into the hands of foreigners after the great land division under the monarchy has been described. Even before 1900 many were disturbed over the concentration of large amounts of Hawaii's scarce land in estates and plantations. It was hoped that the provisions for homesteading, either on a fee simple or long-term lease basis, in legislation of 1884 and 1895, would promote

⁷⁴Annual Report, 9; Furnas, op. cit., 188-189; Taylor, loc. cit., 102.

small farm ownership, encourage diversification of agriculture, and provide for the city-loving, carefree Kanakas a means of gaining economic security. Both the general effects of this legislation and the Kanaka response were disappointing. The Organic Act left much of Hawaii's land laws intact, but Congress later restricted leases of government lands for agricultural purposes to five years and, in the case of corporations, limited the acreage. It was felt this policy would leave more public lands for small-parcel purchase by individuals. These restrictions, however, proved ineffective. Leases were later extended to fifteen years and the limit on acreage was repealed. Congress had also provided that leased agricultural lands could be withdrawn for homesteading at any time. But the homesteading opportunities did not prove very popular and tended to encourage land speculation. Undaunted, Congress passed the Hawaii Homes Commission Act in 1921. Limited to those of at least one-half Hawaiian blood, it encouraged homesteading on long-lease terms. Only about ten percent of the eligible natives took advantage of its provisions. More successful in providing suburban home sites than small farms, this act has never fully met the purposes of its initiators. An official survey in 1946 of homesteading problems resulted in the suggestion that, in the future, public lands be sold only for home sites, as small-farm land allocations had proven impractical. Lands for agricultural use should be leased, the survey report further recommended. In practice, the territorial government has leased agricultural lands for a minimum rate and a share in the profits from cultivation. This arrangement has been a source of considerable government revenue.

The 1937 investigating committee reviewed the land policies of the territory and recommended changes in the Hawaii Homes Commission Act. It also reported that the territorial government had reduced property taxes in order to encourage home ownership. The committee was displeased with the great prevalence of tenancy in the islands. But the general problem of land distribution continued.

Long a critic of Hawaii's land distribution and disturbed by post-war housing and homesite shortages on Oahu, Governor Stainback in 1945, in compliance with the findings of a Land Laws Revision Commission, recommended the creation of a government corporation to buy or confiscate land, improve it, and sell it to prospective home builders. A bill to carry out this recommendation failed passage in the 1945 legislature.

The investigating committee of 1946 found that the federal and territorial governments still owned 42.78 percent of the land. More disturbing was the distribution of the 57.22 percent in private ownership. The largest estate owned 8.87 percent of the total land of Hawaii. This famous Bishop estate was established by a native princess as a trust for the education of Hawaiian boys and girls. Fifty estates owned 39.55 percent, leaving only 17.67 for all other private property owners. The committee commented, ". . . there is a concentration of land holdings in the hands of a few persons, companies, or estates, but attempts have been made to improve the situation."⁷⁵

⁷⁵Marcade, "Report," loc. cit., 20; see also ibid., 15; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 203-210; Gordon Report, 9; Senate Document 151, pp. 83, 85, 87; Vandercook, op. cit., 159; Hearings, H.R. 236, pp. 752, 762, 770, 873-875.

In 1947 the legislature appropriated funds for further subdivision of government lands for sale as house sites. The liquidation of one plantation on Oahu created more homesite possibilities for that crowded island. By 1948, according to the Gordon report, there was little change in land distribution, and acute housing lot shortages on Oahu. There has been much post-war criticism of land ownership concentration in view of the growth in population and rise in housing needs. While this situation provides a serious problem, there seems to have been little feeling either on the part of islanders or Congressional committees that it is prejudicial to the statehood cause.⁷⁶

The economic structure just described supports a population which, in June of 1948, numbered an estimated 540,500. During the years in which the statehood issue has been discussed, no single subject has received as much comment as the heterogeneous nature of this population.⁷⁷

Of the Caucasian element little need be said. In 1948 it represented the largest ethnic group in the islands--33.4 percent. Also, from 1940 to 1948 it was the fastest growing element with an increase of 69.6 percent. As it dominates economic life through direct or indirect ownership of three-fourths of island property, it also continues to be preeminent in the political and cultural life of Hawaii, although other races are coming more and more to share Caucasian leadership.

⁷⁶Annual Report, 46; Gordon Report, 9-10; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 210. For description of operations under Hawaii Homes Commission Act, see Hearings, H.R. 236, pp. 573-575.

⁷⁷Annual Report, 65.

Persons of American ancestry or mainland birth predominate in this group, which, by and large, has been responsible for the amazing development of the islands since Cook's discovery. The language of the predominant haole national groups, English, has remained the chief medium of communication, although various ethnic groups continue to use their native tongues within their respective communities and there is current a pidgin English often used between racial groups.⁷⁸

Mustering 14.9 percent of the population in 1948, the Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians have shown a considerable numerical increase in the last decade. Failing to develop the acquisitive sense, this group tends to remain at the bottom of the economic scale, although it has produced leaders in almost every field. Literate, attractive and drawn to urban life, the Hawaiians are employed in skilled and unskilled labor, ranching, limited small farming, shipping and the various occupations connected with the tourist trade. They also tend to appear in great numbers in minor governmental jobs, such as policemen, park keepers, janitors and clerks. Politically the Hawaiian has always been active and his vote is still an important force in any campaign. He usually, however, elects haoles to office. Government attempts to draw the Hawaiian away from the city into homestead areas have never proven too successful, so that he still is not a large property owner. Intermarrying perhaps more than any

⁷⁸Ibid., 64-65; Coulter, loc. cit., 269-270; DuPuy, op. cit., 94-97; Taylor, loc. cit., 25; Hearing, on H.R. 3034, House Committee on Territories, 74 Congress, 1 Session, May 31, 1935, p. 10. Hereafter cited as Hearing, May, 1935.

race, the Hawaiians, as a racial element will, in time, disappear in the melting pot, but their contribution to the new racial type developing in the islands will be a type of continued existence. Socially the Hawaiian has always had high community standing and is popular with all races. Consequently, he offers no racial problem and has long been assimilated into the American culture.⁷⁹

Chinese immigration, as previously noted, ceased in 1898, and, fifty years later, the Chinese comprised only 5.7 percent of the population. Because of their earlier arrival and smaller numbers, the Chinese have never met the antagonism meted out to the Japanese. This remains true despite the fact that they have retained many native customs, have established Chinatowns in the cities, and have numerous Chinese organizations of all types. The Chinese have taken full advantage of educational and economic opportunities in the islands. Today many are wealthy. They are merchants, storekeepers, bankers and professional men. While primarily settled in urban areas, many Chinese are truck gardeners or small farmers. Since China and the United States were allied in the last war, the Chinese did not share with the Japanese the necessity of proving their loyalty. Their economic progress during the war was amazing. Today they own more property than the entire Japanese population, which is more than five times as large as the Chinese group. In 1947 one Chinese firm outbid "Big Five" agents for a piece of property, while another group invested

⁷⁹ Burrows, op. cit., 44-47; Barber, op. cit., 237-242; Furnas, op. cit., 17, 192-196; Coulter, loc. cit., 268; DuFay, op. cit., 90-91, 100-101, 122-124; Annual Report, 64-65.

over a million dollars in a liquidated plantation to be converted into a housing area. During the war years they bought much property being sold cheaply by people fearing war destruction. Partly responsible for their economic rise has been the hui, a partnership of varying numbers, which enables the Chinese members to get large sums of money in a few hours to make advantageous business deals. The Chinese today bid fair to occupy an economic position in the islands far out of proportion to their numbers. Whether this economic rise will cause racial antagonism in the future cannot yet be determined. In the past the Chinese, despite their business acumen, have caused little resentment. As early as the 1935 Congressional investigation, there were very favorable accounts regarding Chinese assimilation. Probably they will never be a racial problem, since their numbers are small and they tend to intermarry with the haoles and especially with the Hawaiians to a much greater extent than do their fellow citizens of Japanese ancestry.⁸⁰

Last of the great racial invasions was that of the Filipinos, now making up about 9.9 percent of the population. Beginning in 1906 the H.S.P.A., with cooperation of the Philippine government, sponsored Filipino immigration to counter what was considered the economic and social threat of the Japanese. Mainly from northern Luzon, the Filipinos did not settle

⁸⁰House of Representatives Report No. 194, 80 Congress, 1 Session, 27, hereafter cited as House Report No. 194; Hearings, H.R. 3034, pp. 71-73, 77-78, 107-109, 118, 128-129, 131-132; Annual Report, 65; DuPuy, op. cit., 101-103; Coulter, loc. cit., 271-274; Burrows, op. cit., 49-55, 67; Taylor, loc. cit., 24-25, 99.

in the islands to the extent other races had. They would work a few years, save their money and return home. Probably because most Filipinos considered their Hawaiian residence temporary, did not bring their families, and intermarried little, they have not been assimilated rapidly. In 1932, when the Filipino Exclusion Act endangered the Hawaiian labor supply, Hawaii managed to get a special provision allowing immigration, if necessary, with the approval of the Hawaiian governor and the Secretary of Interior. However, the depression decreased the labor need, and comparatively few were imported thereafter. In 1934 the Tydings-McDuffie Act, providing for eventual Philippine independence, further limited Filipino immigration. Today a quota of fifty are allowed in United States territory each year. This ethnic group tends to remain on the plantations and has been responsible for the rise in Hawaii's illiteracy rate.⁸¹

The Portuguese, for whom proportional figures are not available, have developed less rapidly than other Caucasian groups, mainly because of a lack of appreciation for education and an extremely poor economic background in the Azores and Madeiras. They often have been classed separately from other Caucasians, probably because of a strain of Moorish and North African blood. Somewhat unstable at first, they have been assimilated well. Today they are generally found on the plantations,

⁸¹Senate Document No. 151, p. 42; Hearings, H.R. 3034, pp. 115-116, 294, 313; Hearings, Con. Res. 18, p. 144; Annual Report, 65; Vandercook, op. cit., 62-64; Furnas, loc. cit., 133; Furnas, op. cit., 182; Barber, op. cit., 59, 104-105; DuFuy, op. cit., 112-113; Coulter, loc. cit., 241, 284-287; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 212.

on small farms and in the skilled trades. They have caused no racial disturbance.⁸²

The Koreans, representing only 1.4 percent of the population, are assimilating rapidly and are found in such businesses as tailoring and laundering. The Puerto Ricans, making up 1.8 percent, have proven good plantation laborers. Neither of these groups pose race problems.⁸³

In fact, despite the many races and cultures which have found common ground in the islands, the term "race problem" has come to be synonymous with the name of only one racial entity--the Japanese.

By 1948 this controversial group, forming 32.6 percent of Hawaii's population, ranked second only to the Caucasians in numbers. Its rate of increase, however, during the 1940-1948 period ranked below that of three other ethnic groups. Furthermore, the alien percentage in this group during the same time dropped from 23.2 to 17.9 percent. The proportion of Japanese to the total population has steadily declined since 1920, when it reached a high point of 42.7 percent. It seems likely that the present trends of a high alien death rate, low birth rate and increasing citizen percentage will continue, making it improbable that the Japanese element will ever again become an overwhelming majority among Hawaii's people.⁸⁴

⁸²Coulter, loc. cit., 270-271; DuPuy, op. cit., 105-107, 124; Clark, op. cit., 99.

⁸³Coulter, loc. cit., 283-284; Furnas, op. cit., 182; Annual Report, 65.

⁸⁴Senate Document No. 151, pp. 40, 43; Hearings, H.R. 236, Exhibits, 655; Annual Report, 65.

The previously noted influx of Japanese between 1898 and 1900 was followed in 1907 by the Gentlemen's Agreement between the United States and Japan. Thereafter, until 1924, when complete exclusion went into effect, the Japanese entering the islands were mainly "picture brides." In the meantime, by natural increase, the Japanese community had provided Hawaii with a large number of dual citizens, since Hawaiian-born Japanese were both American citizens and Japanese subjects under the laws of the respective countries. The provisions of a Japanese statute of 1924 allowed American-born Japanese to expatriate. It also relinquished any claim to Japanese born after 1924 unless they were registered at the Japanese consulate within two weeks of birth. The lethargy of the Japanese dual citizens in expatriating became a source of continuing irritation to other ethnic groups. Not disloyalty, but inertia, the expense and effort of the process, and often refusal to admit any claim of Japan upon their loyalty seem to have been the main elements in the failure of many to expatriate. There are still a considerable number of dual citizens in the islands.⁸⁵

Another source of irritation has been the Japanese language schools, although alien language schools have been a part of both mainland and island life in the past among various national groups. Originally established when many Japanese planned return to the homeland, the schools have come to serve mainly the following purposes: (1) to enable the

⁸⁵Barber, op. cit., 139-141; Burrows, op. cit., 2, 7; DuPuy, op. cit., 111; Hearings, Con. Res. 18, pp. 313-314; Congressional Record, 56 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 33, Part IV, 3711.

American-born, English-speaking Japanese to communicate with parents and grandparents, (2) to strengthen cultural, family and religious customs, and especially in recent years, (3) to provide children, through their mastery of Japanese, with an economic asset in a community where much business is carried on in Japanese. Of course, there had been some purpose, particularly in the early years, to instill loyalty to Japan, but it would seem that this aim has largely disappeared.⁸⁶

Privately financed, the schools now emphasize language study.

While they can be inspected by the territorial Department of Public Instruction, to which translations of textbooks are available, legislation in the early 1920's to closely regulate the schools was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Textbooks have come mainly to deal with American subjects. In 1937 there were 186 such schools with an enrollment of 40,000 pupils.⁸⁷

The testimony before the various Congressional investigating committees indicates the following conditions with regard to the language schools: (1) the purpose of the schools is primarily social and economic; (2) the schools do not greatly affect loyalty to the United States; (3) the schools offer little interference with public school instruction except insofar as the long hours of the combined schools may tire the children; and (4) the teaching has not been too effective, while the children

⁸⁶Burrows, op. cit., 64; Barber, op. cit., 246.

⁸⁷Ibid., 142-143; Hearings, Con. Res. 18, p. 656; Hearings, H.R. 3034, p. 309.

do not display much enthusiasm for the schools. The testimony supports the conclusions of the 1937 investigating committee that the schools were not a menace and would eventually disappear.⁸⁸

The schools were suppressed after Pearl Harbor, but there has been a movement for their reestablishment since the war. Some school properties have been converted into trusts for veterans. Whether the introduction of the Japanese language into the public school system will stem this movement cannot yet be determined.⁸⁹

Possibly another factor in developing antagonism toward the Japanese has been their rise in economic power. One force in the war-time decision not to follow the example of the Pacific Coast in a wholesale internment of Hawaii's Japanese was the realization that the Hawaiian economy would have been seriously crippled by the elimination of an important element in Hawaiian agriculture and business. The Japanese then represented 73 percent of the farmers and farm managers, 59 percent of the workers in food and dairy stores, 53 percent of employees in restaurants and bars, 62 percent of the owners of retail stores, 51 percent of the craftsmen, and 30 percent of the sugar plantation labor. As in the war years, there is today practically no field of employment and business to which the

⁸⁸Hearings, H.R. 3034, pp. 30-31, 81-84, 135, 179, 180-181, 237; Hearings, Con. Res. 18, pp. 315-317, 328-332, 363-366, 470-472, 181; Senate Document No. 151, pp. 44-46.

⁸⁹Lind, *op. cit.*, 257; Burrows, *op. cit.*, 64n; Hearings, H.R. 236, pp. 45-46. Still pending in the Supreme Court in the summer of 1948 was the question of the constitutionality of an act prohibiting study of foreign language previous to the entrance of a child into the fifth grade. However, it was the Chinese who were contesting this law. See Annual Report, 11.

Japanese do not contribute. They hold virtual monopolies over flower growing, coffee cultivation, commercial fishing and employment as servants. Contributing to the professions in large numbers, the Japanese have come to be a dominant element in Hawaii's middle class. Formerly tending to have its own business organizations, the Japanese community during the war combined in some cases with similar organizations of other races. An example was the discontinuance of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce, the members of which transferred to the Honolulu Chamber. However distasteful to some elements of both mainland and island opinion, the fact remains that the Hawaiian economy today, if deprived of its Japanese element, would be sorely pressed.⁹⁰

The most consistent arguments, however, which have been offered by those who oppose statehood because of the Japanese population have revolved around the questions of Japanese loyalty and bloc voting. In World War I the Japanese community showed up well, its civilians making large purchases of Liberty Bonds and its servicemen performing various duties on the islands. However, these contributions were scarcely dramatic enough to dispel fears concerning their loyalty in the 1930's when the Japanese nation was beginning its territorial expansion.⁹¹

⁹⁰Lind, op. cit., 17-18, 78-79; Coulter, loc. cit., 242, 261-262, 275-276; Burrows, op. cit., 62-64; Barber, op. cit., 136-138, 144-145, 153-155, 174-176, 250; Clark, op. cit., 103, 109.

⁹¹Barber, op. cit., 233; Furnas, loc. cit., 133; Matheson, loc. cit., 141.

The record of Hawaii's Japanese in World War II cannot be dismissed so easily. The close of the war found Japanese names comprising 80 percent of Hawaii's war dead and 88 percent of her wounded. This military record was achieved despite early discouragements that would have embittered less hardy, less loyal citizens. Despite outstanding service on December 7, 1941, and the following weeks, the Americans of Japanese ancestry, or A.J.A.'s, who were members of the Territorial Guard were inactivated on January 23, 1942, because of general fears concerning Japanese loyalty. Draft inductions for Japanese ceased and enlistments were refused. One group, mainly students at the University of Hawaii, voluntarily became a labor battalion serving the Army Engineer Corps at much less pay than defense work offered. This gesture should have prepared Hawaii for the record its A.J.A. soldiers would make when they were at last allowed to prove themselves in combat. Beginning in September of 1943, at Anzio, the 100th Infantry Battalion set the pace for the 442nd Combat Team in which it was later incorporated. The A.J.A.'s consistently served as spearhead units, both in Italy and later in France. Their losses in dead and wounded were extremely high, and their unit was reputed to have received more decorations than any other in American military history. In the Pacific, A.J.A.'s from Hawaii were invaluable as interpreters. Their willingness to serve was demonstrated many times, as in the response to the War Department call in 1943 for volunteers. Nine times as many

⁹¹Barber, op. cit., 233; Furnas, loc. cit., 133; Matheson, loc. cit., 141.

volunteered as had been requested. It has been suggested that the outstanding record of the A.J.A.'s in battle was the result of the compulsion felt by these citizens to prove their loyalty. Whatever the motive, their loyalty could no longer be doubted.⁹²

With the exception of this battle record perhaps no testimonial to Japanese loyalty is more convincing than the report made by Robert L. Shivers to the 1946 investigating committee. Mr. Shivers, in charge of the Honolulu office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1939 to 1943, stated that, out of an approximate 160,000 citizens and alien Japanese present in Hawaii in 1941, only 1,400 were detained for possible internment and only 981 of these were actually considered dangerous enough to intern for the duration of the war. To Mr. Shivers these figures indicated that an overwhelming majority of island citizens of Japanese ancestry were loyal and that aliens, whatever their loyalties, made no moves against American security. Mr. Shivers described the so-called advisory groups of outstanding Japanese citizens who aided him from 1940 on in making what proved to be an accurate appraisal of the general loyalty of Hawaiian Japanese. Other A.J.A. leaders, as members of the Oahu Citizens Committee, were praised by Mr. Shivers for their outstanding work in preparing the Japanese community for their role in war-time life.⁹³

⁹²Statement of Lt. Col. Farrant L. Turner, January 15, 1946, Hearings, H.R. 236, pp. 597-599; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 267-269; Lind, op. cit., 83 84 145-149, 150-156, 156-163; Clark, op. cit., 127-130, 134-138, 140-147; Barber, op. cit., 234-235; Burrows, op. cit., 203-207; Furnas, loc. cit., 17.

⁹³Statement of Robert L. Shivers, Hearings, H.R. 236, pp. 599-604.

Mr. Shivers further stated, "There was not one single act of sabotage committed against the war effort in the Hawaiian Islands during the course of the entire war." Continuing, Mr. Shivers denied all the stories of Japanese sabotage which circulated throughout the nation immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack and throughout the war.⁹⁴ Despite such authoritative statements, some of these rumors are still in popular vogue.⁹⁵

Fears, immediately following the Pearl Harbor attack, that the truck farmers, dominantly alien Japanese, might sabotage the war effort by slowing down food production led to a campaign carried on throughout the islands by both haole and A.J.A. leaders to encourage food production. The reaction to this campaign was the doubling of vegetable production between 1941 and 1942, while hog and fruit production showed great increase.⁹⁶

Such were the answers of Hawaii's Japanese-Americans to the doubts expressed as to their loyalty in the years preceding the war. The investigation committees of 1935 and 1937 had been inundated with charges against and defense of the Japanese. By 1940 the Japanese question had become the chief obstacle to statehood.⁹⁷ The twin to the loyalty doubts, the fear of bloc voting, has had much less right to serious consideration, since

⁹⁴Ibid., 605.

⁹⁵For Japanese activities on December 7, 1941, and the rumors circulated as to sabotage, see Clark, op. cit., 115-127; Lind, op. cit., 40-47.

⁹⁶Clark, op. cit., 128-133.

⁹⁷Lind, op. cit., 235. For testimony in which the Japanese were offered as an obstacle to statehood in the 1937 investigation, see Hearings, Con. Res. 18, pp. 170-176, 220, 222-223, 227-230, 240-241, 247-279, 447-467. In both the 1935 and 1937 investigations there was an amazing amount of testimony favorable to the Japanese.

there has been little evidence of any Hawaiian racial group voting only for persons of its own ethnic group. Had the Japanese been guilty of racial voting to any great extent, their numbers would have long ago made this practice an outstanding feature of Hawaiian political life. Such has not been the case. The report of the 1935 investigating committee and the Cordon report of 1948 are in agreement on this point.⁹⁸ As to the future possibility of bloc voting, a sociologist who has made a lengthy study of the Hawaiian Japanese concludes that there is little danger. He bases his conclusion on the division of the Japanese between the two political parties, the political inexperience of the Japanese community, and the fact that, even were bloc voting practiced, the likelihood of the Japanese ever becoming an actual majority of the island electorate is improbable.⁹⁹ On this subject the report of the 1946 committee was in complete agreement:

. . . such evidence of "bloc voting" as exists among Americans of Japanese ancestry is not likely to assume serious proportions, because they, like other peoples are divided amongst themselves by differences, political, social, and economic.¹⁰⁰

Of the loyalty of the Japanese, the same committee stated, ". . . on the record of their behavior and their participation in the war, American citizens of Japanese ancestry can be little criticized."¹⁰¹ The more recent Cordon report is in agreement.¹⁰²

⁹⁸Senate Document No. 151, p. 35; Cordon Report, 6.

⁹⁹Lind, op. cit., 237-238, 256.

¹⁰⁰Larcade, "Report," loc. cit., 20.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰²Cordon Report, 7.

From all available evidence gathered by Congressional committees, from sociological study, and from the actions of the Japanese themselves, there appears no foundation for continued doubt concerning the loyalty of Hawaii's citizens of Japanese ancestry nor is it likely that they will ever abuse their voting privileges. It cannot be expected that so large and obvious a group as Hawaii's A.J.A.'s will not continue to be the source of some racial antagonism--economic competition alone, particularly in times of depression, will produce some friction. However, denial of statehood on such a basis would hardly be justified in view of the continuing problem of racial relations in our southern states. It seems safe to assume that Hawaii's long tradition of racial tolerance, the high percentage of intermarriage between racial groups and the lengthy experience of Hawaii's people in meeting the challenges of interracial relationships would equip the State of Hawaii to handle competently any future racial problems.¹⁰³

Of Hawaii's culture it need only be said that it continues to remain that of an American community. Of the competence of its educational system, especially with reference to training in democratic ideals and to instilling loyalty to those ideals, the record of its products of Japanese ancestry is proof enough.

There remains the question of Hawaii's strategic position in relation to statehood. Despite the emphasis placed by annexationists upon

¹⁰³Lind, op. cit., 239, 258.

the strategic value of the islands, both military and naval installations were slow to be established. Although troops were stationed in Hawaii in 1898, it was 1907 before Fort Shafter, the first permanent army post was ready for partial occupancy. Schofield Barracks, to become in the late 1930's the largest regular army post in the United States, received its first troops in 1909. In 1913 the Hawaiian Department of the Army was established as a separate unit. By World War I a series of military forts protected Pearl and Honolulu harbors. The end of the war brought the development of air fields, including the enormous Hickam Field near Pearl Harbor. During the first world war the Army's duties were mainly those of guarding installations, although some local draftees replaced regular troops transferred to the mainland. Improvements during the war and the 1920's were made, but real expansion in army facilities dated from 1931. Throughout this development of military strength Oahu has remained the focal point. Army air force activities were greatly increased after the 1940 visit of Chief of Staff George C. Marshall. As early as 1934 plans for military-civilian cooperation in event of attack had been studied. In 1940 these plans were tested in a full-scale maneuver predicated upon an actual invasion of the islands. A complete blackout and other activities entailed considerable cooperation from civilian authorities and the civilian population; each acquitted itself well. The advocates of "Manifest Destiny" were fully vindicated during World War II when Hawaii became a staging, training, transshipment and supply center for army and air force

operations throughout the Pacific area. It also served as a recuperative and recreation center for combat troops.¹⁰⁴

As previously noted, the United States had had, since 1883, the right to use Pearl Harbor as a naval base. But no use could be made of the harbor until channel dredging and the construction of dock and shore facilities were undertaken. It was 1900 before the coaling depot at Honolulu was given the status of a naval station, and it was the same year before Congress appropriated funds for dredging the Pearl Harbor channel. Naval base construction did not begin until 1909, and faulty planning delayed successful completion of the entire installation until 1919. Like the army, real naval expansion did not begin until after 1931. In 1940 came orders to triple base facilities. During World War II three naval air stations were established. By 1944, due to accelerated effort, little trace of the damage inflicted in December of 1941 remained, while many improvements at Pearl Harbor had been effected.¹⁰⁵

In 1939 the costs of military and naval operations and installations in Hawaii were running around \$35,000,000 annually. Undoubtedly this figure is higher today, due to expansion of facilities during the war and higher costs. Hawaii today is a central command post for troops and air forces in the Pacific area as far west as Guam. At Hawaii is

¹⁰⁴McKinley to Congress, December 5, 1899, Foreign Relations, 1899, xxxviii; Kaykendall and Day, op. cit., 214-215, 261; Coulter, loc. cit., 290; Carpenter, op. cit., 20; Simpson, loc. cit., 602; Barber, op. cit., 194-195, 203-205, 208, 213-221.

¹⁰⁵Kaykendall and Day, op. cit., 216; Carpenter, op. cit., 20; Coulter, loc. cit., 289-290; Barber, op. cit., 167-168.

stationed the commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet, who also is chief administrative officer for Pacific United Nations trusteeships assigned to the United States. The events of the last decade have only emphasized the place of Hawaii in the maintenance of national security. Whether as citizens of a territory or a state, the Hawaiian people hold a special trust.¹⁰⁶

However, the competence of the Hawaiian people to uphold that trust has not always been granted. Despite the fact that the island people responded admirably in every way open to them in World War I, Hawaii remained, in many military and naval minds, primarily a vital defense outpost rather than an American community having importance in and of itself. Implied was the idea that a more restricted government in which the military would have a voice might be preferable to territorial status, particularly in view of the heavy Asiatic population. In 1932 this viewpoint was actually expressed publicly by Rear Admiral Yates Sterling, Jr. From that time forward the civilian population of Hawaii was on guard, despite the reassuring attitude of Sterling's successor, Admiral Henry Yarnell. However, the 1937 Joint Congressional Committee commented on the civilian cooperation with the military establishment. It could find no reason to deny statehood on this count.¹⁰⁷

When the crisis of December 7, 1941, came upon Hawaii, one observer, F.B.I. official Robert L. Shivers, later described Hawaiian reaction as

¹⁰⁶ Simpson, loc. cit., 602; Matheson, loc. cit., 139; Barber, op. cit., 13.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 179, 182-185; Senate Document No. 151, p. 93; Hearing, May, 1935, p. 4-6.

follows: "It was not the civilian population who was confused. Nowhere under the sun could there have been a more intelligent response to the needs of the hour than was given by the entire population of these islands." He further stated, "It is high time that the people of the United States should be told of Hawaii's contribution to this war, which is unequalled in the annals of our country."¹⁰⁸

Military and naval personnel familiar with the islands, such as Admiral Chester A. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet during the war, Major General Charles D. Herron (retired), in command in Hawaii from 1937 to 1941, and Colonel Kendall Fielden, Chief of Army Intelligence in Hawaii during the war, have all gone on record as having no objection to statehood from a military point of view. On March 8, 1947, the Navy Department stated that it had no objections, a view restated by it on March 3, 1949, on behalf of the Department of National Defense.¹⁰⁹

That the changed attitude of the military seems justified is evident in the emphasis placed by Governor Stainback in his annual report upon the continued cooperation between the territorial government and people and the military services.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸Statement of Robert L. Shivers, Hearings, H.R. 236, p. 605. For Hawaiian contributions in World War II, see also Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 257-258, 261-262; Hearings, H.R. 236, pp. 551-558, 728.

¹⁰⁹Hearings, H.R. 49-56, pp. 63-72, 73-76, 224-229, 72-73; Statehood for Hawaii, Hearings, Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Possessions, Committee on Public Lands, House of Representatives, on H.R. 49 and Related Bills, 81 Congress, 1 Session, 76. Hereafter cited as Hearings, H.R. 49 and Rel. Bills.

¹¹⁰Annual Report, 4.

Based upon her record in two world wars and the considered opinions of both military and civilian personnel best qualified to judge, Hawaii's strategic naval and military importance is no reason to deny her statehood.

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, there is no real separation of the Hawaiian movement for statehood from the everyday life of the territory. In arbitrarily separating the formal statehood movement from the discussion of Hawaii's economic, social and cultural development, it was inevitable that the latter discussion should involve some of those issues upon which the fate of Hawaii's petition for statehood depends. From this discussion have come conclusions concerning some of Hawaii's qualifications for statehood. Upon the question of Hawaii's general economic stability, it seems evident that the complete dependence of the islands upon agriculture for their income, the uncertainty as to the future of the sugar industry, and the present expansion of both the sugar and pineapple industries to almost the full limit which the islands' area and soil afford call for the development of another money crop. This, however, is a problem which can be met under either territorial or statehood status. There would seem no justification for denying Hawaii statehood on this count. Three other conclusions reached in the discussion were that Hawaii's petition for statehood could not justly be denied because of the economic power of the "Big Five," or the presence in Hawaii of a heterogeneous population in which Japanese play a large role, or the position of Hawaii as a strategic outpost in American defense. It seems

evident also that Hawaii's late achievement of unionization is no bar to statehood. This last conclusion is qualified, however. Any strong subversive element within the labor movement could, through the instrument of strikes alone, greatly weaken, if not wreck, the Hawaiian economy. A discussion of the charges that such an element exists will be found in the following chapter along with the formal movement for statehood.

CHAPTER V

THE FORMAL MOVEMENT FOR STATEHOOD

In the setting of economic, social and cultural developments just described the formal movement of Hawaii for statehood has played its role. Basic to any understanding of the movement is a grasp of the political structure created by the Organic Act which President McKinley approved on April 30, 1900. Effective June 14, 1900, this act, with its various amendments, has served to this mid-century year as the constitution of the islands. But the most significant fact about this constitution is that it is the creature of Congress. It can be amended, repealed or replaced by another form of government at the will of Congress. In such changes the desires of the Hawaiian people have no force other than through appeal to the sense of justice and belief in democratic principles of the men sitting in the House and Senate chambers in Washington.¹ This tremendous power resident in the national legislature stems from a few words in the Constitution of the United States: "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States"²

Indicative of the good judgment of the creators of the Organic Act and of the self-governing abilities of the island people is the fact that,

¹Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 190, 194.

²Art. IV, sec. III, 2.

despite numerous amendments, the structure of the territorial government today differs scarcely at all from that set up in 1900. The citizens of this government, and thus of the United States, were then defined as all those who were citizens of the Republic of Hawaii on August 12, 1898. For these citizens and alien island residents, in harmony with the traditional American plan for territorial organization, there was provided an executive branch of government consisting of a governor and a secretary. These officials were and are appointed by the President of the United States, with the advice of the Senate, for four-year terms. Heads of executive departments are appointed by the governor, with the consent of the territorial senate. Additional executive departments may, and have been, created by the territorial legislature.

The members of the judiciary are all appointive. The judges of the Hawaiian supreme court and the five circuit courts of the Territory are appointed by the President for four-year terms. The two judges of the federal district court, also appointed by the President, serve six-year terms. District magistrates, approximating justices of the peace and police court judges, are appointed by the chief justice of the territorial supreme court for two-year terms.

The territorial legislature, meeting biennially, is composed of a senate of fifteen members, serving four-year terms, and a house of representatives of thirty members, serving two-year terms. The members of each of these houses are chosen by the qualified voters. In general, the acts of this body cover the same area as that of state legislatures. A tribute to the quality of its legislation is the fact that Congress has never used

its power to amend or void any law passed by the territorial body. Moreover, practically all Congressional legislation concerning Hawaii has been initiated at the request of the legislature of the islands. While this body, suffering from inexperience, did not make too good a showing in the first few years, its record since around 1913 compares favorably with that of the average state legislature. The acts of the body are subject to the governor's veto, including an item veto of appropriation bills. A two-thirds majority can override vetoes, however. All members of the legislature must have been island residents for three years.

The most important official elected by the Hawaiians is the delegate to Congress, who may introduce measures, serve on committees, and take part in Congressional debate, but who cannot vote.

The federal government appropriates \$30,000 biennially for legislative expenses. The Territory pays for any additional expenses, such as those for special sessions. These expenses usually equal or exceed the federal contribution. Also paid by the federal government are the salaries of the governor, secretary, legislators and judges of both the territorial and federal courts.

According to the Organic Act, suffrage is on the same basis as on the mainland, with the exception of a literacy qualification, proficiency in either Hawaiian or English being acceptable. There is a residence requirement of one year for voters.

The committee appointed by President McKinley to draft the Organic Act made several provisions foreign to American practice, such as property qualifications for legislators and for those who voted for the territorial

senators. Most of these items were eliminated by Congress in its debate on the act. One exception was the provision that, if the legislature failed to enact an appropriation bill, the government could continue to make necessary disbursements until a special session provided money. It was actually necessary to use this power in the second session of the territorial legislature. The provision, of course, gave the executive more power over the purse than is usual in American government. So far as can be determined, this power was used in only one instance.³

The territorial government has developed rapidly in quality through the years. Much has been done by it to improve Hawaiian economic and social life--harbor improvements, highway construction, land reclamation and homesteading movements. Its employees have had the advantage of a pension plan and job classification system. Territorial citizens have reaped the benefits of a good accounting system for territorial and local governments. The legislature has always exhibited a readiness to adopt constructive measures suggested by Congressional investigating committees and other federal authorities. An Hawaiian state government would not find its predecessor lacking in many qualities worthy of emulation.⁴

Since the Organic Act made no specific provisions for local government, the Territory continued to maintain the highly centralized

³Congressional Record, 56 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 33, Part I, 1871; *ibid.*, Part II, 1919-1920, 1929-1930; *ibid.*, Part III, 2387, 2442, 2246; Senate Document No. 151, pp. 8-10, 12-13; Hearings, H.R. 236, pp. 175-176, 179; Hearings, H.R. 3034, pp. 18, 318; DuPuy, *op. cit.*, 29; Kuykendall and Day, *op. cit.*, 194-195; Willoughby, *op. cit.*, 63-67.

⁴Kuykendall and Day, *op. cit.*, 200-202; DuPuy, *op. cit.*, 128-129; Hardy and Dumke, *op. cit.*, 423.

political structure familiar to the islands under the monarchy and republic. Funds, even for street and curb construction in the farthest island, had to be dispensed from Honolulu. Furthermore, the people of one community were being taxed for improvements elsewhere in the islands in which they had no share. Complaints were soon vocal enough to bring to Hawaii a Congressional committee, whose report in January of 1903 scored this centralization and the remissness of the territorial legislature in not providing local governments. To the latter end, the committee recommended Congressional action if the Territory did not remedy the situation.

Consequently, in April, 1903, the territorial legislature passed the County Act. But this measure was declared unconstitutional on the grounds that some of its provisions ran counter to the Organic Act. Further legislative efforts in 1905 and 1907 provided the essential elements of the local government system now in operation. There are four main counties: Hawaii, Maui, Kauai and the City and County of Honolulu. The last-named is a hybrid municipal-county system for the city of Honolulu, the island of Oahu and various outlying islands, including Kure, 1,204 miles to the northwest. Despite the existence of several cities of adequate size to be separate political units, there are no governments similar to those of mainland municipalities. Kalawao, covering the leper colony on Molokai, is a county in name only since it is administered by a board of hospitals and settlements and is included in Maui County for election purposes.

These county governments are headed by elected boards of supervisors, the chairmen of which act as chief executive officers, except in the City

and County of Honolulu where a mayor is elected separately from the board. The boards are elected for two years. Other county officials are in some cases elected, in others appointed by the chairman of the board or, in Honolulu, by the mayor with approval by the supervisors. There are numerous appointive commissions and boards which often serve without salary.

There has been a considerable amount of contention between the territorial and county governments over the functions of each and the sharing of financial burdens. The county governments have been particularly concerned over the impermanent character of their charters and the unpredictable demands of the legislature for special funds or services. The provisions of a state constitution undoubtedly would resolve many of these conflicts. Moreover, the unhappy experiences of the past should qualify delegates to a constitutional convention to provide a local government system well adapted to meet Hawaiian needs.⁵

Enthusiastic political activity has always marked the people living under the government just described. Territorial life commenced with a three-party system. Both the Democratic and Republican parties were organized before the 1900 elections, but the Home Rule Party, with a nativistic platform, dominated the first legislature and sent, as Hawaii's first delegate to Congress, R. W. Wilcox, long-time political leader of the nationalistic natives. Despite their declining numbers, Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians held a voting majority in the islands for the first

⁵ Senate Document No. 151, pp. 13-14; Hearings, H.R. 236, pp. 176-177, 207-208; Hearings, H.R. 3034, pp. 61, 311; Willoughby, op. cit., 68-70; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 197-198.

two decades of territorial existence. Until about 1930 they outnumbered other racial groups in voting strength. The Home Rule Party continued to poll between sixteen and forty-one percent of the votes through the 1908 elections, after which its strength declined. The Party disappeared after the 1912 elections. Otherwise third parties have played little part in Hawaiian politics. The Socialist Party polled approximately one percent of the vote in 1912, while two other third parties gained small votes, one in the 1914 campaign, the other in 1922.

In 1902 the Republican Party's candidate, Prince Kuhio Kalanianoʻe, was elected delegate to Congress, where he remained until his death in 1922. Except for Democratic victories in 1922, 1924 and 1932, Hawaii's delegate has always been a Republican. In fact, the Democratic Party got a slow start, since it was not firmly established as the second party until 1908. It has never had the support of the large economic interests. Also, the Republicans have dominated the territorial legislature, where, with the exception of the 1900 election, they held a majority until 1946. In the legislative election of that year, as noted in the last chapter, the lower house was evenly divided. The Republican Party finally won control by the election of one of its representatives as speaker. The Democrats usually have found a stronghold in local government, especially in the City and County of Honolulu, where they have elected more mayors than the Republicans.

The political affiliation of the governor, of course, reflects the party in control of the national administration. In forty-seven years the Hawaiians have had five Republican and four Democratic governors,

although, in numbers of years served, the two parties will be about equal by 1952.

One vital factor emerged from early political development. To stem the tendency of the natives to combine political and racial allegiances, both the Republican and Democratic parties early included candidates of the various races on their tickets. While their aim was primarily to win votes, the parties did Hawaii a great service. By the time there developed a large electorate of Asiatic ancestry, Hawaii had a long tradition of voting across racial lines. Undoubtedly this tradition has been partially responsible for the present small amount of bloc voting in the islands.⁶

But the renewal of another tradition--that of statehood--was early underway. The first suggestion of statehood for Hawaii seems to have been offered by a New York state newspaper in 1849. This was followed by the figuring of statehood in the 1854 negotiations for Hawaiian annexation to the United States. Yet these first stirrings of the movement seem to have become almost legendary to the average Hawaiian citizen as issues such as reciprocity and annexation claimed his attention in the latter nineteenth century.⁷

Therefore, the Territory was five years old before the first formal bid for statehood was made. On March 16, 1903, Governor S. B. Dole approved

⁶Hearings, H.R. 236, pp. 722-723, 896-897; Hearings, H.R. 3034, pp. 57, 119-120, 177-178; Hearings, Con. Res. 18, pp. 43, 589-590, 660; Senate Document No. 151, p. 33; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 195-196, 198-199; Burrows, op. cit., 46.

⁷Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 287.

a joint resolution of the territorial legislature petitioning Congress for an enabling act. Between 1903 and 1925 six more such resolutions were passed. The unsuccessful petition of 1925 was unique in its plea for a grant of power to the Hawaiian people to amend the Organic Act. Such a provision, of course, would have given Hawaii practically the same control over its basic law as the citizens of a state have over their constitution. But the petitions for actual statehood kept flowing to the east. By March of 1949 Congress had received fifteen such pleas from the law-making body of the islands. By 1915 the almost automatic passage of such resolutions provoked one island legislator to warn his fellows against allowing statehood to become a joke. The candidate for Hawaiian office seldom failed to express his support of statehood. The local Republican Party had a statehood plank in its 1900 platform and advocated either statehood or preparation for that status in every statement of policy thereafter. The island Democratic Party first inserted a statehood plank in its platform in 1910 and has reiterated support for statehood in practically every succeeding campaign. But this unanimous front did not reflect the actual island viewpoint, so far as immediate action was concerned. Outright opposition in some quarters, particularly from the great economic interests, and general disinterestedness were the actual governing factors. During the first twenty years the islands were busy with economic development and participation in World War I. Fairly content with territorial status, the average islander thought statehood a desirable goal but hardly a necessity.⁸

⁸Hearings, Con. Res. 18, pp. 423-425, 557-559; House Report No. 254, p. 4; Cordon Report, 15; Hearing, H.R. 3034, p. 8; Senate Document No. 151, p. 1; Barber, op. cit., 99-100; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 288; Furnas, loc. cit., 134.

The first governor to evince strong interest in statehood was Charles J. McCarthy (1918-1921). He felt that Hawaii's progress and good account of herself in World War I deserved a higher political status and recommended to the 1919 legislature the passage of a memorial to Congress. McCarthy informed the legislature that Hawaii's people were "fully . . . competent" to take on the responsibility of state government.⁹ The legislature passed another resolution. With this impetus, Delegate Prince Kuhio Kalaniana'ole on February 11, 1919, introduced the first statehood bill in Congress. In the same month of the following year he introduced a similar measure, which, like its predecessor, languished in the House Committee on Territories. As in the case of the first resolution of the legislature, these bills were to have many descendants. Between 1920 and the end of the Eightieth Congress, there were twenty-eight such bills introduced. A high point came in the Eighty-First Congress, which, by March of 1949, had seen one bill introduced in the Senate and seven in the House. However, with regard to the first measure, Prince Kalaniana'ole was without support in his own constituency. The Honolulu Star-Bulletin branded one of the Prince's bills as a "ridiculous proposal."¹⁰ Other island newspapers were in agreement. At this time Japanese labor activities and the strength of their language schools were causing much concern in the islands. As a result, many citizens were doubtful as to the wisdom

⁹Hearings, H.R. 3034, p. 8.

¹⁰Quoted by Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 288.

of immediate statehood. Furthermore, Hawaii was more interested in the previously discussed Hawaiian Homes Commission Act and the defense of her territorial rights as an integral part of the United States. This defense, as expressed in her Bill of Rights, will be discussed later. Statehood, like the star it promised, was a thing visible but remote. It was kept in view, however, by such events as a speech made by Governor Wallace R. Farrington in 1929, when he discussed the legal mechanics for becoming a state and the need for eventual statehood.¹¹

The first delegate after Prince Kalaniana'ole to become firmly convinced that statehood was the only means of assuring for Hawaii adequate attention by Congress was Victor S. K. Houston, who reached his conclusion about 1931. On December 9, 1931, he introduced an enabling act which was to become the model for all those proposed thereafter. However, the delegate did not have the support of the Hawaiian business interests and his bill was finally doomed by the uproar emanating from the Massie case.¹²

The reverberations of the Massie incident provided one of the early decisive stimulants to a determined drive for statehood. In September of 1931 a group of what one author calls "Honolulu hoodlums"¹³

¹¹Congressional Record, 65 Congress, 3 Session, Vol. 57, Part III, 3175; ibid., 66 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 59, Part III, 2383; House Report No. 254, p. 4; Cordon Report, 15; Hearings, H.R. 3034, pp. 142-151; Senate Document No. 151, p. 1; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 201, 288.

¹²Congressional Record, 72 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 75, Part I, 265; Hearings, H.R. 3034, pp. 97, 99-101; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 288.

¹³Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 221.

criminally assaulted the wife of a naval officer. Unfortunately for Hawaii, the "hoodlums" represented several of the racial elements in the islands. After a trial in which the jury could reach no verdict upon the evidence presented, the naval officer, his mother-in-law and two sailors brought about the death of one of the defendants and assaulted another, an American of Japanese ancestry. Subsequently, these four were found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to ten-year prison terms, sentences immediately commuted to one hour. Seemingly, the mainland, where the press unduly colored its accounts of the case, could not accept Hawaiian racial toleration as demonstrated in these trials where the word of a Caucasian carried no more weight than that of a member of another race. It has been suggested, too, that navy officers found this case an excellent sounding board for their theories on commission government, while the American west coast found release for its own racial antipathies. At any rate, Hawaii received much adverse criticism, most of it undeserved, and came under the close scrutiny of Congress.

On January 11, 1932, the Senate requested an investigation of Hawaii's criminal law procedure, enforcement and administration. Sent to Hawaii was Assistant Attorney General Seth Richardson, whose public hearings brought forth not only testimony concerning law administration but much bitter comment on the "Big Five." An impartial and thorough investigator, Mr. Richardson reported that conditions, while not nearly as bad as described in the press, indicated laxness in criminal law administration and enforcement. In addition to recommendations for improvements in criminal law procedure, Mr. Richardson suggested removal of the

residence requirement for federal officials in the islands. He did not, however, think a commission form of government was necessary or desirable. Mr. Richardson, incidentally, would later be a stout proponent of statehood.

Congress was not slow to respond. There was a succession of bills in 1932 which proposed to eliminate the residence requirement for officials appointed by the President and to establish military or commission forms of government. None of these bills reached the floor of Congress, but a greater threat was in the offing. In May of 1933, Representative John E. Rankin of Mississippi introduced an administration-sponsored bill to eliminate the residence requirement for the governor of Hawaii. This bill passed the House by a vote of 237 to 119. Acting on the flood of protest from the islands, Senators Arthur H. Vandenberg and William E. Borah, with other friends of Hawaii, delayed action in the Senate. Governor Judd of Hawaii appointed a three-man, bipartisan commission, which had success in convincing the Roosevelt administration that such a bill was unnecessary. In 1934 the bill was withdrawn from the Senate calendar. This close brush with "carpetbag" rule gave Hawaii a real scare. The islands had long been sensitive on this point. The Organic Act had provided that the governor, secretary, territorial circuit judges and department heads, regardless of the appointing authority, should be territorial citizens, thus insuring at least a short island residence. Certain federal officials, mainly judicial, had not been included in this provision, however. When Congress began to disregard custom and approve appointments of non-residents to these latter offices, the Hawaiian legislature petitioned Congress for

stronger legislation. In 1921 the Organic Act was amended to provide a three-year residence requirement for practically all territorial and federal appointive officials except the secretary who apparently was overlooked. With this assurance, Hawaii felt it had secured for the future rule by officials well acquainted with its life and problems. It took the Massie case and its aftermath to remind Hawaii that its government was still the child of Congress and that the only permanent guarantee of complete self-government was statehood. From this period of threats to its system of comparatively generous home rule, one of the strongest motives for an intensive statehood movement sprang. Even the "Big Five," heretofore content with territorial status, was impressed. Furthermore, rumor had it that the non-resident governor proposed for Hawaii, had the Rankin bill passed, was Fiorello H. LaGuardia, whose views on labor and government would scarcely have agreed with those of Hawaii's economic leaders.

Another result of the Massie case was the appointment of a bipartisan commission to study criminal law administration and prosecution. Most of this body's recommendations were later enacted by the legislature to fill some evident holes in Hawaiian criminal law procedure.¹⁴

¹⁴Congressional Record, 72 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 75, Part II 1652, 11942; ibid., Part III, 3393; ibid., Part VII, 7355; ibid., Part XII, 13637; ibid., 73 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 77, Part IV, 4111; ibid., Part V, 5217; Furnas, loc. cit., 134; Barber, op. cit., 105, 107-109; Lind, op. cit., 26-28; Burrows, op. cit., 123-124; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 202, 220-222, 224; DuPay, op. cit., 125, 128-129; Hearings, H.R. 3034, p. 15, 95, 110; Hearings, H.R. 236, pp. 31-32; Radford Mobley, "Hawaii Looks Toward Statehood," The Christian Science Monitor Magazine (November 2, 1940), 7.

If the Massie case and the Rankin Bill had stirred the long latent desire for statehood, the Jones-Costigan Act of 1934 brought it to full expression. The former incidents threatened Hawaii's political rights; the latter literally endangered an important source of its bread and butter. An amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the bill was intended to gauge sugar supply to domestic needs through quotas for various producing areas, while planters were to be subsidized for crop reduction and maintenance of certain labor standards. It was opposed by Hawaiian sugar growers on four main counts: (1) Hawaii was designated a foreign producing area, its quota, unlike mainland areas', subject to change; (2) the quotas established for mainland producers were higher than recent mainland average production; (3) Hawaiian production suffered a cut estimated at between eight and ten percent; and (4) island refining was limited to three percent of production. Further discrimination was suffered under the administration of the law by the Secretary of Agriculture. When redress through the executive and legislative branches was not forthcoming, the sugar industry brought suit in the United States District Court of the District of Columbia. It pled that the law, in discriminating against Hawaii, violated Hawaiian constitutional rights. The decision of Justice Bailey in October, 1934, shocked not only the sugar industry but all Hawaiians. He wrote: "Under the territorial power of the constitution . . . Congress may discriminate commercially against the Territory of Hawaii as a whole, even though it is an organized territory."¹⁵ In

¹⁵Hearings, H.R. 236, p. 24.

December adjustments, including revision of the sugar quota, benefit payments, and other favorable measures, were agreed upon by the sugar industry and the Secretary of Agriculture. As a result, the H.S.P.A. dropped plans for an appeal of the court decision both because of the expense of further litigation and fear of another adverse decision. As a result, the ruling that Congress might discriminate commercially against the islands remained on the books. Subsequent legislation, as previously noted, removed most of the objections to the Jones-Costigan Act.

More favorable legislation, however, did not erase from Hawaiian business minds the implications of the act and the court decision. It was apparent that Hawaii's status as an integral part of the United States was still subject to a wide variety of interpretations, both in Congress and the courts. Secondly, if commercial discrimination against Hawaii was valid, what might the future bring in view of the definite trend toward greater federal supervision of business? In the third place, the debate leading up to the enactment of the legislation and the following negotiations with the executive department had emphasized the impotence of a non-voting delegate to protect Hawaiian economic interests. Where mainland interests, represented by voting Congressmen, clashed with Hawaiian interests, the islands were powerless. The "Big Five," which had frowned upon the statehood efforts of delegates Kalaniano'le and Houston, now made an about face. Its advertising agency, the Pan Pacific Press Bureau, put its full facilities behind the statehood movement. It has been charged that almost every book published about Hawaii from 1936 to 1941 was subsidized by this agency. This agency has also been given

credit for the two-to-one mainland sentiment in favor of statehood in 1941, as reported by the Gallup poll.

The sudden change in the attitude of the "Big Five" aroused much suspicion in the islands and there has been sharp criticism of the "economic motive" in the statehood movement. Censure is certainly due the "Big Five," if, as its activities before and after the passage of the Jones-Costigan Act would seem to indicate, it placed economic gain above the desire of the Hawaiian people for fuller self-government. However, the desire for greater representation in government in order to protect economic interests has usually been recognized as a valid motive. Greater protection for the Hawaiian sugar industry also meant greater protection for the economic security of the Hawaiian plantation worker, storekeeper and housewife. On the evidence available, it is impossible to ascertain whether the "Big Five" had seriously retarded the statehood movement prior to 1934. To all appearances, general public opinion in Hawaii before the early thirties, while favorable to statehood, had not been aware of its great advantages over territorial status. Again, perhaps "Big Five" opposition had muted that awareness. One thing is certain: in the "Big Five," statehood proponents found a valuable and powerful ally.¹⁶

¹⁶For information on the Jones-Costigan Act, see letter, Delegate Samuel Wilder King to Chairman Marvin Jones of the House Committee on Agriculture, April 28, 1937, Congressional Record, 75 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 81, Part IV, 4004, 4007; Hearings, H.R. 49 and S. 114, p. 230; Vandercook, op. cit., 165-168; Furnas, loc. cit., 134; Mobley, loc. cit., 7; Crawford, loc. cit., 59, 74; Cressey, op. cit., 6; Barber, op. cit., 99-100, 110-111; "Hawaiian Statehood," The New Republic, Vol. 104 (January 27, 1941), 101, hereafter cited as "Hawaiian Statehood,"; Clark, op. cit., 14-15; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 202, 222-224. See Barber, op. cit., 101-103, for the relations of the business interests with Delegates Houston and Kalanianole concerning statehood.

Legislative discrimination, if of a less disturbing nature, was not new to Hawaii in the early thirties. The commission which framed the Organic Act had thought that the law's provisions would insure Hawaii a share in all national legislative benefits. Yet, as early as May, 1910, Congress, answering a Hawaiian plea, amended the Organic Act in an attempt to guarantee the extension of general appropriation bills to the islands. However, two factors have consistently dogged all efforts in this direction: (1) the necessity to name specifically the territories in all national legislation intended to cover them--a step often neglected in drafting bills and one which a busy delegate finds it almost impossible to check in the myriad of laws under consideration in both houses; and (2) the tendency in the past of the Attorney General and other executive department heads to disqualify Hawaii for benefits on the grounds that it was a non-contiguous area or an insular possession. These arbitrary executive rulings were sometimes enforced even when bills specifically mentioned the territories. As a result, Hawaii was deprived of federal aid in such fields as vocational and agricultural education, farm loans, and hydrographic and topographical surveys. By April of 1923, weary of badgering Congress for amendments extending aid bills to the islands, the territorial legislature passed a Bill of Rights. With an outline of the historical basis for its claims, this document declared that Hawaii was an integral part of the United States and, therefore, could not be discriminated against in federal legislation. It further declared that Hawaii had inalienable rights which included a share in all benefits

extended to states where "its functions and responsibilities are the same."¹⁷ Also provided was a commission to work with the delegate in Washington to gain recognition of these claims and to secure legislation to cover recent oversights. After a study of this declaration, the Committee on Territories of the House concluded that, in view of the failure of the 1910 amendment to insure Hawaii all benefits of appropriation bills, there was no basic remedy. A bill passed in 1924 extended to Hawaii most of the beneficial legislation then in effect, such as the Smith-Rughe Act for vocational education, which had been passed in 1917.

The University of Hawaii, a land-grant college, has been a particular victim of executive interpretation of the law. Remedial legislation finally extended federal aid to the university--but on a graduated basis providing full benefits only between 1940 and 1950. Thus, full benefits of national legislation were attained almost forty-three years after the agricultural and mechanical arts college which preceded the university first applied for federal aid in 1907.

A farmers' relief bill was never extended to Hawaii. Housing legislation was late in being applied to the islands. The Federal Aid Road Act for highway construction, passed in 1916, was not applicable to Hawaii until 1923.

In April of 1925 the territorial legislature found it necessary to pass a Declaration of Rights in defense of the equal rights of its

¹⁷Hearings, H.R. 3034, p. 319.

citizens as compared with those enjoyed by mainlanders. This action was prompted by Bureau of Immigration regulations hampering the free travel of citizens of Asiatic ancestry between the islands and the mainland. Again a commission was appointed to aid the over-worked delegate in getting remedial action. Citizens of Hawaii have had less than equal treatment in another matter. Because of the system of allocating West Point and Annapolis appointments to members of the Congress for distribution, Hawaii's one delegate is never able to fill as many appointments as Hawaii, on a population basis, is due. Between 1933 and 1942 Hawaii was originally overlooked in the National Security Act, wages and hours legislation, Fair Labor Standards Act, and War Damage Corporation and war insurance legislation.

Particularly irksome has been neglect of Hawaii in health legislation. Despite a serious tuberculosis problem in the Territory, the delegate had to make a great effort to gain extension of the Tuberculosis Control Act. Hawaii has been consistently left out of public health studies made by government agencies. Although the federal government assumes all responsibility for leper care on the mainland, the Territory, long troubled by this disease, has had practically no federal aid in its control. The legislature appropriates an average of \$80,000 biennially for leper care. While the federal government has provided care for indigent natives such as the Indians and Samoans, it has left to the Territory all responsibility for medical care of native Hawaiians. The federal government has provided neither an old soldiers' home, nor, until recently, a national cemetery.

The Congressional Record is spotted with petitions from the territorial legislature for inclusion in proposed legislation or laws already in effect. Sometimes Hawaii through long effort has gained legislative benefits only to be deprived of them in later action. Such was the case in gaining exemption of territorial government employees from federal income taxes. Only three years later, without any reference to the delegate or the Territory, this provision was repealed.¹⁸

This long tale of discrimination became the more intolerable to the islanders in view of their liability to the same federal taxes as their mainland brothers. As the former delegate, Mr. Samuel Wilder King, ruefully noted in 1937, "Incidentally such omissions seldom occur in revenue measures or other bills of a restrictive nature, but they seem often to occur in measures extending certain benefits or grants."¹⁹

Irritation over these various inequalities has always been tempered by the knowledge that in practically all cases the discrimination was not deliberate. Yet, over a half century, these pin pricks of discrimination have awakened the islanders to full realization of two facts: (1) Congress has practically admitted that it is powerless to guarantee to Hawaii

¹⁸Hearings, H.R. 3034, pp. 93-96, 102, 234, 242, 312, 319-328; Hearings, H.R. 49-56, pp. 37, 101, 155-156; Hearings, H.R. 236, pp. 43, 84; Hearings, H.R. 49 and S. 114, p. 75; Congressional Record, 74 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 79 Part V, 4828; ibid., Part VII, 7548; ibid., 75 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 81, Part IV, 4003, 4009; ibid., Part V, 4748; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 216, 219-220; Furnas, loc. cit., 134; Wilbur, loc. cit., 495-496; Bowman, loc. cit., 353; Mobley, loc. cit., 7; Clark, op. cit., 14.

¹⁹Congressional Record, 75 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 81, Part II, 2249.

a full, immediate share in all federal aid; and (2) one non-voting delegate cannot adequately protect Hawaii against this type of discrimination, while requests for an additional delegate have never been granted.

But Hawaii soon had an opportunity to speak its mind. Following the ill-fated bill of Delegate Houston in 1931, two more bills were introduced in succeeding Congressional sessions. It was the year 1935, however, which brought bright hope to the statehood boosters. After Delegate King's introduction in January of another enabling act, there was a preliminary hearing in Washington on May 31, after which it was decided to send, for the first time, a committee to investigate statehood possibilities.

To Hawaii in October came a six-man subcommittee of the House Committee on Territories. Under the chairmanship of Representative Eugene B. Crowe of Indiana, hearings were held for eleven days on Oahu, Big Island, Maui, Kauai and Molokai. One hundred and five witnesses appeared, of whom ninety favored statehood. Outstanding in these hearings was the Citizens' Bipartisan Committee, appointed by Delegate King to furnish evidence relative to statehood. The large majority of these prominent citizens gave favorable testimony. Also active was the Equal Rights Committee, of which Governor Poindexter was a member. This organization had been created by the 1935 territorial legislature as a fact-finding body to bolster Hawaii's claims to equal treatment in national legislation and to support statehood. The legislature had appropriated \$10,000 for this body's work and later doubled the grant. The legislature had financially supported the statehood cause in another manner. It had made five

appropriations prior to 1937 to pay the expenses of any Congressional committee or members who might wish to visit Hawaii in regard to statehood. This practice of the legislature has continued down to the present.

Emerging from the hearings were several main issues: the "Big Five," the Asiatic population, the strategic position of the islands and, with some, the fear that the people of Hawaii were not yet ready for statehood responsibilities. Two other items engaged major attention. The first of these was the question of reapportionment of the territorial legislature. This issue stemmed from the Organic Act, which had provided the original election districts and representative quotas and had also stipulated that there should be periodic reapportionment. However, the act required for reapportionment certain data concerning citizenship in the election districts which the regular United States Census tabulations did not include. An appeal to the Commerce Department to supply the additional data had been refused, while Congress ignored a 1932 appeal to reapportion the territorial house membership. It therefore became the responsibility of the territorial legislature to finance the gathering of the information. By 1935 no appropriations had been made. Consequently, the island of Oahu, containing about fifty-three percent of the population, had only forty percent of the representation in the territorial house and senate. This condition would only be aggravated in time, since Oahu's population continued to grow faster than that of the other islands. The representatives from the outer islands usually refused to vote for reapportionment because it would give the island of Oahu a majority vote in the legislature. Some charged, too, that the "Big Five," entrenched

in the predominantly Republican outer islands, were not interested in a greater voice for Oahu, which had Democratic leanings. Underlying the whole issue seemed to be the familiar urban-rural jealousy over political power, since more power for Oahu actually meant a greater political voice for Honolulu. The investigating subcommittee found some witnesses insistent upon reapportionment prior to statehood or at least before any election of delegates to a constituent assembly.

The other issue of particular interest to the subcommittee was the abrupt blossoming of statehood fervor in the early thirties, especially among the large economic interests. Many witnesses charged that the "Big Five" had reversed its opinion solely for economic reasons. Also, it was intimated, the "Big Five" wanted less interference from the federal government now that a strong Democratic administration was at the helm. As previously noted, "Big Five" motives were suspect among many Hawaiian groups at this time. However, economic motives could not explain the overall change in the attitude of the general citizenry. For the testimony given the subcommittee indicated that many citizens shared with the "Big Five" a rather sudden enthusiasm for statehood. While statehood, like virtue, always had general public support, the real need for it seems not to have been felt until the early thirties brought the Rankin Bill, the Jones-Costigan Act and a full realization of past legislative discrimination.²⁰

²⁰Hearing, May, 1935, 1-20; Hearings, H.R. 3034, pp. 1, 5-6, 8, 17, 26, 35, 43, 52-54, 59, 61, 63-64, 85, 91, 93, 102, 104, 110-111, 113, 120-121, 124, 127, 134-135, 140-141, 160, 164-170, 197-198, 230, 239-240, 243-245, 254, 258-261, 265, 268, 275-277, 279, 306, 329; Hearings, Con. Res. 18, p. 127; Senate Document No. 151, pp. 1, 11; Hearings, H.R. 236, p. 11,

The final report of the subcommittee included the following:

(1) the conviction that a "comfortable majority" of the island people favored statehood; (2) praise for the general economic and political conditions in the islands, with special approval of the school system; and (3) an expression of admiration for Hawaii's people and concern for their welfare. But the majority opinion was as follows: "Your subcommittee is of the opinion, however, that considerable further study is necessary before a favorable report be made on the King bill /enabling act/" ²¹

Hawaii, on the whole, had come forth with honor from her first exposure to Congressional investigation on statehood. However, she had also met for the first time what would become a familiar adversary--Congressional reluctance to act hastily.

Largely due to the initiative of Delegate King, who had introduced another enabling act in June, 1937, a concurrent resolution was passed by both national houses in August of 1937 to send a joint investigating committee to the islands. The expenses of this committee, incidentally, were paid by the territorial legislature.

Originally composed of twelve senators, twelve representatives, and Delegate King, the absence of five senators reduced the committee to twenty during the island hearings. Senator William H. King of Utah was

181; Congressional Record, 56 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 33, Part III, 2386; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 196-197, 288-290; Barber, op. cit., 112-113.

²¹Hearings, H.R. 3034, p. 329. Two members of the subcommittee had recommended that the full committee endorse the bill.

chairman. Hearings were held only on Oahu, Big Island and Molokai, but committee members visited all the major islands and many institutions, both public and private. Sixty-seven witnesses testified in the hearings, held over a two-week period. While a majority of the witnesses again favored statehood, the percentage of those either opposed or desirous of postponement was larger than in the previous investigation.

Again "Big Five" dominance and the Japanese problem gathered the lion's share of attention, with labor conditions and lack of adequate labor legislation running a strong third. There was more discussion of reapportionment. Testimony revealed again the consciousness of many citizens of the need for a greater voice in national legislation.

The lengthy report of the joint committee made many recommendations, including enactment by the territorial legislature of some type of reapportionment plan offering both more equitable representation and protection for the rural minority. Also recommended was an investigation of transportation rates about which much complaint had been heard. The suggestions with regard to labor legislation have already been discussed. There was in the report high praise for the wide distribution of utility services, for the medical, social and welfare institutions of the islands, for the progress in Americanization of citizens of foreign descent and for the public school system.²²

²²Senate Document No. 151, pp. iii, 1-4, 11-12, 75-76, 87, 89-92; Hearings, Con. Res. 18, pp. 43, 51, 61, 64, 106-107, 109-112, 127, 136, 139, 143, 203-204, 211, 234, 284, 324, 511; Congressional Record, 75 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 81, Part VIII, 9624-9626; *ibid.*, 75 Congress, 3 Session, Vol. 83, Part IX, A827; Kuykendall and Day, *op. cit.*, 290; Barber, *op. cit.*, 113-114.

In its conclusions the joint committee emphasized the precedent-shattering nature of admitting non-contiguous Hawaii to statehood; found the territorial government both adequate and efficient; but reported difficulty in probing Hawaiian sentiment with regard to statehood. With reassurance of the concern of Congress for Hawaii's rights and its desire that the islands enjoy the fullest possible self-government, the committee recommended delay until a more definite expression of Hawaiian opinion could be obtained. This report was approved by all the committee members except Representative Rankin, who favored indefinite postponement. While non-contiguity, uncertainty as to Hawaiian sentiment, and lack of adequate labor legislation were high cards in this decision for delay, the ace was obviously the large Japanese element in the islands. For the committee reported that

. . . the present disturbed condition of international affairs, while not a permanent deterrent to the aspirations of the people of Hawaii, suggests the wisdom of further study and consideration of this question, and possibly the holding of a plebiscite at some future time.²³

Probably, too, the great amount of conflicting testimony had made the committee think well of delay.²⁴

From the investigations of 1935 and 1937 came some good results, however, for Hawaii. She had made many friends in Congress. A much larger number of national legislators were now conversant with island conditions and island problems. This gain the next session of the

²³Senate Document No. 151, p. 95; see ibid., 94-95.

²⁴Clark, op. cit., 15; Barber, op. cit., 113-116.

territorial legislature recognized in an appropriation to finance further visits by Congressmen.²⁵

Out of the 1937 investigation came also a rather backhanded recognition that ". . . Hawaii has fulfilled every requirement for statehood heretofore exacted of Territories."²⁶ While this statement was as true in 1937 as it is in 1950, the present discussion will use figures for later years in order to bring Hawaii's qualification score up to date.

Strangely enough, there exists no set list of qualifications having legal sanction by which to measure the readiness of a territory for statehood. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 required a population of 60,000 and the adoption of a state constitution providing for a republican form of government. Practice, however, has made the latter action more often the result of, rather than a qualification for, an enabling act. The Constitution set forth no qualifications whatsoever for prospective states. It merely provided that "New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union"²⁷ Therefore, in effect, Congress has been given the task not only of evaluating fitness for statehood but of setting up the standards by which that fitness is to be judged. These standards through the years have tended to be somewhat fluid, but at least four criteria have become well established: (1) area, (2) population, (3) economic resources and state of development, and (4) ability of the people to maintain stable and orderly government. On these four counts Hawaii undoubtedly qualifies.

²⁵Ibid., 116-117.

²⁶Hearings, H.R. 236, p. 3.

²⁷Art. IV, sec. III, 1.

Hawaii's area exceeds that of three individual states in our union, while the island population is greater than that of four. Only Oklahoma had a larger population at the time of admission to statehood than Hawaii's estimated 540,500 people in 1948. Furthermore, this population is almost ninety percent citizen in character. Many previous entrants into the union had large Negro or Indian populations. Three had some Asiatics.

As to economic resources and economic development, various indices give Hawaii a high rating. Since 1845, the first year for which figures are available, no territory at the time of admission as a state has approached Hawaii's 1948 real property wealth of nearly \$600,000,000 except Oklahoma, which had, at admission, real property exceeding \$700,000,000. In value of goods produced at time of admission, only one former territory could claim as much as half of Hawaii's annual production value of \$112,441,163 in the early 1940's.²⁸

Moreover, Hawaii has always been self-supporting. From 1944 to 1946, her collections of internal revenue exceeded the collections in each of fourteen of our states, while in 1947 she paid more to the federal treasury in all revenues than did each of twelve states. The percentage of her citizens filing individual income tax returns for 1940 was higher than in twenty-six states. In the first thirty-six years of territorial life, the islands cost the federal government, exclusive of military expenditures, approximately \$64,000,000. In the same period

²⁸Hearings, H.R. 236, pp. 656-657.

the islands contributed to the government over \$207,000,000. Thus the United States government realized a profit of almost \$150,000,000 in these years. The large margin of federal income over federal expenditures continues to prevail. Since 1933 Hawaii has never ranked below the eighth best customer of continental United States. In 1939 and 1940 she ranked fifth, only the United Kingdom, Canada, France and Japan making more purchases in the continental United States.

A financial asset to the federal government, Hawaii has handled her own government financing with considerable success. In the 1920's studies were made leading to the adoption of a uniform budget and accounting system for territorial and local governments. Hawaii established an income tax as early as 1901 and made it a successful source of revenue before any of the states. In 1940 receipts for both territorial and local governments surpassed expenditures by almost a half million dollars. General revenue receipts of the territorial government for the fiscal year ending in June, 1948, amounted to over two million dollars more than government cost payments. These figures for years directly preceding and succeeding World War II indicate the general stability of the territorial financial system. Unlike many states, the territorial government in the middle of the depression year of 1932 had over five million dollars in cash, free of all encumbrances, and an equal amount in liquid bonds.

If length of experience in territorial government is any indication of ability in self-government, only New Mexico, a territory for sixty-two years, has had a longer period of training for statehood. The average territorial life has been only twenty years. As another sign of

political maturity, Hawaiians casting ballots in the 1942 election represented 13.9 percent of the total population, a record higher than that of ten states. The median for all states was 25.9 percent. Honolulu, in 1940, far outranked fifteen comparable mainland cities in the percent of registrants voting. However, this showing is tempered somewhat by the fact that, in Hawaii, local and territorial elections are held at the same time. Since 1900 never less than sixty-six percent of the registrants have voted in general elections. In five elections the percentage has been above ninety, with an overall average in the eighties. Usually about forty percent of the population eligible to vote exercises the ballot in comparison with the national average of forty-two percent. This record is the more significant in view of the fact that Hawaiians do not vote for President or governor.²⁹

From the foregoing it becomes obvious that Hawaii meets every standard that has previously been set up for statehood candidates. However, the same committee which in 1937 virtually conceded this fact intimated by its recommendation for delay that new conditions exact new qualifications. Congressional action in general has followed this principle. And, as has been pointed out, the Constitution has left to Congress

²⁹Larocade, "Report," loc. cit., 15-16; Hearings, H.R. 49 and Rel. Bills, 15, 26, 28, 47; Hearings, H.R. 49-56, pp. 16, 39, 50, 99, 104, 211; Hearings, H.R. 236, pp. 205, 288, 656-657, 658-659, 664, 696, 722-724; Cordon Report, 3, 11; Hearings, H.R. 3034, pp. 7-10, 44; House Report No. 254, p. 7; Congressional Record, 75 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 81, Part IV, 4004; Annual Report, 60, 62, 65; Oliver Perry Chitwood and Frank Lawrence Owsley, A Short History of the American People (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1945), I, 247; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 198; DuPuy, op. cit., 33, 35.

the creation of standards by which to judge statehood candidates. In the case of Hawaii, Congress has considered more exacting criteria necessary.

The need expressed by the 1937 joint investigating committee for some comprehensive survey of Hawaiian sentiment led the territorial legislature of 1939 to authorize a plebiscite to be conducted as part of the 1940 general election. The timing was unfortunate. Increased tension in American-Japanese relations and renewed Congressional discussion of sugar control measures led to island fears that the plebiscite would unduly emphasize Hawaii's large Japanese population and the economic motives involved in the statehood movement. Some also may have felt that the international situation was such that delay of statehood would be wise. While the "Big Five" spared no expense in the campaign for statehood votes, its stand was weakened by a refusal to explain its sudden espousal of the cause in the mid-thirties. Added to suspicion of "Big Five" motives were charges that the various meetings conducted throughout the islands gave no opportunity for expression of opinions opposing statehood. As late as the 1946 Congressional investigation there would be charges that the issues in the statehood plebiscite had never been fully explained, although other witnesses testified that the people were well aware of what they were doing. As to the citizens of Japanese ancestry, it has been suggested that they voted for statehood more to indicate their loyalty than through any feeling that the new political status would aid their community standing. Others, it has been intimated, voted favorably because the islands would have looked foolish, if, after two Congressional investigations, Hawaii rejected statehood.

Whatever their motives, 74,538 of the 87,321 registered voters participated in the plebiscite on November 5. Of these, 46,174 favored statehood, 22,428 opposed it, and some 6,000 either did not vote or had their votes invalidated. In a survey of mainland editorial reaction to this two-to-one vote, the Interior Department found an unfavorable sentiment in about the same ratio. The war drums which certainly must have affected the plebiscite were possibly responsible for this editorial view as the United States uneasily eyed the progress of Japanese conquest. Non-contiguity and the "Big Five" issue may also have played a part. This adverse viewpoint was also present in a 1940 survey by Fortune magazine, in which scarcely over half those questioned were willing to fight for Hawaii--about the same number who felt Mexico worth defending. It is difficult, however, to reconcile these findings with the Gallup poll of January, 1941, in which forty-eight percent favored statehood, twenty-three percent opposed it and twenty-nine percent were undecided--about the same favorable ratio as in Hawaii. With allowances for the fallibility of public opinion polls, it seems fairly evident that, in 1941, the mainland had not definitely made up its mind about statehood for Hawaii. If there was any margin, it was in favor of Hawaii's plea.³⁰

³⁰ Hearings, H.R. 49 and Rel. Bills, 27; House Report No. 194, p. 10; Hearings, H.R. 236, pp. 887-889, 361-362, 366, 368, 725; Barber, op. cit., II, 124-125, 118-121, 253-255; Krykendall and Day, op. cit., 290; Furnas, op. cit., 189-190; Clark, op. cit., 15; "Hawaii, 49th State," Newsweek, XVI (November 18, 1940), 22, hereafter cited as "Hawaii, 49th State"; Furnas, loc. cit., 134; Mobley, loc. cit., 7, 14; "Hawaiian Statehood," loc. cit., 101.

As to the lack of Congressional action at this time, various observers offered these reasons: (1) the influence of the recommendations of the 1937 committee, (2) military authorities' hesitancy to make such a change under existing international conditions, (3) doubt concerning the loyalty of Hawaii's Japanese, and (4) some political opposition within the Democratic Party.³¹

But Hawaii was soon to add to her experience another great lesson in the superiority of the statehood status. Never had she completely rid herself of the phantom of military government. This phantom, as previously suggested, had some substance, although military and naval minds so inclined had been unable to foist upon the islands a commission form of government. However, the events of one day brought to Hawaii the realization of her worst fears. On December 7, 1941, Hawaii quietly laid aside her dreams of statehood until the war should be won. The same day she entered upon a period of military rule perhaps unparalleled in length and scope in the history of American government.³²

It has been suggested that only imminent peril and the belief that the emergency measure would be short-lived led Governor Poindexter on the afternoon of December 7 to sign a proclamation imposing martial law.

³¹"Hawaii, 49th State," loc. cit., 22; Mobley, loc. cit., 7.

³²House Report No. 194, p. 11; Hearings, H.R. 49 and S. 114, p. 466; Furnas, loc. cit., 134; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 290.

While the United States District Court remained open, henceforth all criminal cases were tried by military officers. Even traffic violations came under the jurisdiction of military judges, who dispensed the law without benefit of jury and without provision of the right of appeal for the defendant. Fines and sentences often exceeded the law--one measure was the involuntary donation of blood, a practice condemned by many as degrading and brutalizing. While, in the usual course of judicial procedure, approximately one-third of the defendants will be found innocent, military courts found not one innocent person among the 1,454 tried in November of 1942. Over two million dollars in fines were collected during the first two years of military rule. At first considered but a temporary hardship, military law and its vagaries, as well as the high-handed attitude of military personnel, did not greatly alarm the civilian population for some weeks. But the passage of months and then years brought a rising flood of resentment and protest.³³

The courts were not alone in feeling military control. Military officers also enforced censorship of all communication facilities, the blackout, food rationing, and price, rent and food control. Ordinary civil administrative duties, such as regulations on dog license tags and commitment of the insane, were shouldered by the military. Particularly resented was the retention of the blackout long after areas farther west were no longer darkened and while the Pearl Harbor area blazed every night. One witness at a post-war investigation testified that the blackout not

³³Hearings, H.R. 49 and S. 114, pp. 35-37, 118, 127; Clark, op. cit., 183-192; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 236, 256.

only frayed nerves but was unhealthful in a climate where people made a habit of staying outdoors as much as possible. Tuberculosis rates increased, while other deleterious effects upon health probably ensued. Military censorship of civilian mail, far stricter than that on the mainland, where it was under civilian control, was greatly resented. Funds originally allocated by the Interior Department for the relief of Hawaii's people immediately after Pearl Harbor were used by the army to pay its hosts of clerical and administrative employees. The restrictions upon labor have already been described.³⁴

Protests, especially against the detention of civilians without charges or trial, were not long in appearing. In February, 1942, came the Zimmerman case, in which a detained civilian appealed for a writ of habeas corpus. United States District Court Judge Delbert C. Metzger ruled that the writ should be issued but that military law forbade him to take action. Upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of San Francisco, the decision was on the way to a Supreme Court hearing when the prisoner, supposedly an enemy of the United States, was suddenly released in California.³⁵

Early active against military abuses of the law was a Honolulu attorney, J. Garner Anthony. In March of 1942 he warned that the Army's order to pay overtime only after forty-eight hours, rather than the

³⁴Ibid., 257; Hearings, H.R. 236, p. 33; Hearings, H.R. 49 and S. 114, p. 105; Clark, op. cit., 199-201.

³⁵Ibid., 193-194; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 263-264.

forty hours stipulated in the Fair Labor Standards Act, would subject employers after the war to prosecution in which the penalty was double payment for lost wages. He further protested army pocketing of all court fines while the Territory bore increased expenses in maintaining military prisoners. Many noted that inadequate price control policies were unduly increasing living costs. These complaints received no attention, while censorship made appeal to mainland authorities difficult.³⁶

Persisting, Anthony wrote an article on the illegality of the military rule, which he managed to get through to the California Law Review. When published in May, 1942, it received much attention in mainland newspapers. The first real blow had been dealt military rule. The second came with the appointment on August 24, 1942, of Ingram M. Stainback as governor to succeed Governor Poindexter whose term had expired. A former federal district attorney, with almost thirty years' law practice in the Territory, Governor Stainback had also had rich experience in military law as an army officer in the First World War. Appointing Anthony as attorney general, the governor set about regaining civil rule. A trip by these two to Washington in December of 1942 elicited from President Roosevelt an order to the commanding general in Hawaii to cease supervision of civil functions.³⁷

In February, 1943, a joint declaration by the governor and General Delos C. Emmons restored by March some functions to civil authorities, such as price and food control. Civilian censorship soon replaced that

³⁶Ibid., 264; Clark, op. cit., 195-196.

³⁷Ibid., 197-198; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 264-265.

by the military. An inquiry by civil authorities concerning the continued detention of civilians brought the sudden release of about two hundred internees. But habeas corpus was still suspended, martial law existed, and the blackout and ten o'clock curfew continued.³⁸

The appeal of two detainees, in prison almost two years, for a writ of habeas corpus was granted in the early summer of 1943 on the strength of the governor's announcement that the regular courts would again take up their usual duties. The refusal of the new commanding officer, Lt. General Robert C. Richardson, Jr., to produce the prisoners led to the imposition of a \$5,000 fine for contempt of court. Richardson replied with a military order imposing a heavy fine and/or imprisonment against any court official attempting to process writs. Now in deep water, Richardson, with advice from the Justice Department, rescinded this last order and proved that his disregard of the writ had been ordered by Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall. The original fine was reduced to \$100 by the court, but an appeal for a pardon for Richardson was answered only in Washington. As in the Zimmerman suit, the sudden release of the prisoners prevented a review of their case by the Supreme Court.³⁹

In the spring of 1944, Anthony, in a private case in which he represented a detainee, was able to break down the army's contention that there was still an emergency requiring military prosecution of civilian

³⁸Ibid.; Clark, op. cit., 201.

³⁹Ibid., 201-205; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 265.

violators of civil law. The District Court consequently ruled that martial law had ceased after March 10, 1943. Therefore, writs could be processed. However, the decision was reversed by the Circuit Court in San Francisco. Finally, this case and another similar one were reviewed by the Supreme Court. Oddly, the hearings began on December 7, 1945, four years after martial law was first imposed. On February 25, 1946, the Supreme Court in a six-to-two decision declared that martial law had been unconstitutional.⁴⁰ The Court ruled that, "Extraordinary measures in Hawaii, however necessary, are not supportable on the mistaken premise that Hawaiian inhabitants are less entitled to constitutional protection than others."⁴¹ Justice Murphy wrote, "The unconstitutionality of the usurpation of civil power by the military is so great in this instance as to warrant this Court's complete and outright repudiation of the action."⁴²

Hawaii had won its long battle against military rule. However, the very fact that it had once more found it necessary to prove its right to constitutional protection only served further to impress upon the islanders the insecurity of territorial status. Hawaiians had not liked treatment very similar to that accorded occupied enemy territory. In a 1948 investigation a mainland judge wrote, "The general opinion prevails that these military courts were conducted in a high-handed and ruthless manner."⁴³ The judge reported increased respect for good civil courts.

⁴⁰Ibid., 265-266; Clark, op. cit., 206-208.

⁴¹Quoted in Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 266.

⁴²Quoted by Clark, op. cit., 209.

⁴³Carl E. Wimberly, Circuit Court Judge, State of Oregon, to Senator Guy Cordon, February 12, 1948, Cordon Report, 15.

The people of the islands probably would be quick to agree that the initial imposition of martial law was a necessary measure in view of the sudden Japanese attack, the possibility of more attacks, and the impossibility of pre-gauging with certainty the loyalty of some island inhabitants. The fact that this action later proved to have been unnecessary cannot be used as a basis for condemning military action. However, the manner in which the military dispensed law and the extension of martial rule long after any conceivable danger directly threatened the islands can hardly be excused. Hawaii realized that such an extension would have been far less likely had the islands been a state. As one observer, who had been in the islands previous to the war, noted, post-war Hawaii had a "new seriousness."⁴⁴ And statehood had new significance.⁴⁵

But the excesses of military rule had not been the only war-time impetus to statehood. The many contacts of the island people with civilians and soldiers from the mainland, the great number of island-mainland marriages, and the gallant demonstration by Hawaii's people of all racial extractions of their loyalty--all these tied Hawaii closer to the continent. Some of the new residents from the mainland, too, were irked at the lack of full political rights. Furthermore, Hawaii had come to full realization of its place as the hub of any American activities in the

⁴⁴Clark, op. cit., 13.

⁴⁵Taylor, loc. cit., 99; Clark, op. cit., 209-210; Furnas, loc. cit., 134; Hearings, H.R. 49 and S. 114, pp. 31-33, 43, 103; Delegate Joseph R. Farrington, "Statehood for Hawaii," address at 16th Annual Forum of the New York Herald Tribune, October 20, 1947 (Reprint: Hawaii Statehood Commission, n.d.), 2-3.

Pacific area--in war or peace. As it was an integral, vital part of American commercial and military life, it wanted a similar place in American political life.⁴⁶

With ultimate victory of the United Nations a certainty, Hawaii again turned to the statehood question. Its legislature on May 4, 1945, passed another resolution, in which Congressional committees were invited to the islands. Already, however, discussions by the House Committee on Territories had led to the decision for the entire committee to visit the islands in the fall. A House resolution in April authorized such an investigation, but various developments led to the appointment of a subcommittee under the chairmanship of Representative Henry D. Larcade, Jr., of Louisiana, to make the trip. Five Congressmen, Delegate Farrington, and an advisor from the Department of Interior held hearings from January 7 through January 18, 1946, on Oahu, Molokai, Maui, Big Island and Kauai.⁴⁷

Just previous to the hearings, on December 22, 1945, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes went on record as a strong advocate of statehood.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 269-270; Clark, op. cit., 18-19.

⁴⁷ Hearings, H.R. 236, pp. II, 1-2, 4-5; Larcade, "Report," loc. cit., 14; Enabling the People of Hawaii To Form A Constitution and State Government to be Admitted into the Union on an Equal Footing with The Original States, Hearing, Pursuant to House Resolution 3643, Committee on the Territories, House of Representatives, 79 Congress, 1 Session, 1. Hereafter cited as Hearing, H.R. 3643.

⁴⁸ Hearings, H.R. 236, pp. 9-10.

The subcommittee, whose investigation Delegate Farrington characterized as "one of the most searching inquiries" ever made in Hawaii, listened to testimony concerning labor, land distribution, the "Big Five," Hawaii's place in national defense, Hawaii's war record, the housing shortage, the ever-present reapportionment problem, and, as always, the racial question. The witnesses favoring statehood outnumbered those opposing or desiring postponement by almost four to one. A number of those in opposition were mainland civilian workers in the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, whose main complaint seemed to be that they had to pay taxes in Hawaii as well as in their home states. The Japanese were still feared by some opponents; the "Big Five" was still considered by a few as an obstacle. Others felt simply that the islands were not yet ready. As in past investigations, the statehood proponents were much better organized and appeared much better informed than opponents of the movement. This was in no small part due to the presentations of the Equal Rights Commission. Many organizations expressed through resolutions or representatives their desire for immediate statehood; the Democratic and Republican parties of Hawaii; the Honolulu Medical Society; the Pineapple Research Institute; the Pineapple Growers Association; the H.S.P.A.; I.L.W.U.; various A.F. of L. locals; the Hawaiian Government Employees Association; Hawaiian Chinese Civic Association; various Chamber of Commerce units; the Filipino Federation of America; the Bar Association of Hawaii and many others.⁴⁹

⁴⁹Ibid., 25, 29, 37-38, 40-41, 44-45, 47-53, 55-68, 103, 109, 112-114, 134-135, 139, 181-182, 184-185, 212-213, 215, 242-250, 254-259, 261-264, 295, 350, 451. For other extremely favorable appraisals of the work of the Iarcade subcommittee, see Congressional Record, 79 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 92, Part IX, A773-774, A205; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 291.

After a lengthy summary of its findings concerning Hawaiian economic, social and political affairs, the subcommittee listed some sixteen conclusions. Telescoped, these conclusions were as follows: (1) That the people of Hawaii, despite their multi-racial character and the preponderance of Japanese, were ready for self-government; (2) That improvements could be expected in land distribution and that the "Big Five" dominance was no bar to independent enterprise; (3) That labor organization and labor-management relations were improving rapidly; (4) That the school system had been successful in producing a democratic and capable citizenry; and (5) That a majority of the citizens of Hawaii wanted statehood. The subcommittee further emphasized the loyalty of the Hawaiian people, the historic American policy favoring self-determination of peoples, Hawaii's role in Pacific international affairs, and the fact that the United States government in various ways had led the people of Hawaii to expect ultimate statehood. Finding Hawaii to have met all the necessary requirements, the subcommittee recommended immediate legislation to grant the islands statehood status.⁵⁰

Immediately after the hearings, on January 21, 1946, President Harry S. Truman, in his annual message to Congress, recommended statehood for Hawaii.⁵¹

On June 4, 1946, the House Committee on Territories held a hearing in Washington to announce the completion and availability of the printed

⁵⁰Larocade, "Report," loc. cit., 14-21.

⁵¹Congressional Record, 79 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 92, Part I, 147.

report of the investigation and findings of the Larcade subcommittee. Chairman Hugh Peterson of Georgia noted that the interest shown in the statehood question was "surprising."⁵² A letter was introduced from Secretary of Interior J. A. Krug, strongly endorsing statehood.⁵³ Delegate Farrington emphasized statehood as a corollary to American championship of dependent peoples, especially with regard to those in the Pacific area. Included in the hearing report was various correspondence referred to the committee during 1945 and 1946 in which sentiments for or against statehood were expressed. These letters, mainly from people who had been temporary residents of the islands during the war and from permanent residents of the mainland, overwhelmingly opposed statehood or wished postponement. The most frequent reasons for opposition were charges of poor law enforcement, bad treatment of mainland civilians, seamen and military personnel, and the Asiatic population. On the other hand, the organizations expressing views were heavily favorable, some thirty local and national organizations, both mainland and Hawaiian, advocating immediate statehood. Only three organizations opposed. The committee took no action. Emphasis was upon deliberation and consideration of all information possible. As a result, despite Delegate Farrington's efforts and the activities of the Hawaiian Statehood Commission, adjournment found statehood among the many measures lost in the rush to enact post-war readjustment legislation.⁵⁴

⁵²Hearing, H.R. 3643, p. 2.

⁵³Krug to Peterson, April 25, 1946, ibid., pp. 2-3.

⁵⁴Ibid., 5-7, 9-10, 13, 15-30, 33-34, 37-42, 45-47, 53-64, 67-75; Hearings, H.R. 49 and Rel. Bills, 10-11; House Report No. 254, p. 5; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 291.

On the opening of the Eightieth Congress, Delegate Farrington on January 3, 1947, introduced an enabling act. Five Republicans and three Democrats followed his lead in introducing similar measures. From March 7 to March 19, the House Committee on Public Lands held hearings in Washington in which the testimony for statehood was overwhelmingly favorable. This investigation was aimed at discovering mainland sentiment. Practically the only dissenting note was in a letter from Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, who opposed the admittance of any non-contiguous territories to statehood. Two other opposing communications were not included in the testimony. No witness appeared in opposition. Among those testifying for statehood were Secretary of Interior Krug, Governor Stainback, Robert L. Shivers, Congressmen from nine states, members of both parties from the territorial house and senate, and representatives of the H.S.P.A. and I.L.W.U. Other expressions of support came from various mainland Chambers of Commerce, army and navy personnel, the Navy Department, the National Education Association, the national American Veterans Committee, and various Lions' Clubs. The Delegate introduced favorable editorial comment from newspapers in thirty-seven states and Hawaii. Again highlighted was the international significance of the statehood question. Secretary Krug, who had just returned from a trip to the Pacific area, reported that General Douglas MacArthur favored extension of American democratic forms to the Pacific area as an aid in his task of democratizing Japan. The General, said Mr. Krug, definitely favored statehood. Committee member Clair Engle of California reported that MacArthur

had not considered statehood in any manner detrimental to the American defense system. The hearings ended with the unanimous decision of the committee to report the enabling act favorably to the House.⁵⁵

In his report of recommendation of March 27, Chairman Richard J. Welch stressed the lack of objection from military and naval authorities, the support of the Interior Department, the favorable effect of statehood upon American foreign relations and world democracy, and the great degree of unanimity of opinion in the islands and on the mainland. Chairman Welch reported: ". . . the Committee on Public Lands is unanimously convinced that the Territory of Hawaii has met every necessary requirement to be admitted as a State of the Union."⁵⁶ Welch further stated,

This committee agrees fully, after a study of all of the evidence, that Hawaii's admission as a State and its representation in the Congress would add an informed and experienced element in our national deliberations, both on defense and on our relations with the Orient.⁵⁷

After debate lasting less than four hours, the enabling act passed the House on June 30, 1947. The vote was 195 to 133, with Republicans favoring the bill by a large majority. Most of the Democratic vote was against the measure, probably due to Southern opposition on racial grounds. In the debate, however, the only argument advanced strongly against statehood

⁵⁵Hearings, H.R. 49-56, pp. 40, 43, 50, 79, 86, 139, 203, 214-220, 310; House Report No. 254, p. 5; "Hawaii, Star for Good Behavior," News-week, XXX (July 14, 1947), 24, hereafter cited as "Hawaii, Star"; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 291.

⁵⁶House Report No. 194, p. 21; see ibid., 1, 12-19.

⁵⁷Ibid., 14.

was that of non-contiguity.⁵⁸ This passage by the House was another milestone in the statehood movement.

In July of 1947, after a preliminary study of the enabling act passed by the House, the Senate Committee on Public Lands⁵⁹ planned a subcommittee investigation in the islands. A special session of Congress intervened, so the chairman of the Subcommittee on Territories and Insular Affairs, Guy Cordon, was requested to make the investigation. With the aid of Judge Carl E. Wimberly, Circuit Court judge of Oregon, hearings were held from January 5 to January 20, 1948, on the islands of Oahu, Kauai, Molokai, Lanai, Maui and Hawaii. Subsequently, a hearing in Washington by the full subcommittee took place on April 15.

Meanwhile President Truman had again advocated statehood in his annual message of January 7, 1948. Further, he included it as a part of his Civil Rights Program which he presented to Congress in a special message of February 2.

Despite a special effort by Senator Cordon and Judge Wimberly to encourage expressions in opposition to statehood, 215 of the 231 witnesses favored the step. Opposition amounting to forty percent marked the mail received by the senator in the islands, fifteen percent of which was based on the race question and eight percent on the Communist threat. The

⁵⁸ Congressional Record, 80 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 93, Part VI, 7916-7923; 7927-7941; Hearings, H.R. 49 and Rel. Bills, 10-11; House Report No. 254, p. 5; "Hawaii, Star," 25.

⁵⁹ Subsequently the name of this committee became Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

testimony concerning Communism will be discussed later. In addition to the old issues of the Japanese, the "Big Five," and reapportionment, testimony centered around the war-time military government and the international significance of statehood. As in practically all testimony since the war, the issues of Japanese loyalty, bloc voting and Asiatic office holders were treated favorably by the majority of witnesses. A large number of Hawaiian organizations--student, industrial, labor, education, racial, veteran and social--presented resolutions or representatives to express a desire for statehood.⁶⁰

Reasons in opposition included fear of the Japanese, bloc voting, and the feeling that Hawaii did not have men capable of holding high office.⁶¹ Impressive was the testimony related to the international scene. Proponents argued that statehood not only would bring into Congress men well acquainted with affairs in the vital Pacific area but also adept in interracial relations. It was further asserted that the granting of statehood to Hawaii, with its large Asiatic population, would greatly enhance United States prestige in the Far East, as well as strengthen the forces of democracy everywhere. Evidence of the interest of Samoa

⁶⁰Congressional Record, 80 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 94, Part I, 33, 929; Hearings, H.R. 49 and S. 114; on bloc voting, 5, 13, 25, 28, 42-44, 60, 65, 69, 80, 88, 106, 125, 129, 152, 155, 165, 167, 185, 191, 202, 219-220, 227; on Japanese office holders, 3-5, 26, 28, 69; on Japanese loyalty, 11, 14, 29-30, 34, 45, 48-50, 57, 67-68, 87, 89, 180-181, 210-211, 221, 239, 250; on reapportionment, 227, 238-239, 271, 423-425. See also Cordon Report, 10; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 293.

⁶¹Hearings, H.R. 49 and S. 114, pp. 7-11, 37-39, 93.

and other south sea islands, as well as India, in the statehood movement was presented. There was the argument that statehood would be a weapon in fighting Communism in Asia.⁶²

Senator Cordon's report contained favorable comment upon the Hawaiian judicial system, one of the purposes of the investigation being to reassess this vital part of American government.⁶³ The Senator found the climate of statehood opinion even more favorable than in 1940. He suggested that longer failure to grant statehood would not only bring into question the "good faith of Congress,"⁶⁴ but would deprive the United States of an opportunity to show that ". . . it means what it says and practices what it urges when advocating true democracy for all peoples."⁶⁵ He concluded that Hawaii was ready for statehood and recommended that the enabling act be favorably recommended to the Senate for immediate passage.⁶⁶

The ensuing one-day hearing in Washington in April brought favorable testimony from Under Secretary of the Interior Oscar L. Chapman, Mr. Seth Richardson, who made the 1932 investigation of criminal law procedure in Hawaii, and Mr. Robert L. Shivers. There was a review of various

⁶²Ibid., 4, 117, 166, 183, 231, 249, 268, 461, 493.

⁶³Judge Wimberly made a special investigation of the Hawaiian judicial system, his letter of report, February 12, 1948, being included in the Cordon Report, 12-15.

⁶⁴Ibid., 8.

⁶⁵Ibid., 11.

⁶⁶Cordon Report, 1-2, 11.

mainland Gallup polls. The third poll in 1948 indicated that sixty-six percent favored statehood, fifteen percent opposed and nineteen percent were without opinions. In the 1946 poll, sixty percent had been favorable; in 1941, only forty-eight percent. This was an indication that favorable Hawaiian and mainland opinion had increased in similar proportions. The Delegate presented lists of twenty-four national and ninety-eight Hawaiian and mainland local organizations favorable to statehood. However, one senator expressed the idea that the committee should work slowly, since the step, once taken, was irrevocable. This was a familiar theme to statehood proponents. In May the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs decided that no further action would be taken until such time as those members of the committee so desiring might make an investigation in Hawaii. Senator W. F. Knowland of California, ardent supporter of statehood, took an unprecedented step in introducing a resolution to release the bill from the committee and place it on the Senate floor, but his move was blocked. In June the committee authorized its chairman, Senator Hugh Butler of Nebraska, to arrange for an investigation in Hawaii. The results of this investigation were not reported until the next June, and, since they dealt with the question of Communism, they will be discussed later.⁶⁷ No further action was taken by the Senate in the Eightieth Congress.

⁶⁷Hearings, H.R. 49 and S. 114, pp. 445, 463-464, 485-491, 495; Statehood for Hawaii, Communist Penetration of the Hawaiian Islands, Report, Relative to Investigation with Reference to H.R. 49, 80 Congress, 2 Session, 2, hereafter referred to as Butler Report; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 294.

Since the advent of a new Congress meant the introduction and passage of a new statehood bill, Hawaii had lost another round in its battle for a star. But the action of the House in the Eightieth Congress had been the most promising step in the entire history of the movement.

Between January 3 and February 3, 1949, six enabling acts were introduced in the House. In the Senate one bill was introduced in January followed by another later in the session. There were other hopeful signs. President Truman, on January 5, in his annual message to Congress again requested passage of his Civil Rights Program as outlined the previous year. Since this program included the granting of statehood to Hawaii, the President's message was a reiteration of his belief that Hawaii was ready for full partnership in the union. Incidentally, his first recommendation in 1946 had marked a departure from precedent. No previous President had included statehood in his program of desired legislation.⁶⁸

Further, there were indications that mainland sentiment was still highly favorable. Between 1946 and 1948, twenty-seven national organizations had passed resolutions favoring Hawaii's bid. The Hawaiian Statehood Commission compiled a list of editorial comments for the first three months of 1949, in which seventy-six editors wrote favorably of statehood. Only two newspapers, both in South Carolina, in thirty-two states expressed opposition.⁶⁹

⁶⁸Congressional Record, 81 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 95, No. 1, pp. 12-13; No. 2, p. 77; No. 3, p. 96; No. 13, pp. 758, 841; No. 79, p. 5732; ibid., Vol. 95, Part I, 76.

⁶⁹Ibid., No. 15, p. A533; No. 56, pp. 2077-2078.

Hearings held between March 3 and 8, 1949, by the Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Possessions of the House Committee on Public Lands again brought expressions of overwhelming support for statehood. Long-time supporters Secretary Krug and Representative Larcade again pled Hawaii's cause. Secretary Charles H. Brannan of the Department of Agriculture endorsed the enabling act. The Department of National Defense interposed no objections. Two pieces of opposing testimony were based upon fear of Communism in the islands. One of these was a letter from island Senator W. H. Hill who was the only territorial legislator voting against a March resolution in favor of immediate statehood. Another letter from a mainland resident listed unsettled world affairs and the question of non-contiguity as sufficient reasons for delaying statehood. The committee chairman did not feel that these requests for delay of committee action were sufficiently substantiated to be given serious consideration. The international significance of the granting of statehood again got its share of attention. Probably most significant was the statement, in a resume of past Congressional action, that

. . . the record on Hawaii is complete. Virtually everything there is to know about Hawaii has been chronicled. . . . Her social, political, cultural, and economic structure has been subjected to an examination that was unheard of when the other 29 Territories were candidates for statehood.⁷⁰

The enabling act was reported to the Committee on Public Lands, which, on March 8, 1949, voted to report the bill favorably to the House.

⁷⁰Hearings, H.R. 49 and Rel. Bills, . 10; see also ibid., 12-17, 26, 34, 38, 45, 47.

The one dissenting vote was based upon indecision as to the question of non-contiguity.⁷¹

Further action during the session was not forthcoming, however, despite the poll of Congressional opinion by a Hearst newspaper in which statehood was favored three-to-one. Delegate Farrington was reported to have blamed the inaction upon Congressional leaders, who did not wish to consider the issue in the 1949 session.⁷²

At the beginning of the next Congressional session, President Truman, emphasizing its place in his Civil Rights Program again recommended statehood on January 4, 1950. Six days later, presidential endorsement was strengthened by the report of the House Special Committee on Pacific Territories and Island Possessions. This committee, just returned from an inspection trip of Pacific and Far East areas, had, on two occasions, stopped in Hawaii. Its report argued that statehood was the wish of the Hawaiian people, that the serious strike of 1949 indicated the need of the islands for a state government which alone would be strong enough to cope with such emergencies, and that the grant of statehood would aid United States prestige in the Pacific and Far East by presenting a re-affirmation of American faith in democracy to counteract Communist propaganda. "It [Hawaii]," the committee felt, "has been a lighthouse of democracy in the Pacific. . . ." ⁷³ "People of the Pacific look to Hawaii

⁷¹Ibid., 50.

⁷²Congressional Record, 81 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 95, No. 143, p. A5342.

⁷³Congressional Record, 81 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 96, No. 8, p. A211; see also ibid., A210-A211; ibid., No. 2, p. 65.

. . . as the French do to Paris. . . ."⁷⁴ The committee recommended immediate statehood for what it considered the cultural center of the Pacific.⁷⁵

In House debate on the enabling act in March, Delegate Farrington pointed out that the accounts of the various hearings on statehood now filled 3,000 pages. There had been over 700 witnesses heard; eighty or ninety members of Congress had investigated statehood; and almost fifty Congressmen had visited the islands. The delegate also referred to a mainland opinion poll of February 22, which indicated a ratio of four to one in favor of statehood. As debate progressed, the outstanding opposition arguments were fears of Communism, the question of extending statehood to non-contiguous territory, and the old racial question. However, on March 7, the bill passed by a vote of 262 to 110. For a second time the House had given its approval to statehood. The next day the Senate referred the bill to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. While the results of this Committee's hearings are not known at this writing, President Truman on May 5 complimented the committee chairman on the thoroughness of the investigation. The same month the President assured Hawaiian statehood proponents that he would make every effort to gain passage by the Senate during the session. However, in June, the threat of opposition from Southern senators on grounds of race appeared when

⁷⁴Ibid., No. 8, p. A210.

⁷⁵Ibid., A210-A211.

Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana announced his opposition because Hawaii's people "are quite different from our people. . . ."76

By July a national magazine was reporting that the desire for early adjournment in an election year would prevent Senate consideration during the 1950 session. When, on June 30, the decision for all-out aid to South Korea against Communist invaders was announced by President Truman, action on statehood became even less likely. Not only would there be more pressing measures for consideration, but, if the past record was any indication, a change in the form of government in Hawaii at a time of extreme crisis in the Far East would not appeal either to Congress or to military and naval leaders. As this is being written, the likelihood is that statehood will be deferred until the next Congress, when the whole process of introduction of a bill and passage by both houses will be required.⁷⁷

Out of the myriad of hearings, reports, debate and discussion there had appeared by mid-1950 four basic issues in the statehood question: (1) the racial composition of the island population; (2) the question of extension of statehood to non-contiguous territory; (3) the amount of Communist infiltration in the islands; and (4) the international significance of statehood.

⁷⁶"The Periscope," Newsweek, XXXV (June 19, 1950), 13; see also ibid. (May 8, 1950), 15; Congressional Record, 81 Congress, 2 Session, No. 44, pp. 2821-2824, 2906-2923, 2992; No. 48, p. 3035; No. 95, p. A3783; No. 194, p. 7023.

⁷⁷"The Periscope," Newsweek, XXXVI (July 3, 1950), 8; ibid. (July 10, 1950), 17.

The racial issue, of course, continues to revolve mainly around the large number of people of Japanese ancestry in the islands. There is still in the islands a small faction which insists that the Japanese are a menace. And, as previously suggested, in an economic crisis attended by unemployment and limited circulation of money the tremendous competition which the Japanese-Americans, by virtue of their numbers alone, would offer other racial groups might engender more wide-spread antagonism. Furthermore, as the Communist question has become prominent, there has been a slight but obvious tendency on the part of a few to suggest that the Japanese element is more susceptible to Communist influence than other racial groups. On the basis of the limited information now available, there seems little reason to believe that, proportionately, those of Japanese ancestry are any more active in the Communist program than persons of other racial extractions. However, the very fact that such ideas are entertained by even a few indicates that the Japanese-Americans still have a certain amount of prejudice to overcome in the islands. By and large, however, the record seems to indicate that the majority of Hawaii's people are fighting a winning battle against racial antagonism. No race riot has ever troubled Hawaiian human relations. The tradition of racial harmony and tolerance is long and probably unequalled in any part of the world. Therefore, any potent opposition to statehood based on the race question will probably stem from the mainland. Even here such opposition seems confined to the South, if expressions of Congressional opinion and newspaper editorials are any indication. But, as in Hawaii, racial bias must influence only a small element, since numerous Southern newspapers

have advocated statehood, while Congressional leaders such as Representative Larcade of Louisiana and Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee have been outspoken in their support. All indications lead to the conclusion that, while some opposition based on race will continue to be voiced, it alone will not block Hawaii's realization of statehood.

Opposition based on non-contiguity offers a greater, if less tenable, obstacle. In a radio debate on the Town Meeting of the Air in the fall of 1949, Senator Harry P. Cain of the State of Washington, in opposing immediate statehood, declared that the Senate would not act until a policy concerning the admission of non-contiguous territory had been formulated. "No such policy," he said, "has as yet been either seriously discussed or agreed to." Until this "fundamentally important question" was settled, he held a dim view for statehood prospects. This stand was not new. Even though those most impressed by this question no longer based their arguments on mere distance. Modern transportation and communication facilities have brought Hawaii closer, in time, to Washington, D. C., than were many of the early states. Fears based upon non-contiguity rest mainly on two points: (1) to admit Hawaii would set a precedent which might morally obligate the United States to admit other non-contiguous areas such Puerto Rico, Samoa and South Pacific islands under United States control; and (2) to open the door to non-contiguous areas would increase the membership in the already unwieldy houses of Congress. In this opposition there seems to be no fear of changing the political balance in

Congress, since, in post-war years, statehood for Republican Hawaii has been coupled with that for predominantly Democratic Alaska.⁷⁸

In his rebuttal to Senator Cain's argument, Delegate Farrington gave the traditional reply that this question had been settled in 1900 when the Organic Act established a territorial government for Hawaii. Involved also in this issue is the immemorial claim of statehood proponents that the United States had "promised" Hawaii statehood--at least by implication.

The questions of non-contiguity and the "promise" must be traced back to the annexation of Hawaii. Actually these issues stem from even earlier history. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, passed by the Congress of the Confederation, established the principle of admitting western territories, upon the meeting of certain qualifications, to the union on a basis equal to the first states. The Constitution, as previously suggested, was silent as to the admission of new states other than to grant Congress the power to receive new members into the union. Precedent, however, has taken on almost the force of law. Every continental territory of the United States has eventually been granted statehood. Furthermore, as statehood proponents are quick to point out, the Philippine Islands and Puerto Rico both came under American jurisdiction at the time when Hawaii was annexed. Yet, Hawaii alone was granted territorial status, an indication of special consideration.⁷⁹

⁷⁸Quotations in Town Meeting Bulletin, 12; see also ibid., 10, 13, 22.

⁷⁹Chitwood and Owsley, op. cit., 246-247; Cordon Report, 7; Hearings, H.R. 49-56, pp. 18-19.

Much emphasis has been laid upon the actions of the United States leading up to annexation in 1898 as implying a "promise" of statehood, and, consequently, invalidating the non-contiguity argument. Despite many statements to the contrary, the treaty of annexation of 1897, like its predecessor in 1893, did not provide statehood for Hawaii. It did provide territorial status. The Hawaiian senate included in its resolution of ratification, September 9, 1897, the complete treaty. Congress in the Newlands Resolution of 1898, by which annexation was consummated, agreed to the following: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives . . ., That said cession is accepted, ratified, and confirmed"⁸⁰ Since "said cession" refers to the ratifying act of the Hawaiian senate, in which the treaty granting territorial status was incorporated, statehood supporters have argued that the United States thereby promised eventual statehood. The wording of the resolution was repeated by Minister Harold M. Sewall in the ceremonies of August 12, 1898, when Hawaii was formally annexed. This rather tenuous logic, whatever its validity, seems superficial in the face of much stronger claims. "Promise" has also been read into the debate and discussion regarding annexation in which Congressional and administrative leaders recognized that territorial status might lead to statehood. However, these expressions clearly could not be considered binding upon succeeding Congresses or national administrations.⁸¹

⁸⁰House Report No. 194, p. 27; see also ibid., 25-26; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 287. For an attack upon the "promise" argument by members of the 1935 Congressional investigating committee, see Hearings, H.R. 3034, pp. 60-61, 111-112, 119, 152, 158-159, 169.

⁸¹Ibid., 324; Hearing, H.R. 3643, p. 3.

More pertinent was the debate leading up to passage of the Organic Act in 1900. Both in the House and Senate amendments stipulating that the extension of territorial status could not be considered as a promise of statehood were blocked. These rejections and numerous comments during the debate indicate that the Congress was well aware that territorial status implied ultimate statehood.⁸² Again the statements were not binding. Nor were the comments and intentions of the commission appointed by President McKinley to draft the Organic Act. One commissioner, Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama, made several speeches while in Hawaii in which he indicated that statehood would not be far distant. The only surviving member of the commission in 1947, Walter F. Frear, wrote to Delegate Farrington that the commission had decided upon territorial status at its first meeting and had recognized the implication of eventual statehood. However, another commissioner, Senator Shelby M. Cullum of Illinois, in the debate on the act, stated that he was not favorable to statehood-- at least in the near future.⁸³

But none of the foregoing events actually established Hawaii's right to statehood. The valid claim of Hawaii stems from the Organic Act, which states: ". . . that the constitution shall have the same

⁸²Congressional Record, 26 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 33, Part III, 2024, 2181, 2186, 2188, 2194, 2446, 2448; Part IV, 3704, 3770; Hearings, H.R. 49 and Rel. Bills, p. 26; Hearings, H.R. 236, p. 412; Congressional Record, 75 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 81, Part III, 2592; Hearings, H.R. 3034, p. 324; Cordon Report, 7; Kuykendall and Day, op. cit., 287-288.

⁸³Hearings, Con. Res. 18, pp. 415-416; Hearings, H.R. 236, p. 411; Congressional Record, 56 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 33, Part III, 2189; Frear to Farrington, March 3, 1947, Hearings, H.R. 49-56, pp. 137-138.

force and effect within said Territory as elsewhere in the United States."⁸⁴

In this statement and in its provisions for a territorial government, the Organic Act legally recognized Hawaii's right to that status which historically implied statehood. Such an interpretation of the Organic Act is confirmed by various Supreme Court decisions. In the so-called Insular Cases, the Supreme Court ruled in 1903 that Hawaii was an integral part of the United States to which the Constitution applied in full. It clearly differentiated between Hawaii and other island areas which have status as dependencies. Further confirmation came from Chief Justice Taft in 1922 when he ruled that ". . . incorporation has always been a step and an important step leading to statehood."⁸⁵

The case of O'Donoghue v. United States, in which the Supreme Court differentiated between the status of courts of the District of Columbia and those of the territories, brought a ruling that ". . . as a preliminary step toward that foreordained end /statehood/ --to tide over the period of ineligibility--Congress, from time to time, created territorial governments, the existence of which was necessarily limited to the period of pupillage." In this decision the court referred to two previous rulings. One read: "The territorial status is one of pupillage at best." The other stated: "A territory, under the constitution and laws of the United States is an inchoate state."⁸⁶

⁸⁴Ibid., 37.

⁸⁵Hearings, H.R. 3034, p. 162; see also House Report No. 194, p. 10; Hearings, H.R. 49-56, p. 97; Hearings, H.R. 3034, pp. 126, 324; Hearings, H.R. 236, p. 14; Bowman, loc. cit., 252-253; Crawford, loc. cit., 60.

⁸⁶Hearings, H.R. 236, p. 14. Italics are those of the source.

Therefore, Hawaii's claim to statehood by virtue of her territorial status rests upon three elements: (1) the principles and practices of American political expansion, as established by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787; (2) the Organic Act, which established Hawaii as a territory; and (3) the decisions of the Supreme Court defining a territory as an embryo state. It follows that the decision as to whether non-contiguous territories would be granted statehood was made in 1900. Nevertheless, this objection to Hawaiian statehood continues to appear. Established legal right will not prevent members of Congress from hesitating to welcome into the union an area separated by over 2,000 miles of water from the other states. The question of non-contiguity is still an obstacle to statehood.⁸⁷

Before discussing the evidence concerning the infiltration of Communism in the islands, two other matters deserve comment. The first relates to Australian-born Harry Bridges, president of the national I.L.W.U., and the man who always has made the final decisions concerning not only west coast and Hawaiian shipping strikes but strikes in the I.L.W.U.-dominated sugar and pineapple industries of Hawaii. In April of 1950, after two previous trials, Bridges was convicted in a San Francisco Federal Court of perjury and evasion of naturalization laws in denying his membership in the Communist Party. Two of his close associates, also I.L.W.U. leaders, also were convicted. Given a prison sentence of five years, Bridges, was subsequently deprived of his citizenship.⁸⁸

⁸⁷"Hawaii, Star," 25.

⁸⁸"Harry the Commy," Newsweek, XXXV (April 17, 1950), 29-30.

Closely related is the second matter. On May 1, 1949, the I.L.W.U. longshoremen of Hawaii struck for higher wages. This strike, lasting 159 days, virtually paralyzed Hawaiian life and economy. Moreover, the wage increase finally gained by the workers hardly compensated for their losses in wages. The strike, dealing a hard blow to the sugar, pineapple and tourist enterprises, cost Hawaii an estimated \$100,000,000. In fact, the only winner was Harry Bridges, since the new contract with Hawaiian shipping firms was to expire on the same day as those held by unions with mainland shippers. Bridges now virtually ruled Pacific shipping, and, consequently, the lifeline of Hawaii.⁸⁹

The strike was only thirty-nine days old when Delegate Farrington reported to the House that it had ". . . created a crisis without parallel in the history of Hawaii. . . . The health and welfare of the people of the islands are in jeopardy." The delegate explained the failure of the territorial government to make any progress in strike settlement and called upon President Truman to force resumption of shipping.⁹⁰ The following day he introduced a bill which would have authorized federal seizure of shipping facilities in case of strikes or other threats to the island lifeline. Despite the introduction of three such bills, the delegate was unable to enlist federal intervention. There was, however, considerable

⁸⁹"Victory for Bridges," Newsweek, XXXIV (October 17, 1949), 28; Congressional Record, 81 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 95, No. 116, p. A4334.

⁹⁰Congressional Record, 81 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 95, No. 101, p. A3745.

expression of alarm in the Senate. A letter was introduced from a Hawaiian citizen pointing out that only a few Communists with Bridges' power could imperil the islands.⁹¹ The Washington Daily News on August 4, 1949, received a report that Moscow had praised the striking activities of Bridges' union. Meanwhile, a Scripps-Howard reporter, Edwin C. Heinke, expressed belief that the I.L.W.U. was definitely under Communist leadership.⁹²

In the 1930's there had been little mention of Communism in the islands. There had been, early in the century, a Socialist Party, but a witness in 1937 said there were then very few Socialists in Hawaii. However, to the investigating committee of that year was submitted an editorial from the Honolulu Advertiser praising the newly organized Industrial Association of Hawaii, one of whose aims was to fight Communist influence. In 1940 Communists had taken advantage of the practice blackout to distribute anti-war propaganda.⁹³

As on the mainland, serious consideration of the Communist menace did not develop until after the war. It was in November of 1947 that Hawaii was startled by the publication of a pamphlet entitled The Truth About Communism in Hawaii. More generally known as the Izuka Pamphlet, this account was written by an American of Japanese ancestry who claimed

⁹¹Ibid., No. 102, p. 7653; No. 88, pp. 6505-6506; No. 114, pp. 8578-8580, 8584; No. 86, pp. 6342-6344; No. 115, pp. 8701-8702.

⁹²Ibid., No. 141, p. 10952; Knoxville News-Sentinel, August 2-4, 1949.

⁹³Hearings, Con. Res. 18, pp. 385-386; Barber, op. cit., 218.

membership in the Communist Party from 1938 to 1946. The son of plantation laborers, whose life he described under the heading of "Fertile Soil for Communism," Izuka traced his first contacts with the Communists, among whom he listed Jack W. Hall, present regional director of the I.L.W.U. in Hawaii. He described the tactics by which he claimed the Communists gained control of Hawaiian unions, the majority membership of which was unaware that it was a tool for party action. In company with Jack Hall he attended a training school in San Francisco until the outbreak of World War II, when Communist schools were discontinued. At that time the German-Soviet non-aggression pact was in effect and the Communist Party feared scrutiny by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Hawaiian Communists faithfully followed the about-face in propaganda following the German attack upon Russia in 1941. During the war Izuka was detained for several months by the military government on charges of inciting slow-downs on defense work. During two hearings he denied Communist affiliation.

According to Izuka, the Communist Party was reactivated in 1945 after a front organization had been successful, through "discussion groups," in establishing a number of party members as citizens highly respected among the professional and middle class circles of Hawaii. By 1946 he claimed there were nine cells or groups on Oahu and several on the other islands. As is usual in Communist organization, delegates from each group made up an Executive Board which decided policy in the islands or handed down decisions from higher, mainland echelons.

Izuka wrote that the party got as many of its members as possible into salaried positions in the unions and attempted to wean unions away from the A.F. of L., which had proven more difficult to penetrate than the C.I.O. Izuka charged that practically every candidate endorsed by the P.A.C. in the 1946 elections was the choice of the Communist Party. It was a result of this election that he left the organization. He disapproved of party support for Republican Joseph R. Farrington for the delegateship in opposition to Democrat William Borthwick, whom Izuka described as an old friend of labor in Hawaii. Izuka felt that the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, which Farrington owns, had been bought or duped into neutrality in the election in return for P.A.C. endorsement of Farrington.

The Izuka Pamphlet was followed in 1948 by The Plot to Sovietize Hawaii, written by a Hilo radio commentator, Thomas O'Brien. O'Brien charged that one I.L.W.U. local prohibited its members from joining the Hawaii National Guard; that the failure of the P.A.C. to win control in the 1946 election and the opprobrium earned by its activities led the I.L.W.U. to take over control of the Democratic Party of Hawaii to further its political aims; and that the I.L.W.U. deliberately incited its members to hatred of management, regardless of industrial moves toward cooperation.

O'Brien also reiterated Izuka's charges of some type of understanding between the I.L.W.U. and the Honolulu Star-Bulletin in the 1946 election whereby Farrington received P.A.C. endorsement. It is only fair

to note at this point that Delegate Farrington ran almost exclusively on a statehood platform in this election. No one has charged him with pro-Communist leanings. Other than the criticisms of Izuka and O'Brien, adverse comment has generally been restricted to Mr. Farrington's failure to repudiate I.L.W.U. support. To have alienated the labor vote would have probably lost Mr. Farrington his seat in Congress at a time when he felt almost certain he could win statehood for Hawaii.

There is an account by O'Brien of the revolt of one sugar workers' local on Big Island after leaders charged by Izuka to be Communists refused to deny party membership. To combat this revolt, the I.L. W.U. held a "Sugar Unity Conference" in January of 1948 at Hilo. At this conference Izuka was given an opportunity to defend his charges before a large group of sugar workers. However, according to O'Brien, the entire meeting was so closely under the control of Jack Hall and one of Bridges' mainland associates that Izuka's "hearing" was a farce. The writer also claimed that the I.L. W.U. discouraged its members from reading newspapers or listening to radio programs not approved by the union. Another indication to the author of the Communist leanings of the I.L.W.U. was the importation of left-wing singer Paul Robeson for a fund-raising concert tour of the islands.

O'Brien was convinced that the I.L.W.U. supported statehood because it was certain to control the constitutional convention. He felt that, ". . . until Hawaii knows for sure the strength of its communist-inclined labor union," statehood should be deferred.⁹⁴ This writer reported that

⁹⁴O'Brien, op. cit., 64; see also Izuka, op. cit., 1-31.

the I.L.W.U. failed again in 1948 to gain control of the territorial legislature.⁹⁵

By this time Congress was taking much interest in the charges of Communist infiltration in Hawaii. In the hearings presided over by Senator Cordon and Judge Wimberly in the winter of 1948, discussion of Communism in the islands was encouraged. Those who minimized the Communist menace--and these were in the majority--usually expressed one or all of the following ideas: (1) Communism would make no great headway among either labor or the general public of Hawaii, which was alert to the danger; (2) statehood would strengthen Hawaii in its resistance to Communism, or, the Communist question bore no relation to statehood; (3) Communism was Hawaii's problem to solve and it was no more a menace in the islands than on the mainland; (4) Communism was a mainland import; and (5) Communism was a "red herring" employed by those who opposed statehood.⁹⁶

An A.F. of L. representative felt there was sufficient evidence to prove that the I.L.W.U. was Communist-dominated, but he felt that Hawaii probably could handle the problem. A University of Hawaii professor emphasized the growth of the right wing in labor organizations as a sign that Hawaii could meet the challenge. An American Legion representative said that Hawaii could better handle the situation as a state. An I.L.W.U.

⁹⁵See ibid., 1-79, with introductory material, for complete account of O'Brien's charges.

⁹⁶Hearings, H.R. 49 and S. 114, pp. 12-13, 20, 29, 45, 80, 77-78, 89-90, 97-98, 118, 138, 144, 178, 184, 194, 221, 223, 229-230, 237, 277, 259, 311-312, 324, 329, 346-347, 351, 385.

representative pointed to the recent adoption by a sugar workers' convention of a set of principles including the idea that no political party would determine its policies but that each union member's own political convictions would not be questioned by the union. This, of course, meant the I.L.W.U. would make no attempt to rid its unions of Communists. A representative of the H.S.P.A. stated that evidence of Communist attempts to gain adherents among plantation workers had been found, but that the workers were resisting. The organization felt that ". . . communism will not gain an appreciable foothold in the rural portions of these islands."⁹⁷ Others, including a Methodist minister and the editor of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin joined in the general opinion that Communist infiltration was not strong among the rank and file of workers. Still others, including prominent businessman Walter F. Dillingham and an Hawaiian senator, favored delay until the extent of Communist influence could be better gauged. Some spoke of infiltration among the Japanese-- a new facet of the racial question. Several spoke of the apathy of the island people toward the threat.⁹⁸

In his final report, Senator Cordon suggested that much of the fear of Communism had arisen as a result of the 1946 sugar strike and the 1947 pineapple strike. While he recognized that influences propelling these strikes originated on the west coast of the mainland, he felt the

⁹⁷Hearings, H.R. 49 and S. 114, p. 20; see also ibid., 27, 170, 77-78, 89-90.

⁹⁸Ibid., 30, 48, 70-71, 92-93, 132-133, 178, 184, 213, 323, 401-407, 421, 469-470.

basic conflict was not different from mainland labor disputes. He believed the strong bent of Hawaiian labor toward the I.L.W.U. was the result of the traditional tie-up of Hawaiian industry with shipping and the economic bonds of Hawaii with the west coast rather than any attraction for Communist ideas. While Communists had been actively engaged in trying to stir up race and class conflict within the unions, Cordon was convinced that the Hawaiian people and workers were alert to the danger and resistant. Despite all efforts to estimate Communist power, Cordon reported: "The plain truth is that no one knows the extent of Communist success in Hawaii."⁹⁹ He found no infiltration in the branches of the territorial or local governments. His final conclusion was that ". . . there will be ample protection against the infiltration of Communist doctrines in the formation of the State constitution, which must be approved by the President of the United States as well as the electorate of Hawaii."¹⁰⁰ Cordon's conclusion, however, was weakened appreciably by another statement made later in the same report that, because of the islands' territorial status,

. . . the people of Hawaii lack experience in handling the ordinary, everyday problems of government close to the grass roots as on a State level. Whether there is a lack of interest on the part of the people is uncertain. The assessment was difficult to make. The fact that they have not had as much experience in this respect as comes to the citizens of a State, while not their fault, is regrettable.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹Cordon Report, 6; see also ibid., 5.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 6.

¹⁰¹Ibid., 10-11.

Mr. Shivers, war-time F.B.I. agent in Hawaii, who had made an investigation of Communist activities in Hawaii, said there was no evidence of Communist sabotage during the war and that he believed Senator Cordon's report was ". . . as accurate as anyone could make it."¹⁰² In his opinion, Communists were no more active in Hawaii than in the United States, and, other than supporting certain candidates, were not represented in the territorial legislature or government. He estimated there were about five revolutionary Communists, whom he defined as those taking orders from Moscow, and from 100 to 150 party members who were not revolutionaries.¹⁰³

As previously noted, the Senate did not act upon the recommendation of Senator Cordon for immediate statehood in the spring of 1948, but the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs authorized its chairman, Senator Hugh Butler, to arrange for further investigations in Hawaii. A special investigator, sent to Hawaii in August, contacted several hundred persons in field inspections lasting through almost two and one-half months. Formal hearings by the committee, planned for November, were cancelled because of the Pacific coast maritime strike. Senator Butler, therefore, made a personal investigation, holding some seventy-seven confidential interviews in November. Contacts by the senator with about one hundred other citizens were not recorded. Although listed in the investigation

¹⁰²Hearings, H.R. 49 and S. 114, p. 486.

¹⁰³Ibid., 486-487.

files, the names of witnesses are not published in the report. Senator Butler felt much information would not have been secured had the witnesses not been assured their names would be kept secret.¹⁰⁴

According to Senator Butler's report, the Hawaiian Communist Party is a part of District No. 13 of the Communist Party of the United States of America. District headquarters are in San Francisco. In the islands there are nine branches on Oahu and one each on Big Island and Kauai. The Executive Committee, which directs party activities when the general convention is not in session, is composed of a delegate from each branch. This information, incidentally, tallies with that of the Izuka Pamphlet, as do many of the names of alleged Communists. Butler names the members of the Executive Committee in 1947, among whom is Jack Hall. Others include the editor of the Hawaii Star, a Communist-line, Japanese-language weekly, the territorial representative and director of public relations for the I.L.W.U., an I.L.W.U. research worker, a former University of Hawaii agricultural chemist, a secretary to an I.L.W.U. longshoreman's local, a Maui international representative of the I.L.W.U., and a national representative for a C.I.O maritime cook and steward union.

Until 1947 the Hawaiian Communist Party's activities, Butler asserts, were secret. In September of that year, at a district meeting in San Francisco, the Hawaiian representative announced that, in close cooperation with the I.L.W.U. leaders, the party planned to use the Democratic Party for political activities. The day following the announcement of

¹⁰⁴Butler Report, 2-3.

this policy, the Honolulu Star-Bulletin reported that the P.A.C. of the C.I.O., active in 1946 and early 1947, was greatly restricting its activities and recommending the Democratic Party to I.L.W.U. members. From September to March, charges Butler, the I.L.W.U. made every effort to gain control of the Democratic Party under the guidance of a recognized Communist and I.L.W.U. leader. Through an unscheduled election of precinct club officers and convention delegates in March, the I.L.W.U. got control of the territorial Democratic convention. Butler says that, as a result, "The former Democratic Party became the Communist apparatus in the Territory of Hawaii."¹⁰⁵ The convention in May found forty-one Communist Party members as delegates or alternates. Soon after the convention, Mrs. Victoria K. Holt, Democratic National Committee-woman announced in a radio address her candidacy for delegate to Congress, a move, she said, taken to combat Communist control of the Democratic Party. She charged that the ordinary members of both the Democratic Party and the I.L.W.U. faced the problem of ridding themselves of control by the same Communist group. Long an advocate of statehood, Mrs. Holt said that, because of Communist infiltration, ". . . I realize that we cannot expect statehood--that we should not have statehood--until we prove to ourselves and to the rest of the United States that we can solve the Communist problem."¹⁰⁶ She warned that the I.L.W.U., with its control of shipping, pineapple and sugar, could wreck island economy by a general strike. She further stated

¹⁰⁵Butler Report, 5; also see ibid., 3-5.

¹⁰⁶Butler Report, 7; see ibid., 5-7.

that Communist success in infiltrating the Democratic Party presented the distinct possibility that it could, under statehood, control elected officials, including the governor and courts. Under territorial status there would still be the safeguard of Congressional review. She concluded, "We must prove that we can control the Communist problem before we can expect Congress to grant us statehood."¹⁰⁷

Butler noted that several former Democratic Party members had indicated that the Communist-controlled I.L.W.U. group had a majority within the Democratic Party.

According to Butler, the I.L.W.U., with its approximately 35,000 members, had decided against a planned strike in favor of pooling all efforts toward gaining complete mastery of the Democratic Party, since 1948 was an election year.¹⁰⁸

Meanwhile the Communist Party came into the open in October, 1948, with headquarters in Honolulu. In a radio address the same month a Communist leader announced party support for breaking up of large estates for re-sale to small holders, revised immigration laws to allow naturalization for all immigrants, public ownership of utilities, and taxation on a basis of ability to pay. He further stated, "We support the granting of immediate statehood for Hawaii."¹⁰⁹ There is, incidentally, marked similarity between this platform and that of the P.A.C. in 1946.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 7.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., 8; see also ibid., 7. For statement of Communist Party program, see Hearings, H.R. 49 and S. 114, pp. 482-483.

Also described is the Hawaii Civil Liberties Committee, which all evidence indicates is Communist-controlled. It sponsored a lecture tour by a California Communist Party educational director in the islands. The lecture subject was Communism, and I.L.W.U. locals made considerable contributions to the funds solicited on the tour. This organization was supposedly started to get funds for defense of an island school teacher, suspended for alleged Communist activities.

Butler emphasized the vulnerability of Hawaii to shipping strikes. Not only did Hawaii suffer stoppage of food, clothing, and construction supplies, which could bring business to a halt, but strikes could cause widespread unemployment. In the tourist season such strikes brought tremendous losses to hotels and island transportation. In addition, they increased export handling charges, thus reducing greatly the margin of profit on such products as sugar. Butler charged that the I.L.W.U. had created a strike pattern in which the settlement of a Pacific coast strike would be followed by a Hawaiian shipping strike, in effect doubling the length of the strike for the islands. Further, by delaying tactics in negotiations and successive strikes, the San Francisco-directed labor activities would scarcely allow financial recovery from one crisis before initiating another. Butler saw here

. . . the familiar pattern of the Communist "softening up" by economic attrition before the big push for the final coup d'etat. If the Territory of Hawaii can be prostrated by this system of slow economic bleeding, it must ultimately become a social bog ripe for the final wrecking blow of Communist seizure.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰Ibid., 11; see also ibid., 8-10.

After naming Harry Bridges as the Communist leader of Hawaii and stating that there was a record of Communist activity in Hawaii as early as July, 1928, when reports were made to Moscow, Butler recommended the enforcement of the Smith Act of 1940, which provided heavy penalties for advocating overthrow of the United States Government.

Based upon Communist documents seized in the islands, there is the further charge that "The Kremlin in Moscow . . . regards Hawaii as one of its principal operating bases in the campaign for a Communist United States of America." It was Butler's conclusion that the Communist Party and the I.L.W.U. favored statehood because they could control the constitutional convention. After recommending Justice Department action against Communists, territorial action to suppress unlawful Communist activities and Congressional legislation to protect Hawaii from extreme I.L.W.U. activities, Butler proposed that ". . . statehood for Hawaii be deferred indefinitely, until communism in the Territory may be brought under effective control. . . ."lll

The arguments of those who do not feel that Communist activity in the territory, which they admit exists, is a valid basis for postponing statehood are well expressed in a letter from Edward R. Burke, counsel for the Hawaii Statehood Commission to Senator Butler. Parenthetically, this Commission was created by the 1947 territorial legislature to further the statehood movement. Its offices in Honolulu and Washington, D. C., as well as all its activities, are supported by public funds.

lll Ibid., 14, for quotations; see also, ibid., 12, 14-15.

Mr. Burke criticized Senator Butler's report as being inconsistent because it recommended delay of statehood on the grounds of possible Communist influence in the drafting of a state constitution while it praised the abilities, devotion to democratic principles and anti-Communist attitude of the majority of the Hawaiian people. Mr. Burke pointed out that any proposed constitution would have to be approved by the Hawaiian electorate and by the President. If Senator Butler believed in the loyalty and self-governing abilities of the Hawaiian people--why not trust their judgment to discover any Communist influences in such a constitution? He further criticized the report for describing Communist and I.L.W.U. moves through the Democratic Party for political control of the islands in the 1948 elections while failing to report the results of that election in which ". . . not a single follower of the Communist Party line was elected to any office of importance. . . ." ¹¹² Burke's basic ideas, and those of others who deny the validity of the Communist argument for delay, are: (1) There are adequate safeguards to prevent inclusion in any state constitution of provisions either Communist in nature or conducive to growth of Communist political power; (2) Hawaii has an informed, intelligent electorate which will insure the adoption of a constitution based wholly upon American political principles and which can handle adequately any threat of Communist infiltration; and (3) statehood would increase the power of the island people to meet the Communist threat. ¹¹³

¹¹²Butler Report, 1, 14-15; Burke to Butler, July 5, 1949, 3 (copy of letter furnished author by Hawaii Statehood Commission).

¹¹³Burke to Butler, July 5, 1949, 1-3.

The Statehood Commission made a compilation of editorial comment in seventeen states on the Butler report. Of the thirty-eight comments received, thirty were in disagreement with the conclusions reached by Butler. The central theme of these criticisms of the Butler report was that delay on the basis of Communism was unfair to the people of Hawaii, since the same threat existed on the mainland, and it was also an insult to the intelligence and loyalty of the Hawaiian people.

Pertinent is the question as to what the islands have done to combat Communism. The legislature was called into special session in July of 1949 to deal with the strike crisis. It might be pointed out here that this session authorized the Territory, through its harbor commission, to undertake stevedoring activities, a measure which relieved somewhat the effects of the strike and aided, according to the editor of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, in bringing the stevedoring companies and unions into agreement. But this legislative session also set up, by joint resolution, a non-partisan, fact-finding commission "on Communist and Other Subversive Activities." The results of this commission's investigation are not available, but its establishment exhibited an effort by the Territory to evaluate the Communist threat. It also needs emphasis that the strike of 1949 was settled through territorial measures without aid from the federal government.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴Riley H. Allen, Editor, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, to author, October 17, 1949; Raymond Coll, Editor, The Honolulu Advertiser, to author, November 2, 1949.

In September of 1949 the Town Meeting of the Air broadcast from Honolulu a debate on statehood. Both Senator Cain and Mr. Daniel G. Ridley, Hawaiian lawyer, emphasized Communism as a bar to immediate statehood. Mr. Ridley's arguments were based upon his belief that the large number of Hawaiian citizens of alien parentage were not as yet thoroughly enough indoctrinated in American traditions to be able to meet the threat of Communist propaganda and infiltration without the supervision implied in the territorial status. More important, in that it indicated the trend of Senatorial thinking, was the statement of Senator Cain that

Until Hawaii can convince--and this is your job--both houses of the Congress and the American people on the mainland that communism is no present or future menace to the social, economic, and political life of the islands, there will be no statehood for Hawaii. . . . This is the threat which must be done away with by the people of Hawaii before Hawaii has earned its full right of statehood.¹¹⁵

Delegate Farrington, in rebuttal, said that Hawaii was fully able to meet this threat, as she had in the 1946 elections. The editor of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin commented that neither Cain nor Ridley produced evidence that Communism was a "major threat." He also reiterated the arguments that Communism in Hawaii was a mainland import and that it was unfair to deny statehood on the basis of a nation-wide problem.¹¹⁶

Meanwhile plans went forward for the calling of a constitutional convention. This action was based upon the fact that fifteen of the

¹¹⁵Town Meeting Bulletin, 12; see also ibid., 6-8, 20, 22.

¹¹⁶Ibid., 13; Allen, loc. cit., October 17, 1949, 3.

twenty-nine territories admitted to the union had gained entrance through presenting completed state constitutions to the Congress with petitions for approval. From the information available, it is understood that this convention was held in April of 1950, but the results of its work are not known.¹¹⁷

In the spring of 1950 also, a subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities Committee held hearings in Hawaii with regard to Communist infiltration. At its first meeting, an American of Japanese ancestry, who was a member of the board of supervisors of the City and County of Honolulu and a delegate to the constitutional convention, admitted he was a former Communist. This admission demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the requirement exacted of delegates that they take an oath stating that they had not been members of subversive groups in the last five years. During the hearings Jack W. Hall and four others refused to deny or affirm affiliation with the Communist Party and there were plans for indictment of these men for contempt.¹¹⁸

Two late developments in the Communist situation were the report of a split in the Democratic Party and the admission by Secretary of Interior Osoar L. Chapman at a Senate hearing that there was Communist infiltration in the Hawaiian Democratic Party. The party split resulted

¹¹⁷George H. McLane, Executive Secretary, Hawaii Statehood Commission, to author, October 19, 1949, 2; Congressional Record, 81 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 95, No. 12, p. A356; ibid., 81 Congress, 2 Session, Vol. 96, No. 66, p. 4638.

¹¹⁸Ibid., No. 72, p. 5119; ibid., No. 74, p. 5227.

from the withdrawal of the old-line Democrats from the regular territorial convention when the left-wing members gained control. The regular Democrats then organized their own convention.¹¹⁹

As a possible indication of the trend of thinking in the islands regarding Communism, the following statements made last year are presented for comparison. The Honolulu Advertiser on May 31, 1949, was chiding the Washington, D. C., Post for its failure to view seriously the Communist influence in the islands: ". . . no matter how few Hawaii's Communists may be, they have a strong underground leadership here that is destroying the social and economic life of the islands. . . . Hawaii's life is at stake."¹²⁰

On November 2, 1949, the editor of the Honolulu Advertiser, a statehood supporter, wrote the following:

The dock workers strike which lasted from May until the middle of October to some extent cooled enthusiasm for Statehood. There undoubtedly is some infiltration of Communism in the Islands. Just to what extent this move prevails no one can be certain. There are two investigations underway, one set up by the Territorial Legislature and one by the Congressional Un-American Activities Committee. We will know more when their reports are made.¹²¹

This latter statement seems to indicate a calmer outlook on the situation.

The charges and counter-charges concerning Communist activities are difficult to assess. There seems, however, little doubt that the Communists have been very active in the Territory. Moreover, the Territory

¹¹⁹Ibid., No. 91, p. 6674.

¹²⁰Congressional Record, 81 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 95, No. 106, 3883.

¹²¹Coll, loc. cit., November 2, 1949.

is particularly vulnerable to Communist propaganda and activities on four counts: (1) a long tradition of grievances, real or imagined, against the powerful economic interests in the islands and the still-recent memory of strongly paternalistic employment policies--a wide opening for incitement of class hatred; (2) the lack of the people's experience in local government, i.e., experience in choosing and evaluating local leaders--a lack that seems to extend into the unions where the laboring man is new to the responsibilities and problems of union organization and management; (3) the presence of a heterogeneous population, offering great opportunities to the Communists for developing racial hatred and antagonisms, and (4) the economic vulnerability of the islands to strikes, either in shipping or the basic industries. Unfortunately, the islands present a tempting target to the Communists. Probably this factor has had much to do with Senate delay on statehood during the last three years. It seems very likely that Hawaii will be asked to meet a new qualification: indisputable proof of her ability to withstand any Communist threat to her economy, her government and her society.

The fourth main issue which has played a part in the post-war statehood movement is the tremendous emphasis upon the international significance of statehood. Supporters have been eager to point out the following ideas: (1) to grant statehood to Hawaii with its large Asiatic population would greatly enhance United States prestige among the Asiatic nations by effectively demonstrating American belief in the equality of all men; (2) to confer statehood would emphasize American support of the

principle of self-determination of peoples; (3) to act favorably upon statehood would be a powerful move in counteracting Communism in Asia; (4) to approve statehood would mean the entry into the national legislature of men conversant with the problems, cultures and conditions of the Pacific and the Far Eastern areas, as well as men with rich experience in inter-racial relations.

These are not only valid arguments but extremely tempting ones. They have been supported by the statement of Acting Secretary of State James E. Webb that statehood would ". . . serve to support American foreign policy and strengthen the position of the United States in international affairs."¹²²

Not only would statehood be a great advantage in international relations, but it most certainly would bolster the morale of the average American citizen. For it would be a reaffirmation not only of belief in democratic principles but of faith in the intrinsic strength of those principles. However, until the islands have demonstrated clearly their ability to cope with Communist tactics and until further investigation has furnished a somewhat clearer outline of the extent of Communist infiltration, statehood would seem to involve a calculated risk. Despite arguments to the contrary, an appointed executive and judiciary, as well as Congressional review of legislation, lend to the territorial status safeguards not present in a state government. Even if it were granted

122
p. 3597. Congressional Record, 81 Congress, 1 Session, Vol. 95, No. 98,

that a territory is as susceptible to Communist control as a state, a Communist coup in a territory would be far less damaging to United States prestige than Communist overthrow of a state government. And, as the leading democratic nation of the world, the United States has the responsibility of maintaining its prestige at a high level. In the cold war prestige has become a weapon.

Conclusions

A summary of this study of the statehood movement is in order. The years from Cook's discovery until annexation in 1898 constituted a period of intensive Americanization of the islands. As early as 1830 the American domination of the fur and sandalwood trade, the beginnings of American missionary endeavors, and the unofficial diplomacy of American naval officers had given an American slant to the sails of the Hawaiian ship of state. This was accomplished in the face of a strong British influence, a definite thrust by the French for an island foothold and an unofficial feeler by the Russians. From 1830 to 1890 internal Hawaiian development was marked by political growth in which American principles of government became basic through the influence of the missionary councillors of state. In the later years of the period there was a trend toward absolutism, intensified by growing native nationalism, a trend which reached its climax in the Revolution of 1893. Economic development included the rise and fall of the whaling trade, numerous experiments in agriculture, and the final emergence of a highly organized sugar industry as the dominant

factor in the economy. In all economic developments American leadership and capital predominated. In the field of international relations Hawaii maintained a precarious independence, made tenable mainly by the three-way rivalry of the British, French and Americans. The two greatest props to independence were Hawaii's policy of welcoming foreign commerce and economic enterprise and, after late 1842, almost continuous support by the United States through the Tyler Doctrine. Later came the Reciprocity Treaty and its renewal which, in effect, permanently united the Hawaiian economy to that of the United States. After the Revolution of 1893 had established the economically and politically dominant American interests in power, annexation was a foregone conclusion. The years from 1778 to 1898 thus had marked the development in Hawaii of a political system, economy and culture basically American. As a territory Hawaii had the problem of assimilating a large Asiatic population, of making the most of limited economic resources, and of coping with the social and economic problems created by a restrictive, paternalistic two-crop economy. Despite these handicaps, Hawaii by 1937 had not only met every previously required qualification for statehood, but her people had developed a strong desire for full membership in the union. The movement for statehood developed from the desire for a voice in the economic policies of the nation to which Hawaii contributed so much financially, the feeling that Hawaii should have an equal share of the benefits of national legislation and the desire for that political equality and dignity resident in full self-government. World War II not only proved Hawaii more worthy of

statehood but intensified the desire for that political status which would prevent the recurrence of extended military rule. Post-war Congressional investigators have, with few exceptions, unqualifiedly endorsed statehood, as have many national leaders. The only arguments outstanding against statehood have been a lingering doubt concerning the Asiatic element in Hawaii's population, the fairly potent, if invalid, objection to admitting non-contiguous territories to the union and the threat of Communist infiltration.

From the survey of those factors in Hawaiian history and development which are pertinent to the statehood question, the following conclusions have been reached:

1. By every standard of measurement previously established Hawaii qualifies for and deserves statehood.
2. Hawaii, despite a population representing many races and cultures is today in every respect an American community.
3. Statehood for Hawaii would not only enhance the international prestige of the United States but effectively demonstrate the vitality and strength of democratic principles of life and government.
4. Eventual statehood for Hawaii is practically a certainty.

However, due to the latitude granted Congress by the Constitution in setting up the qualifications for prospective states, the gradual development of the principle that new conditions exact new qualifications and the vulnerability of Hawaii's location, economy and social organization

to international stress and Communist infiltration, it is very likely that statehood will be deferred until two conditions prevail. First, there must be strong evidence that Hawaii can protect herself against subversive thrusts for economic or political control of the islands. Secondly, international conditions must be such that the change in government can be made without greatly affecting the nation at large or the security of Hawaii.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. PRIMARY SOURCES

Government Documents

Congressional Record, 43-81 Congresses. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1875-1950.

Department of the Interior, Annual Report of the Governor of Hawaii to the Secretary of the Interior, 1948. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949.

Department of the Interior, Hawaii and Its Race Problem. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1932.

Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1868-1899. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1869-1901.

Hearing, on H.R. 3034, House Committee on Territories, 74 Congress, 1 Session, May, 1935. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1935.

Hearing, Pursuant to H.R. 3643, House Committee on the Territories, 79 Congress, 1 Session. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1946.

House of Representatives Document No. 35, 27 Congress, 3 Session. Washington: Thomas Allen, 1842.

House of Representatives Executive Documents Nos. 47, 48, 70, 76, 79, 95, 112, 256, 53 Congress, 2 Session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1895.

House of Representatives Executive Document No. 282, 53 Congress, 3 Session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1895.

House of Representatives Report No. 92, 28 Congress, 2 Session. Washington: Blair and Rives, 1844-1845.

House of Representatives Report No. 108, 29 Congress, 1 Session. Washington: Ritchie and Heiss, 1845-1846.

House of Representatives Report No. 243, Part 2, 53 Congress, 2 Session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1894.

House of Representatives Report No. 1355, 55 Congress, 2 Session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899.

- House of Representatives Report No. 194, 80 Congress, 1 Session. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1947.
- House of Representatives Report No. 254, 81 Congress, 1 Session. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949.
- Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States, 26 Congress, 1 Session. Washington: Blair and Rives, 1840.
- Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States, 27 Congress, 3 Session. Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1843.
- Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 32 Congress, 1 Session. Washington: A. Boyd Hamilton, 1851-1852.
- Larode, Henry D., Chairman, "Report of the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Territories, United States House of Representatives, on Statehood for Hawaii," House of Representatives Report No. 254, 81 Congress, 1 Session, 13-21. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949.
- Malloy, William M., compiler, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909, I. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1910.
- Miller, David Hunter, editor, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, III. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1933.
- Richardson, James D., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, X. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899.
- Senate Executive Document No. 1, 32 Congress, 1 Session. Washington: A. Boyd Hamilton, 1852.
- Senate Executive Document No. 16, 33 Congress, 2 Session. Washington: A.O.P. Nicholson, 1855.
- Senate Executive Documents Nos. 76 and 77, 52 Congress, 2 Session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1893.
- Senate Executive Documents Nos. 46, 57, 65, 77, 85, 92, 103, 117, 156, 53 Congress, 2 Session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1895.
- Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 151, 75 Congress, 3 Session. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1938.

Senate Report No. 227, 53 Congress, 2 Session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1895.

Senate Report No. 681, 55 Congress, 2 Session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899.

Senate Report to Accompany H.R. 49, 80 Congress, 2 Session. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1948.

Statehood for Hawaii, Hearings, Pursuant to House Resolution 3034, Subcommittee of the Committee on Territories, 74 Congress, 1 Session. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1936.

Statehood for Hawaii, Hearings, Pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution 18, Joint Committee on Hawaii, 75 Congress, 2 Session. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1938.

Statehood for Hawaii, Hearings, Pursuant to House Resolution 236, Subcommittee of the Committee on the Territories, House of Representatives, 79 Congress, 2 Session. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1946.

Statehood for Hawaii, Hearings, on House Resolutions 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 1125 and 1758, Committee on Public Lands, House of Representatives, 80 Congress, 1 Session. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1947.

Statehood for Hawaii, Hearings, on H.R. 49 and S. 114, Subcommittee on Territories and Insular Affairs of the Committee on Public Lands, United States Senate, 80 Congress, 2 Session. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1948.

Statehood for Hawaii, Communist Penetration of the Hawaiian Islands, Report Relative to Investigation with Reference to H.R. 49, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, 80 Congress, 2 Session. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949.

Statehood for Hawaii, Hearings, on H.R. 49 and Related Bills, Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Possessions, Committee on Public Lands, House of Representatives, 81 Congress, 1 Session. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949.

Other Documents

Voyage to the Pacific Ocean; . . . Performed Under the Direction of Captains Cook, Clarke, and Gore, in the Years 1776, 1777, 1778, 1779, 1780, Compiled from the Various Accounts of That Voyage Hitherto Published, II. Philadelphia: Robert Desilver, 1818.

Newspaper

Knoxville News-Sentinel, August 2-4, 1949.

Periodicals and Pamphlets

- " ' Arry the Commy," Newsweek, XXXV (April 17, 1950), 29-30.
- Bowman, Sidney S., "Hawaii Knocks at the Door," The Forum, XCV (June, 1936), 350-353.
- Crawford, D. L., "Hawaii—Our Western Frontier," Review of Reviews, XCI-XCII (January, 1935), 58-60, 73-74.
- Davis, Theo. H., "The Hawaiian Revolution," The Nineteenth Century, XXXIII (May, 1893), 830-835.
- Furnas, J. C., "Will Hawaii Become a State?," The Saturday Evening Post, CCXVIII (April 6, 1946), 17, 133-134.
- "Hawaii," Newsweek, XXXII (October 4, 1948), 68-69.
- "Hawaii, 49th State?," Newsweek, XVI (November 18, 1940), 22.
- "Hawaii, Star for Good Behavior," Newsweek, XXX (July 14, 1947), 24-25.
- "Hawaii—Struggle for Control," Newsweek, XXIX (April 7, 1947), 26-27.
- "Hawaiian Statehood," The New Republic, CIV (January 27, 1941), 101.
- Izuka, Ichiro, The Truth About Communism in Hawaii. Honolulu: Privately printed, 1947.
- James, Daniel, "Hawaii's Claims to Statehood," The American Mercury, LXIII (September, 1946), 330-336.
- Lindsay, Forbes, "Hawaiian Problems of To-Day," The American Review of Reviews, XL (September, 1909), 305-312.
- Lodge, H. C., "Our Blundering Foreign Policy," The Forum, XIX (March, 1895), 8-17.
- Mahan, A. T., "Hawaii and Our Future Sea Power," The Forum, XV (March, 1893), 1-11.

Matheson, Walker, "Hawaii Pleads for Statehood," The North American Review, CCXLVII (Spring, 1939), 130-141.

Mobley, Radford, "Hawaii Looks Toward Statehood," The Christian Science Monitor Magazine (November 2, 1940), 7, 14.

O'Brien, Thomas Lawrence, The Plot to Sovietize Hawaii, Hilo, Hawaii: The Hawaii News Printshop, 1948.

Patterson, John, "The United States and Hawaiian Reciprocity, 1867-1870," The Pacific Historical Review, VII (March, 1938), 14-26.

"Should Hawaii Be Admitted to Statehood Now?," Town Meeting Bulletin, IV (October 4, 1949), 3-23.

Simpich, Frederick Jr., "Because It Rains on Hawaii," The National Geographic Magazine, XCVI (November, 1949), 571-610.

Taylor, Frank J., "Labor Moves in on Hawaii," The Saturday Evening Post, CCXIX (June 28, 1947), 24-25, 99-102.

"The Periscope," Newsweek, XXXV (May 8, 1950), 15; XXXV (June 19, 1950), 13; XXXVI (July 3, 1950); XXXVI (July 10, 1950), 17.

Van Alstyne, Richard W., editor, "Anglo-American Relations, 1853-1857," The American Historical Review, XLII (April, 1937), 491-500.

"Victory for Bridges," Newsweek, XXXIV (October 17, 1949), 28.

Wilbur, Ray Lyman, "Statehood for Hawaii," Atlantic Monthly, CLXVI (October, 1940), 494-497.

Speeches, Letters and Memoirs

Allen, Riley H., editor, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, letter to writer, October 17, 1949.

Burke, Edward G., Hawaii Statehood Commission, letter to Honorable Hugh Butler, July 5, 1949.

Coll, Raymond, editor, The Honolulu Advertiser, letter to writer, November 2, 1949.

Farrington, Joseph R., "Statehood for Hawaii," address at 16th Annual Forum of the New York Herald Tribune, October 20, 1947. Reprint: Hawaii Statehood Commission, n.d., 1-6.

- Foster, John W., Diplomatic Memoirs, II. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1909.
- Madden, Henry Miller, editor, "Letters of Sanford B. Dole and John W. Burgess," The Pacific Historical Review, V (March, 1936), 71-75.
- McLane, George H., Executive Secretary, Hawaii Statehood Commission, letter to writer, October 19, 1949.
- Nevins, Allan, editor, Letters of Grover Cleveland, 1850-1908. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1933.
- Volwiler, Albert T., editor, The Correspondence Between Benjamin Harrison and James G. Blaine, 1882-1893. Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1940.

II. SECONDARY SOURCES

General Works

- Bailey, Thomas A., A Diplomatic History of the American People. 3rd Edition. New York: F. S. Crofts and Company, 1947.
- Barber, Joseph, Jr., Hawaii: Restless Rampart. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1941.
- Carpenter, Francis, The Pacific: Its Lands and Peoples. New York: American Book Company, 1944.
- Chitwood, Oliver Perry, and Owsley, Frank Lawrence, A Short History of the American People, I. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1945.
- Clark, Blake, Hawaii the 49th State. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1947.
- Collier's World Atlas and Gazetteer. New York: P. F. Collier and Son Corporation, 1942.
- Coulter, John Wesley, "The Territory of Hawaii," in Haas, William H., editor, The American Empire, A Study of the Outlying Territories of the United States. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1940.
- Cressey, George B., Asia's Lands and Peoples. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1944.

- Furnas, J. C., Anatomy of Paradise. New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948.
- Hardy, Osgood, and Dumke, Glenn S., A History of the Pacific Area in Modern Times. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949.
- Kuykendall, Ralph S., A History of Hawaii. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1926.
- Kuykendall, Ralph S., and Day, A. Grove, Hawaii: A History. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948.

Monographs

- Adams, Randolph G., "Abel Parker Upshur," in Bemis, Samuel Flagg, editor, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, V. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927-1929.
- Bradley, Harold Whitman, The American Frontier in Hawaii: The Pioneers, 1789-1843. Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 1942.
- Brown, Philip Marshall, "Frederick T. Frelinghuysen," in Bemis, Samuel Flagg, editor, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, VIII. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927-1929.
- Burrows, Edwin G., Hawaiian Americans. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947.
- Chambers, Henry E., "Constitutional History of Hawaii," in Adams, Herbert B., editor, Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science, XIV. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1896.
- Dulebohn, George Roscoe, Principles of Foreign Policy Under the Cleveland Administrations. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1941.
- Duniway, Clyde A., "Daniel Webster," in Bemis, Samuel Flagg, editor, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, V. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927-1929.
- _____, "Daniel Webster," (2nd term), in Bemis, Samuel Flagg, editor, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, VI. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927-1929.
- DuPuy, William Atherton, Hawaii and Its Race Problem. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949.

- Ellis, William, Polynesian Researches, During A Residence of Nearly Eight Years in the Society and Sandwich Islands, IV. New York: J. and J. Harper, 1833.
- Frear, Walter Francis, Mark Twain and Hawaii. Chicago: Lakeside Press, 1947.
- Learned, H. Barrett, "William Learned Marcy," in Bemis, Samuel Flagg, editor, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, VI. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927-1929.
- Lind, Andrew W., Hawaii's Japanese, an Experiment in Democracy. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1946.
- Lockey, Joseph B., "James Gillespie Blaine," in Bemis, Samuel Flagg, editor, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, VIII. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927-1929.
- McElroy, Robert, Grover Cleveland The Man and Statesman, 2 Vols. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1923.
- Morgan, Theodore, Hawaii, A Century of Economic Change, 1778-1876. Harvard Economic Studies, LXXXIII. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1948.
- Nevins, Allan, Grover Cleveland, A Study in Courage. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1933.
- Pratt, Julius W., Expansionists of 1898. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1936.
- Rhodes, James F., The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, 1897-1909. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1923.
- Schuyler, Montgomery, "Walter Quintin Gresham," in Bemis, Samuel Flagg, editor, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, VIII. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927-1929.
- Sears, Louis Martin, "John Sherman," in Bemis, Samuel Flagg, editor, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, IX. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927-1929.
- Shippee, Lester B., "William Rufus Day," in Bemis, Samuel Flagg, editor, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, IX. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927-1929.
- Sioussat, St. George Leakin, "James Buchanan," in Bemis, Samuel Flagg, editor, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, V. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927-1929.

- _____, "John Caldwell Calhoun," in Bemis, Samuel Flagg, editor, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, V. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927-1929.
- Stevens, Sylvester Kirby, American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842-1898. Harrisburg: Archives Publishing Company of Pennsylvania, Inc., 1945.
- Temple, Henry W., "William H. Seward," in Bemis, Samuel Flagg, editor, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, VII. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927-1929.
- Vandercook, John W., King Cane. New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1939.
- Williams, Mary Wilhelmine, "John Middleton Clayton," in Bemis, Samuel Flagg, editor, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, VI. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927-1929.
- Williamson, James A., Cook and The Opening of the Pacific. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948.
- Willoughby, Franklin, Territories and Dependencies of the United States, Their Government and Administration. New York: The Century Company, 1905.

Periodicals

- Bailey, Thomas A., "Japan's Protest Against the Annexation of Hawaii," The Journal of Modern History, III (March, 1931), 46-61.
- _____, "The United States and Hawaii During the Spanish-American War," The American Historical Review, XXXVI (April, 1931), 552-560.
- Blue, George Verne, "The Project for a French Settlement in the Hawaiian Islands, 1824-1842," The Pacific Historical Review, II (March, 1933), 85-99.
- Bradley, Harold Whitman, "Review of the Books," The Pacific Historical Review, XI (March, 1942), 110-111.
- _____, "Review of the Books," The Pacific Historical Review, XIV (June, 1945), 232-233.
- Dozer, Donald Marquand, "The Opposition to Hawaiian Reciprocity, 1876-1888," The Pacific Historical Review, XIV (June, 1945), 157-183.

- Hooley, Osborne E., "Hawaiian Negotiations for Reciprocity, 1855-1857," The Pacific Historical Review, VII (June, 1938), 128-146.
- Kuykendall, Ralph S., "Early Hawaiian Commerical Development," The Pacific Historical Review, III (December, 1934), 365-385.
- Ladenson, Alex, "The Background of the Hawaiian-Japanese Labor Convention of 1886," The Pacific Historical Review, IX (December, 1940), 389-400.
- Pratt, Julius W., "The Hawaiian Revolution: A Re-Interpretation," The Pacific Historical Review, I (August, 1932), 273-294.
- Rowland, Donald, "The Establishment of the Republic of Hawaii," The Pacific Historical Review, IV (September, 1935), 201-220.
- _____, "The United States and the Contract Labor Question in Hawaii, 1862-1900," The Pacific Historical Review, II (September, 1933), 249-269.
- Russ, William A., Jr., "The Role of Sugar in Hawaiian Annexation," The Pacific Historical Review, XII (December, 1943), 339-350.
- Van Alstyne, Richard W., "Great Britain, The United States, and Hawaiian Independence, 1850-1855," The Pacific Historical Review, IV (March, 1935), 15-24.
- Weigle, Richard D., "Sugar and the Hawaiian Revolution," The Pacific Historical Review, XVI (February, 1947), 41-58.
- Zierer, Clifford M., "Review of the Books," The Pacific Historical Review, III (March, 1934), 96-98.